fkie_cve-2022-48818
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2024-07-16 12:15
Modified
2024-11-21 07:34
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: don't use devres for mdiobus
As explained in commits:
74b6d7d13307 ("net: dsa: realtek: register the MDIO bus under devres")
5135e96a3dd2 ("net: dsa: don't allocate the slave_mii_bus using devres")
mdiobus_free() will panic when called from devm_mdiobus_free() <-
devres_release_all() <- __device_release_driver(), and that mdiobus was
not previously unregistered.
The mv88e6xxx is an MDIO device, so the initial set of constraints that
I thought would cause this (I2C or SPI buses which call ->remove on
->shutdown) do not apply. But there is one more which applies here.
If the DSA master itself is on a bus that calls ->remove from ->shutdown
(like dpaa2-eth, which is on the fsl-mc bus), there is a device link
between the switch and the DSA master, and device_links_unbind_consumers()
will unbind the Marvell switch driver on shutdown.
systemd-shutdown[1]: Powering off.
mv88e6085 0x0000000008b96000:00 sw_gl0: Link is Down
fsl-mc dpbp.9: Removing from iommu group 7
fsl-mc dpbp.8: Removing from iommu group 7
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:677!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd-shutdow Not tainted 5.16.5-00040-gdc05f73788e5 #15
pc : mdiobus_free+0x44/0x50
lr : devm_mdiobus_free+0x10/0x20
Call trace:
mdiobus_free+0x44/0x50
devm_mdiobus_free+0x10/0x20
devres_release_all+0xa0/0x100
__device_release_driver+0x190/0x220
device_release_driver_internal+0xac/0xb0
device_links_unbind_consumers+0xd4/0x100
__device_release_driver+0x4c/0x220
device_release_driver_internal+0xac/0xb0
device_links_unbind_consumers+0xd4/0x100
__device_release_driver+0x94/0x220
device_release_driver+0x28/0x40
bus_remove_device+0x118/0x124
device_del+0x174/0x420
fsl_mc_device_remove+0x24/0x40
__fsl_mc_device_remove+0xc/0x20
device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
dprc_remove+0x90/0xb0
fsl_mc_driver_remove+0x20/0x5c
__device_release_driver+0x21c/0x220
device_release_driver+0x28/0x40
bus_remove_device+0x118/0x124
device_del+0x174/0x420
fsl_mc_bus_remove+0x80/0x100
fsl_mc_bus_shutdown+0xc/0x1c
platform_shutdown+0x20/0x30
device_shutdown+0x154/0x330
kernel_power_off+0x34/0x6c
__do_sys_reboot+0x15c/0x250
__arm64_sys_reboot+0x20/0x30
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x4c/0xe0
do_el0_svc+0x4c/0x150
el0_svc+0x24/0xb0
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa8/0xb0
el0t_64_sync+0x178/0x17c
So the same treatment must be applied to all DSA switch drivers, which
is: either use devres for both the mdiobus allocation and registration,
or don't use devres at all.
The Marvell driver already has a good structure for mdiobus removal, so
just plug in mdiobus_free and get rid of devres.
References
Impacted products
Vendor | Product | Version |
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{ "cveTags": [], "descriptions": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: dsa: mv88e6xxx: don\u0027t use devres for mdiobus\n\nAs explained in commits:\n74b6d7d13307 (\"net: dsa: realtek: register the MDIO bus under devres\")\n5135e96a3dd2 (\"net: dsa: don\u0027t allocate the slave_mii_bus using devres\")\n\nmdiobus_free() will panic when called from devm_mdiobus_free() \u003c-\ndevres_release_all() \u003c- __device_release_driver(), and that mdiobus was\nnot previously unregistered.\n\nThe mv88e6xxx is an MDIO device, so the initial set of constraints that\nI thought would cause this (I2C or SPI buses which call -\u003eremove on\n-\u003eshutdown) do not apply. But there is one more which applies here.\n\nIf the DSA master itself is on a bus that calls -\u003eremove from -\u003eshutdown\n(like dpaa2-eth, which is on the fsl-mc bus), there is a device link\nbetween the switch and the DSA master, and device_links_unbind_consumers()\nwill unbind the Marvell switch driver on shutdown.\n\nsystemd-shutdown[1]: Powering off.\nmv88e6085 0x0000000008b96000:00 sw_gl0: Link is Down\nfsl-mc dpbp.9: Removing from iommu group 7\nfsl-mc dpbp.8: Removing from iommu group 7\n------------[ cut here ]------------\nkernel BUG at drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:677!\nInternal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP\nModules linked in:\nCPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd-shutdow Not tainted 5.16.5-00040-gdc05f73788e5 #15\npc : mdiobus_free+0x44/0x50\nlr : devm_mdiobus_free+0x10/0x20\nCall trace:\n mdiobus_free+0x44/0x50\n devm_mdiobus_free+0x10/0x20\n devres_release_all+0xa0/0x100\n __device_release_driver+0x190/0x220\n device_release_driver_internal+0xac/0xb0\n device_links_unbind_consumers+0xd4/0x100\n __device_release_driver+0x4c/0x220\n device_release_driver_internal+0xac/0xb0\n device_links_unbind_consumers+0xd4/0x100\n __device_release_driver+0x94/0x220\n device_release_driver+0x28/0x40\n bus_remove_device+0x118/0x124\n device_del+0x174/0x420\n fsl_mc_device_remove+0x24/0x40\n __fsl_mc_device_remove+0xc/0x20\n device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0\n dprc_remove+0x90/0xb0\n fsl_mc_driver_remove+0x20/0x5c\n __device_release_driver+0x21c/0x220\n device_release_driver+0x28/0x40\n bus_remove_device+0x118/0x124\n device_del+0x174/0x420\n fsl_mc_bus_remove+0x80/0x100\n fsl_mc_bus_shutdown+0xc/0x1c\n platform_shutdown+0x20/0x30\n device_shutdown+0x154/0x330\n kernel_power_off+0x34/0x6c\n __do_sys_reboot+0x15c/0x250\n __arm64_sys_reboot+0x20/0x30\n invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x4c/0xe0\n do_el0_svc+0x4c/0x150\n el0_svc+0x24/0xb0\n el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa8/0xb0\n el0t_64_sync+0x178/0x17c\n\nSo the same treatment must be applied to all DSA switch drivers, which\nis: either use devres for both the mdiobus allocation and registration,\nor don\u0027t use devres at all.\n\nThe Marvell driver already has a good structure for mdiobus removal, so\njust plug in mdiobus_free and get rid of devres." }, { "lang": "es", "value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: no use devres para mdiobus Como se explica en los commits: 74b6d7d13307 (\"net: dsa: realtek: registre el bus MDIO en devres\") 5135e96a3dd2 (\" net: dsa: no asigne el esclavo_mii_bus usando devres\") mdiobus_free() entrar\u00e1 en p\u00e1nico cuando se llame desde devm_mdiobus_free() \u0026lt;- devres_release_all() \u0026lt;- __device_release_driver(), y ese mdiobus no fue anulado previamente. El mv88e6xxx es un dispositivo MDIO, por lo que el conjunto inicial de restricciones que pens\u00e9 que causar\u00eda esto (buses I2C o SPI que llaman -\u0026gt;eliminar en -\u0026gt;apagar) no se aplican. Pero hay algo m\u00e1s que se aplica aqu\u00ed. Si el maestro DSA est\u00e1 en un bus que llama -\u0026gt;remove from -\u0026gt;shutdown (como dpaa2-eth, que est\u00e1 en el bus fsl-mc), hay un enlace de dispositivo entre el conmutador y el maestro DSA, y device_links_unbind_consumers( ) desvincular\u00e1 el controlador del interruptor Marvell al apagarlo. systemd-shutdown[1]: Apagando. mv88e6085 0x0000000008b96000:00 sw_gl0: El enlace est\u00e1 inactivo fsl-mc dpbp.9: Eliminando del grupo iommu 7 fsl-mc dpbp.8: Eliminando del grupo iommu 7 ------------[ cortar aqu\u00ed ]- ----------- \u00a1ERROR del kernel en drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:677! Error interno: Ups - ERROR: 0 [#1] PREEMPT M\u00f3dulos SMP vinculados en: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd-shutdow Not tainted 5.16.5-00040-gdc05f73788e5 #15 pc: mdiobus_free+0x44/0x50 lr: devm_mdiobus_free +0x10/0x20 Rastreo de llamadas: mdiobus_free+0x44/0x50 devm_mdiobus_free+0x10/0x20 devres_release_all+0xa0/0x100 __device_release_driver+0x190/0x220 device_release_driver_internal+0xac/0xb0 device_links_unbind_consumers+0xd4/0x 100 __device_release_driver+0x4c/0x220 dispositivo_release_driver_internal+0xac/0xb0 device_links_unbind_consumers+0xd4 /0x100 __device_release_driver+0x94/0x220 dispositivo_release_driver+0x28/0x40 bus_remove_device+0x118/0x124 device_del+0x174/0x420 fsl_mc_device_remove+0x24/0x40 __fsl_mc_device_remove+0xc/0x20 _for_each_child+0x58/0xa0 dprc_remove+0x90/0xb0 fsl_mc_driver_remove+0x20/0x5c __device_release_driver+0x21c /0x220 dispositivo_liberaci\u00f3n_controlador+0x28/0x40 bus_remove_device+0x118/0x124 dispositivo_del+0x174/0x420 fsl_mc_bus_remove+0x80/0x100 fsl_mc_bus_shutdown+0xc/0x1c plataforma_apagado+0x20/0x30 54/0x330 kernel_power_off+0x34/0x6c __do_sys_reboot+0x15c/0x250 __arm64_sys_reboot+0x20 /0x30 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x4c/0xe0 do_el0_svc+0x4c/0x150 el0_svc+0x24/0xb0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa8/0xb0 el0t_64_sync+0x178/0x17c Por lo tanto, se debe aplicar el mismo tratamiento a todos los controladores de conmutador DSA, que es: usar devres tanto para la asignaci\u00f3n como para el registro de mdiobus, o no utilice devres en absoluto. El controlador Marvell ya tiene una buena estructura para la eliminaci\u00f3n de mdiobus, as\u00ed que simplemente conecte mdiobus_free y elimine los devres." } ], "id": "CVE-2022-48818", "lastModified": "2024-11-21T07:34:08.730", "metrics": {}, "published": "2024-07-16T12:15:05.813", "references": [ { "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1b451c3994a2d322f8e55032c62c8b47b7d95900" }, { "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8b626d45127d6f5ada7d815b83cfdc09e8cb1394" }, { "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8ccebe77df6e0d88c72ba5e69cf1835927e53b6c" }, { "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f53a2ce893b2c7884ef94471f170839170a4eba0" }, { "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1b451c3994a2d322f8e55032c62c8b47b7d95900" }, { "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8b626d45127d6f5ada7d815b83cfdc09e8cb1394" }, { "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8ccebe77df6e0d88c72ba5e69cf1835927e53b6c" }, { "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f53a2ce893b2c7884ef94471f170839170a4eba0" } ], "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis" }
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Sightings
Author | Source | Type | Date |
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Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
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- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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