CVE-2022-50069 (GCVE-0-2022-50069)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2025-06-18 11:02
Modified
2025-06-18 11:02
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: BPF: Fix potential bad pointer dereference in bpf_sys_bpf() The bpf_sys_bpf() helper function allows an eBPF program to load another eBPF program from within the kernel. In this case the argument union bpf_attr pointer (as well as the insns and license pointers inside) is a kernel address instead of a userspace address (which is the case of a usual bpf() syscall). To make the memory copying process in the syscall work in both cases, bpfptr_t was introduced to wrap around the pointer and distinguish its origin. Specifically, when copying memory contents from a bpfptr_t, a copy_from_user() is performed in case of a userspace address and a memcpy() is performed for a kernel address. This can lead to problems because the in-kernel pointer is never checked for validity. The problem happens when an eBPF syscall program tries to call bpf_sys_bpf() to load a program but provides a bad insns pointer -- say 0xdeadbeef -- in the bpf_attr union. The helper calls __sys_bpf() which would then call bpf_prog_load() to load the program. bpf_prog_load() is responsible for copying the eBPF instructions to the newly allocated memory for the program; it creates a kernel bpfptr_t for insns and invokes copy_from_bpfptr(). Internally, all bpfptr_t operations are backed by the corresponding sockptr_t operations, which performs direct memcpy() on kernel pointers for copy_from/strncpy_from operations. Therefore, the code is always happy to dereference the bad pointer to trigger a un-handle-able page fault and in turn an oops. However, this is not supposed to happen because at that point the eBPF program is already verified and should not cause a memory error. Sample KASAN trace: [ 25.685056][ T228] ================================================================== [ 25.685680][ T228] BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30 [ 25.686210][ T228] Read of size 80 at addr 00000000deadbeef by task poc/228 [ 25.686732][ T228] [ 25.686893][ T228] CPU: 3 PID: 228 Comm: poc Not tainted 5.19.0-rc7 #7 [ 25.687375][ T228] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS d55cb5a 04/01/2014 [ 25.687991][ T228] Call Trace: [ 25.688223][ T228] <TASK> [ 25.688429][ T228] dump_stack_lvl+0x73/0x9e [ 25.688747][ T228] print_report+0xea/0x200 [ 25.689061][ T228] ? copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30 [ 25.689401][ T228] ? _printk+0x54/0x6e [ 25.689693][ T228] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x70/0xd0 [ 25.690071][ T228] ? copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30 [ 25.690412][ T228] kasan_report+0xb5/0xe0 [ 25.690716][ T228] ? copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30 [ 25.691059][ T228] kasan_check_range+0x2bd/0x2e0 [ 25.691405][ T228] ? copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30 [ 25.691734][ T228] memcpy+0x25/0x60 [ 25.692000][ T228] copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30 [ 25.692328][ T228] bpf_prog_load+0x604/0x9e0 [ 25.692653][ T228] ? cap_capable+0xb4/0xe0 [ 25.692956][ T228] ? security_capable+0x4f/0x70 [ 25.693324][ T228] __sys_bpf+0x3af/0x580 [ 25.693635][ T228] bpf_sys_bpf+0x45/0x240 [ 25.693937][ T228] bpf_prog_f0ec79a5a3caca46_bpf_func1+0xa2/0xbd [ 25.694394][ T228] bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu+0x2f/0xb0 [ 25.694756][ T228] bpf_prog_test_run_syscall+0x146/0x1c0 [ 25.695144][ T228] bpf_prog_test_run+0x172/0x190 [ 25.695487][ T228] __sys_bpf+0x2c5/0x580 [ 25.695776][ T228] __x64_sys_bpf+0x3a/0x50 [ 25.696084][ T228] do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 [ 25.696393][ T228] ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x50/0x60 [ 25.696815][ T228] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x36/0xa0 [ 25.697202][ T228] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x20/0x40 [ 25.697586][ T228] ? do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x90 [ 25.697899][ T228] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 25.698312][ T228] RIP: 0033:0x7f6d543fb759 [ 25.698624][ T228] Code: 08 5b 89 e8 5d c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d ---truncated---
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Version: af2ac3e13e45752af03c8a933f9b6e18841b128b
Version: af2ac3e13e45752af03c8a933f9b6e18841b128b
Version: af2ac3e13e45752af03c8a933f9b6e18841b128b
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{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "include/linux/bpfptr.h"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "41fd6cc88aaf7058b9dfc9c7a09cc80f99c8c830",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "af2ac3e13e45752af03c8a933f9b6e18841b128b",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "1f6db7148ed7382b336c5827af33b5d9e992630e",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "af2ac3e13e45752af03c8a933f9b6e18841b128b",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "e2dcac2f58f5a95ab092d1da237ffdc0da1832cf",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "af2ac3e13e45752af03c8a933f9b6e18841b128b",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "include/linux/bpfptr.h"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5.14"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "5.14",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "5.15.63",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "5.19.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "5.19.4",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.0",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "5.15.63",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "5.14",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "5.19.4",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "5.14",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.0",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "5.14",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBPF: Fix potential bad pointer dereference in bpf_sys_bpf()\n\nThe bpf_sys_bpf() helper function allows an eBPF program to load another\neBPF program from within the kernel. In this case the argument union\nbpf_attr pointer (as well as the insns and license pointers inside) is a\nkernel address instead of a userspace address (which is the case of a\nusual bpf() syscall). To make the memory copying process in the syscall\nwork in both cases, bpfptr_t was introduced to wrap around the pointer\nand distinguish its origin. Specifically, when copying memory contents\nfrom a bpfptr_t, a copy_from_user() is performed in case of a userspace\naddress and a memcpy() is performed for a kernel address.\n\nThis can lead to problems because the in-kernel pointer is never checked\nfor validity. The problem happens when an eBPF syscall program tries to\ncall bpf_sys_bpf() to load a program but provides a bad insns pointer --\nsay 0xdeadbeef -- in the bpf_attr union. The helper calls __sys_bpf()\nwhich would then call bpf_prog_load() to load the program.\nbpf_prog_load() is responsible for copying the eBPF instructions to the\nnewly allocated memory for the program; it creates a kernel bpfptr_t for\ninsns and invokes copy_from_bpfptr(). Internally, all bpfptr_t\noperations are backed by the corresponding sockptr_t operations, which\nperforms direct memcpy() on kernel pointers for copy_from/strncpy_from\noperations. Therefore, the code is always happy to dereference the bad\npointer to trigger a un-handle-able page fault and in turn an oops.\nHowever, this is not supposed to happen because at that point the eBPF\nprogram is already verified and should not cause a memory error.\n\nSample KASAN trace:\n\n[   25.685056][  T228] ==================================================================\n[   25.685680][  T228] BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30\n[   25.686210][  T228] Read of size 80 at addr 00000000deadbeef by task poc/228\n[   25.686732][  T228]\n[   25.686893][  T228] CPU: 3 PID: 228 Comm: poc Not tainted 5.19.0-rc7 #7\n[   25.687375][  T228] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS d55cb5a 04/01/2014\n[   25.687991][  T228] Call Trace:\n[   25.688223][  T228]  \u003cTASK\u003e\n[   25.688429][  T228]  dump_stack_lvl+0x73/0x9e\n[   25.688747][  T228]  print_report+0xea/0x200\n[   25.689061][  T228]  ? copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30\n[   25.689401][  T228]  ? _printk+0x54/0x6e\n[   25.689693][  T228]  ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x70/0xd0\n[   25.690071][  T228]  ? copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30\n[   25.690412][  T228]  kasan_report+0xb5/0xe0\n[   25.690716][  T228]  ? copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30\n[   25.691059][  T228]  kasan_check_range+0x2bd/0x2e0\n[   25.691405][  T228]  ? copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30\n[   25.691734][  T228]  memcpy+0x25/0x60\n[   25.692000][  T228]  copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30\n[   25.692328][  T228]  bpf_prog_load+0x604/0x9e0\n[   25.692653][  T228]  ? cap_capable+0xb4/0xe0\n[   25.692956][  T228]  ? security_capable+0x4f/0x70\n[   25.693324][  T228]  __sys_bpf+0x3af/0x580\n[   25.693635][  T228]  bpf_sys_bpf+0x45/0x240\n[   25.693937][  T228]  bpf_prog_f0ec79a5a3caca46_bpf_func1+0xa2/0xbd\n[   25.694394][  T228]  bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu+0x2f/0xb0\n[   25.694756][  T228]  bpf_prog_test_run_syscall+0x146/0x1c0\n[   25.695144][  T228]  bpf_prog_test_run+0x172/0x190\n[   25.695487][  T228]  __sys_bpf+0x2c5/0x580\n[   25.695776][  T228]  __x64_sys_bpf+0x3a/0x50\n[   25.696084][  T228]  do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90\n[   25.696393][  T228]  ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x50/0x60\n[   25.696815][  T228]  ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x36/0xa0\n[   25.697202][  T228]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x20/0x40\n[   25.697586][  T228]  ? do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x90\n[   25.697899][  T228]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd\n[   25.698312][  T228] RIP: 0033:0x7f6d543fb759\n[   25.698624][  T228] Code: 08 5b 89 e8 5d c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d \n---truncated---"
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2025-06-18T11:02:14.440Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/41fd6cc88aaf7058b9dfc9c7a09cc80f99c8c830"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1f6db7148ed7382b336c5827af33b5d9e992630e"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e2dcac2f58f5a95ab092d1da237ffdc0da1832cf"
        }
      ],
      "title": "BPF: Fix potential bad pointer dereference in bpf_sys_bpf()",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2022-50069",
    "datePublished": "2025-06-18T11:02:14.440Z",
    "dateReserved": "2025-06-18T10:57:27.406Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2025-06-18T11:02:14.440Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.1",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "nvd": "{\"cve\":{\"id\":\"CVE-2022-50069\",\"sourceIdentifier\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"published\":\"2025-06-18T11:15:35.733\",\"lastModified\":\"2025-06-18T13:47:40.833\",\"vulnStatus\":\"Awaiting Analysis\",\"cveTags\":[],\"descriptions\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nBPF: Fix potential bad pointer dereference in bpf_sys_bpf()\\n\\nThe bpf_sys_bpf() helper function allows an eBPF program to load another\\neBPF program from within the kernel. In this case the argument union\\nbpf_attr pointer (as well as the insns and license pointers inside) is a\\nkernel address instead of a userspace address (which is the case of a\\nusual bpf() syscall). To make the memory copying process in the syscall\\nwork in both cases, bpfptr_t was introduced to wrap around the pointer\\nand distinguish its origin. Specifically, when copying memory contents\\nfrom a bpfptr_t, a copy_from_user() is performed in case of a userspace\\naddress and a memcpy() is performed for a kernel address.\\n\\nThis can lead to problems because the in-kernel pointer is never checked\\nfor validity. The problem happens when an eBPF syscall program tries to\\ncall bpf_sys_bpf() to load a program but provides a bad insns pointer --\\nsay 0xdeadbeef -- in the bpf_attr union. The helper calls __sys_bpf()\\nwhich would then call bpf_prog_load() to load the program.\\nbpf_prog_load() is responsible for copying the eBPF instructions to the\\nnewly allocated memory for the program; it creates a kernel bpfptr_t for\\ninsns and invokes copy_from_bpfptr(). Internally, all bpfptr_t\\noperations are backed by the corresponding sockptr_t operations, which\\nperforms direct memcpy() on kernel pointers for copy_from/strncpy_from\\noperations. Therefore, the code is always happy to dereference the bad\\npointer to trigger a un-handle-able page fault and in turn an oops.\\nHowever, this is not supposed to happen because at that point the eBPF\\nprogram is already verified and should not cause a memory error.\\n\\nSample KASAN trace:\\n\\n[   25.685056][  T228] ==================================================================\\n[   25.685680][  T228] BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30\\n[   25.686210][  T228] Read of size 80 at addr 00000000deadbeef by task poc/228\\n[   25.686732][  T228]\\n[   25.686893][  T228] CPU: 3 PID: 228 Comm: poc Not tainted 5.19.0-rc7 #7\\n[   25.687375][  T228] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS d55cb5a 04/01/2014\\n[   25.687991][  T228] Call Trace:\\n[   25.688223][  T228]  \u003cTASK\u003e\\n[   25.688429][  T228]  dump_stack_lvl+0x73/0x9e\\n[   25.688747][  T228]  print_report+0xea/0x200\\n[   25.689061][  T228]  ? copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30\\n[   25.689401][  T228]  ? _printk+0x54/0x6e\\n[   25.689693][  T228]  ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x70/0xd0\\n[   25.690071][  T228]  ? copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30\\n[   25.690412][  T228]  kasan_report+0xb5/0xe0\\n[   25.690716][  T228]  ? copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30\\n[   25.691059][  T228]  kasan_check_range+0x2bd/0x2e0\\n[   25.691405][  T228]  ? copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30\\n[   25.691734][  T228]  memcpy+0x25/0x60\\n[   25.692000][  T228]  copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30\\n[   25.692328][  T228]  bpf_prog_load+0x604/0x9e0\\n[   25.692653][  T228]  ? cap_capable+0xb4/0xe0\\n[   25.692956][  T228]  ? security_capable+0x4f/0x70\\n[   25.693324][  T228]  __sys_bpf+0x3af/0x580\\n[   25.693635][  T228]  bpf_sys_bpf+0x45/0x240\\n[   25.693937][  T228]  bpf_prog_f0ec79a5a3caca46_bpf_func1+0xa2/0xbd\\n[   25.694394][  T228]  bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu+0x2f/0xb0\\n[   25.694756][  T228]  bpf_prog_test_run_syscall+0x146/0x1c0\\n[   25.695144][  T228]  bpf_prog_test_run+0x172/0x190\\n[   25.695487][  T228]  __sys_bpf+0x2c5/0x580\\n[   25.695776][  T228]  __x64_sys_bpf+0x3a/0x50\\n[   25.696084][  T228]  do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90\\n[   25.696393][  T228]  ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x50/0x60\\n[   25.696815][  T228]  ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x36/0xa0\\n[   25.697202][  T228]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x20/0x40\\n[   25.697586][  T228]  ? do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x90\\n[   25.697899][  T228]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd\\n[   25.698312][  T228] RIP: 0033:0x7f6d543fb759\\n[   25.698624][  T228] Code: 08 5b 89 e8 5d c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d \\n---truncated---\"},{\"lang\":\"es\",\"value\":\"En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: BPF: Arreglar posible desreferencia de puntero incorrecta en bpf_sys_bpf() La funci\u00f3n auxiliar bpf_sys_bpf() permite que un programa eBPF cargue otro programa eBPF desde dentro del kernel. En este caso, el puntero de uni\u00f3n de argumentos bpf_attr (as\u00ed como los punteros insns y license dentro) es una direcci\u00f3n de kernel en lugar de una direcci\u00f3n de espacio de usuario (que es el caso de una llamada al sistema bpf() habitual). Para hacer que el proceso de copia de memoria en la llamada al sistema funcione en ambos casos, se introdujo bpfptr_t para envolver el puntero y distinguir su origen. Espec\u00edficamente, al copiar contenido de memoria desde un bpfptr_t, se realiza un copy_from_user() en el caso de una direcci\u00f3n de espacio de usuario y se realiza un memcpy() para una direcci\u00f3n de kernel. Esto puede conducir a problemas porque el puntero en el kernel nunca se comprueba para su validez. El problema ocurre cuando un programa de llamada al sistema eBPF intenta llamar a bpf_sys_bpf() para cargar un programa, pero proporciona un puntero insns incorrecto (por ejemplo, 0xdeadbeef) en la uni\u00f3n bpf_attr. El asistente llama a __sys_bpf(), que a su vez llama a bpf_prog_load() para cargar el programa. bpf_prog_load() se encarga de copiar las instrucciones eBPF a la memoria reci\u00e9n asignada al programa; crea un bpfptr_t de kernel para insns e invoca copy_from_bpfptr(). Internamente, todas las operaciones bpfptr_t est\u00e1n respaldadas por las operaciones sockptr_t correspondientes, que ejecutan memcpy() directamente en los punteros de kernel para las operaciones copy_from/strncpy_from. Por lo tanto, el c\u00f3digo siempre desreferencia el puntero incorrecto para generar un fallo de p\u00e1gina imposible de controlar y, en consecuencia, un error. Sin embargo, esto no deber\u00eda suceder porque en ese momento el programa eBPF ya est\u00e1 verificado y no deber\u00eda causar un error de memoria. Ejemplo de seguimiento de KASAN: [ 25.685056][ T228] ======================================================================= [ 25.685680][ T228] ERROR: KASAN: acceso a memoria de usuario en copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30 [ 25.686210][ T228] Lectura de tama\u00f1o 80 en la direcci\u00f3n 00000000deadbeef por la tarea poc/228 [ 25.686732][ T228] [ 25.686893][ T228] CPU: 3 PID: 228 Comm: poc No contaminado 5.19.0-rc7 #7 [ 25.687375][ T228] Nombre del hardware: PC est\u00e1ndar QEMU (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS d55cb5a 01/04/2014 [ 25.687991][ T228] Seguimiento de llamadas: [ 25.688223][ T228]  [ 25.688429][ T228] dump_stack_lvl+0x73/0x9e [ 25.688747][ T228] print_report+0xea/0x200 [ 25.689061][ T228] ? copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30 [ 25.689401][ T228] ? _printk+0x54/0x6e [ 25.689693][ T228] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x70/0xd0 [ 25.690071][ T228] ? copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30 [ 25.690412][ T228] kasan_report+0xb5/0xe0 [ 25.690716][ T228] ? copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30 [ 25.691059][ T228] kasan_check_range+0x2bd/0x2e0 [ 25.691405][ T228] ? copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30 [ 25.691734][ T228] memcpy+0x25/0x60 [ 25.692000][ T228] copy_from_bpfptr+0x21/0x30 [ 25.692328][ T228] bpf_prog_load+0x604/0x9e0 [ 25.692653][ T228] ? cap_capable+0xb4/0xe0 [ 25.692956][ T228] ? security_capable+0x4f/0x70 [ 25.693324][ T228] __sys_bpf+0x3af/0x580 [ 25.693635][ T228] bpf_sys_bpf+0x45/0x240 [ 25.693937][ T228] bpf_prog_f0ec79a5a3caca46_bpf_func1+0xa2/0xbd [ 25.694394][ T228] bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu+0x2f/0xb0 [ 25.694756][ T228] bpf_prog_test_run_syscall+0x146/0x1c0 [ 25.695144][ T228] bpf_prog_test_run+0x172/0x190 [ 25.695487][ T228] __sys_bpf+0x2c5/0x580 [ 25.695776][ T228] __x64_sys_bpf+0x3a/0x50 [ 25.696084][ T228] do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 [ 25.696393][ T228] ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x50/0x60 [ 25.696815][ T228] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x36/0xa0 [ 25.697202][ T228] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x20/0x40 [ 25.697586][ T228] ? do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x90 [ 25.697899][ T228] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 25.698312][ T228] RIP: 0033:0x7f6d543fb759 [ 25.698624][ T228] Code: 08 5b 89 e8 5d c3 66 ---truncado---\"}],\"metrics\":{},\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1f6db7148ed7382b336c5827af33b5d9e992630e\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/41fd6cc88aaf7058b9dfc9c7a09cc80f99c8c830\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e2dcac2f58f5a95ab092d1da237ffdc0da1832cf\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"}]}}"
  }
}


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