CVE-2023-43633 (GCVE-0-2023-43633)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2023-09-21 13:08
Modified
2024-09-24 17:00
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
CWE
Summary
On boot, the Pillar eve container checks for the existence and content of
“/config/GlobalConfig/global.json”.
If the file exists, it overrides the existing configuration on the device on boot.
This allows an attacker to change the system’s configuration, which also includes some
debug functions.
This could be used to unlock the ssh with custom “authorized_keys” via the
“debug.enable.ssh” key, similar to the “authorized_keys” finding that was noted before.
Other usages include unlocking the usb to enable the keyboard via the “debug.enable.usb”
key, allowing VNC access via the “app.allow.vnc” key, and more.
An attacker could easily enable these debug functionalities without triggering the “measured
boot” mechanism implemented by EVE OS, and without marking the device as “UUD”
(“Unknown Update Detected”).
This is because the “/config” partition is not protected by “measured boot”, it is mutable and it
is not encrypted in any way.
An attacker can gain full control over the device without changing the PCR values, thereby not
triggering the “measured boot” mechanism, and having full access to the vault.
Note:
This issue was partially fixed in these commits (after disclosure to Zededa), where the config
partition measurement was added to PCR13:
• aa3501d6c57206ced222c33aea15a9169d629141
• 5fef4d92e75838cc78010edaed5247dfbdae1889.
This issue was made viable in version 9.0.0 when the calculation was moved to PCR14 but it was not included in the measured boot.
References
► | URL | Tags | |||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Impacted products
Vendor | Product | Version | ||
---|---|---|---|---|
LF-Edge, Zededa | EVE OS |
Version: 0 Version: 9.0.0 |
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Sightings
Author | Source | Type | Date |
---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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