fkie_cve-2022-48925
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2024-08-22 02:15
Modified
2024-08-23 02:07
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/cma: Do not change route.addr.src_addr outside state checks If the state is not idle then resolve_prepare_src() should immediately fail and no change to global state should happen. However, it unconditionally overwrites the src_addr trying to build a temporary any address. For instance if the state is already RDMA_CM_LISTEN then this will corrupt the src_addr and would cause the test in cma_cancel_operation(): if (cma_any_addr(cma_src_addr(id_priv)) && !id_priv->cma_dev) Which would manifest as this trace from syzkaller: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __list_add_valid+0x93/0xa0 lib/list_debug.c:26 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881546491e0 by task syz-executor.1/32204 CPU: 1 PID: 32204 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc8-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline] dump_stack+0x141/0x1d7 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x5b/0x2f8 mm/kasan/report.c:232 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:399 [inline] kasan_report.cold+0x7c/0xd8 mm/kasan/report.c:416 __list_add_valid+0x93/0xa0 lib/list_debug.c:26 __list_add include/linux/list.h:67 [inline] list_add_tail include/linux/list.h:100 [inline] cma_listen_on_all drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:2557 [inline] rdma_listen+0x787/0xe00 drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:3751 ucma_listen+0x16a/0x210 drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1102 ucma_write+0x259/0x350 drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1732 vfs_write+0x28e/0xa30 fs/read_write.c:603 ksys_write+0x1ee/0x250 fs/read_write.c:658 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae This is indicating that an rdma_id_private was destroyed without doing cma_cancel_listens(). Instead of trying to re-use the src_addr memory to indirectly create an any address derived from the dst build one explicitly on the stack and bind to that as any other normal flow would do. rdma_bind_addr() will copy it over the src_addr once it knows the state is valid. This is similar to commit bc0bdc5afaa7 ("RDMA/cma: Do not change route.addr.src_addr.ss_family")
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
linux linux_kernel *
linux linux_kernel *
linux linux_kernel *



{
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "B515B8BE-A929-4F26-A3AE-065750435804",
              "versionEndExcluding": "5.10.103",
              "versionStartIncluding": "5.10",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "9AB342AE-A62E-4947-A6EA-511453062B2B",
              "versionEndExcluding": "5.15.26",
              "versionStartIncluding": "5.11",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "C76BAB21-7F23-4AD8-A25F-CA7B262A2698",
              "versionEndExcluding": "5.16.12",
              "versionStartIncluding": "5.16",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nRDMA/cma: Do not change route.addr.src_addr outside state checks\n\nIf the state is not idle then resolve_prepare_src() should immediately\nfail and no change to global state should happen. However, it\nunconditionally overwrites the src_addr trying to build a temporary any\naddress.\n\nFor instance if the state is already RDMA_CM_LISTEN then this will corrupt\nthe src_addr and would cause the test in cma_cancel_operation():\n\n           if (cma_any_addr(cma_src_addr(id_priv)) \u0026\u0026 !id_priv-\u003ecma_dev)\n\nWhich would manifest as this trace from syzkaller:\n\n  BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __list_add_valid+0x93/0xa0 lib/list_debug.c:26\n  Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881546491e0 by task syz-executor.1/32204\n\n  CPU: 1 PID: 32204 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc8-syzkaller #0\n  Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011\n  Call Trace:\n   __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]\n   dump_stack+0x141/0x1d7 lib/dump_stack.c:120\n   print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x5b/0x2f8 mm/kasan/report.c:232\n   __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:399 [inline]\n   kasan_report.cold+0x7c/0xd8 mm/kasan/report.c:416\n   __list_add_valid+0x93/0xa0 lib/list_debug.c:26\n   __list_add include/linux/list.h:67 [inline]\n   list_add_tail include/linux/list.h:100 [inline]\n   cma_listen_on_all drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:2557 [inline]\n   rdma_listen+0x787/0xe00 drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:3751\n   ucma_listen+0x16a/0x210 drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1102\n   ucma_write+0x259/0x350 drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1732\n   vfs_write+0x28e/0xa30 fs/read_write.c:603\n   ksys_write+0x1ee/0x250 fs/read_write.c:658\n   do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46\n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae\n\nThis is indicating that an rdma_id_private was destroyed without doing\ncma_cancel_listens().\n\nInstead of trying to re-use the src_addr memory to indirectly create an\nany address derived from the dst build one explicitly on the stack and\nbind to that as any other normal flow would do. rdma_bind_addr() will copy\nit over the src_addr once it knows the state is valid.\n\nThis is similar to commit bc0bdc5afaa7 (\"RDMA/cma: Do not change\nroute.addr.src_addr.ss_family\")"
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "En el kernel de Linux, se resolvi\u00f3 la siguiente vulnerabilidad: RDMA/cma: no cambie route.addr.src_addr fuera de las comprobaciones de estado. Si el estado no est\u00e1 inactivo, resolve_prepare_src() deber\u00eda fallar inmediatamente y no deber\u00eda ocurrir ning\u00fan cambio en el estado global. Sin embargo, sobrescribe incondicionalmente src_addr al intentar crear una direcci\u00f3n temporal. Por ejemplo, si el estado ya es RDMA_CM_LISTEN, esto da\u00f1ar\u00e1 src_addr y provocar\u00e1 la prueba en cma_cancel_operation(): if (cma_any_addr(cma_src_addr(id_priv)) \u0026amp;\u0026amp; !id_priv-\u0026gt;cma_dev) Lo que se manifestar\u00eda como este rastro de syzkaller: ERROR : KASAN: use-after-free en __list_add_valid+0x93/0xa0 lib/list_debug.c:26 Lectura de tama\u00f1o 8 en addr ffff8881546491e0 por tarea syz-executor.1/32204 CPU: 1 PID: 32204 Comm: syz-executor.1 No contaminado 5.12.0-rc8-syzkaller #0 Nombre del hardware: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Seguimiento de llamadas: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [en l\u00ednea] dump_stack+0x141/0x1d7 lib /dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x5b/0x2f8 mm/kasan/report.c:232 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:399 [en l\u00ednea] kasan_report.cold+0x7c/0xd8 mm/kasan/ report.c:416 __list_add_valid+0x93/0xa0 lib/list_debug.c:26 __list_add include/linux/list.h:67 [en l\u00ednea] list_add_tail include/linux/list.h:100 [en l\u00ednea] cma_listen_on_all drivers/infiniband/core/ cma.c:2557 [en l\u00ednea] rdma_listen+0x787/0xe00 controladores/infiniband/core/cma.c:3751 ucma_listen+0x16a/0x210 controladores/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1102 ucma_write+0x259/0x350 controladores/infiniband/core /ucma.c:1732 vfs_write+0x28e/0xa30 fs/read_write.c:603 ksys_write+0x1ee/0x250 fs/read_write.c:658 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 Entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/ 0xae Esto indica que un rdma_id_private fue destruido sin realizar cma_cancel_listens(). En lugar de intentar reutilizar la memoria src_addr para crear indirectamente cualquier direcci\u00f3n derivada del dst, cree una expl\u00edcitamente en la pila y vinc\u00falela como lo har\u00eda cualquier otro flujo normal. rdma_bind_addr() lo copiar\u00e1 sobre src_addr una vez que sepa que el estado es v\u00e1lido. Esto es similar al commit bc0bdc5afaa7 (\"RDMA/cma: No cambiar route.addr.src_addr.ss_family\")"
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2022-48925",
  "lastModified": "2024-08-23T02:07:41.047",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2024-08-22T02:15:08.750",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/00265efbd3e5705038c9492a434fda8cf960c8a2"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/22e9f71072fa605cbf033158db58e0790101928d"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b1cef5798b4fd6e4fd5522e7b8a26248beeacaa"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d350724795c7a48b05bf921d94699fbfecf7da0b"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-416"
        }
      ],
      "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}


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