fkie_cve-2022-49985
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2025-06-18 11:15
Modified
2025-06-18 13:46
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Don't use tnum_range on array range checking for poke descriptors Hsin-Wei reported a KASAN splat triggered by their BPF runtime fuzzer which is based on a customized syzkaller: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in bpf_int_jit_compile+0x1257/0x13f0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888004e90b58 by task syz-executor.0/1489 CPU: 1 PID: 1489 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.19.0 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x9c/0xc9 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x1f0 ? bpf_int_jit_compile+0x1257/0x13f0 kasan_report.cold+0xeb/0x197 ? kvmalloc_node+0x170/0x200 ? bpf_int_jit_compile+0x1257/0x13f0 bpf_int_jit_compile+0x1257/0x13f0 ? arch_prepare_bpf_dispatcher+0xd0/0xd0 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x43/0x70 bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x3e8/0x640 ? bpf_obj_name_cpy+0x149/0x1b0 bpf_prog_load+0x102f/0x2220 ? __bpf_prog_put.constprop.0+0x220/0x220 ? find_held_lock+0x2c/0x110 ? __might_fault+0xd6/0x180 ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0 ? lock_is_held_type+0xa6/0x120 ? __might_fault+0x147/0x180 __sys_bpf+0x137b/0x6070 ? bpf_perf_link_attach+0x530/0x530 ? new_sync_read+0x600/0x600 ? __fget_files+0x255/0x450 ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0 ? fput+0x30/0x1a0 ? ksys_write+0x1a8/0x260 __x64_sys_bpf+0x7a/0xc0 ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x21/0x70 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f917c4e2c2d The problem here is that a range of tnum_range(0, map->max_entries - 1) has limited ability to represent the concrete tight range with the tnum as the set of resulting states from value + mask can result in a superset of the actual intended range, and as such a tnum_in(range, reg->var_off) check may yield true when it shouldn't, for example tnum_range(0, 2) would result in 00XX -> v = 0000, m = 0011 such that the intended set of {0, 1, 2} is here represented by a less precise superset of {0, 1, 2, 3}. As the register is known const scalar, really just use the concrete reg->var_off.value for the upper index check.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4f672112f8665102a5842c170be1713f8ff95919
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a36df92c7ff7ecde2fb362241d0ab024dddd0597
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a657182a5c5150cdfacb6640aad1d2712571a409
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e8979807178434db8ceaa84dfcd44363e71e50bb
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version


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{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Don\u0027t use tnum_range on array range checking for poke descriptors\n\nHsin-Wei reported a KASAN splat triggered by their BPF runtime fuzzer which\nis based on a customized syzkaller:\n\n  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in bpf_int_jit_compile+0x1257/0x13f0\n  Read of size 8 at addr ffff888004e90b58 by task syz-executor.0/1489\n  CPU: 1 PID: 1489 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.19.0 #1\n  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS\n  1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014\n  Call Trace:\n   \u003cTASK\u003e\n   dump_stack_lvl+0x9c/0xc9\n   print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x1f0\n   ? bpf_int_jit_compile+0x1257/0x13f0\n   kasan_report.cold+0xeb/0x197\n   ? kvmalloc_node+0x170/0x200\n   ? bpf_int_jit_compile+0x1257/0x13f0\n   bpf_int_jit_compile+0x1257/0x13f0\n   ? arch_prepare_bpf_dispatcher+0xd0/0xd0\n   ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x43/0x70\n   bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x3e8/0x640\n   ? bpf_obj_name_cpy+0x149/0x1b0\n   bpf_prog_load+0x102f/0x2220\n   ? __bpf_prog_put.constprop.0+0x220/0x220\n   ? find_held_lock+0x2c/0x110\n   ? __might_fault+0xd6/0x180\n   ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0\n   ? lock_is_held_type+0xa6/0x120\n   ? __might_fault+0x147/0x180\n   __sys_bpf+0x137b/0x6070\n   ? bpf_perf_link_attach+0x530/0x530\n   ? new_sync_read+0x600/0x600\n   ? __fget_files+0x255/0x450\n   ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0\n   ? fput+0x30/0x1a0\n   ? ksys_write+0x1a8/0x260\n   __x64_sys_bpf+0x7a/0xc0\n   ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x21/0x70\n   do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90\n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd\n  RIP: 0033:0x7f917c4e2c2d\n\nThe problem here is that a range of tnum_range(0, map-\u003emax_entries - 1) has\nlimited ability to represent the concrete tight range with the tnum as the\nset of resulting states from value + mask can result in a superset of the\nactual intended range, and as such a tnum_in(range, reg-\u003evar_off) check may\nyield true when it shouldn\u0027t, for example tnum_range(0, 2) would result in\n00XX -\u003e v = 0000, m = 0011 such that the intended set of {0, 1, 2} is here\nrepresented by a less precise superset of {0, 1, 2, 3}. As the register is\nknown const scalar, really just use the concrete reg-\u003evar_off.value for the\nupper index check."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: bpf: No use tnum_range en la comprobaci\u00f3n del rango de matriz para los descriptores de poke Hsin-Wei inform\u00f3 un splat de KASAN activado por su fuzzer de tiempo de ejecuci\u00f3n BPF que se basa en un syzkaller personalizado: ERROR: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds en bpf_int_jit_compile+0x1257/0x13f0 Lectura de tama\u00f1o 8 en la direcci\u00f3n ffff888004e90b58 por la tarea syz-executor.0/1489 CPU: 1 PID: 1489 Comm: syz-executor.0 No contaminado 5.19.0 #1 Nombre del hardware: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 01/04/2014 Rastreo de llamadas:  dump_stack_lvl+0x9c/0xc9 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x1f0 ? bpf_int_jit_compile+0x1257/0x13f0 kasan_report.cold+0xeb/0x197 ? kvmalloc_node+0x170/0x200 ? bpf_int_jit_compile+0x1257/0x13f0 bpf_int_jit_compile+0x1257/0x13f0 ? arch_prepare_bpf_dispatcher+0xd0/0xd0 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x43/0x70 bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x3e8/0x640 ? bpf_obj_name_cpy+0x149/0x1b0 bpf_prog_load+0x102f/0x2220 ? __bpf_prog_put.constprop.0+0x220/0x220 ? find_held_lock+0x2c/0x110 ? __might_fault+0xd6/0x180 ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0 ? lock_is_held_type+0xa6/0x120 ? __might_fault+0x147/0x180 __sys_bpf+0x137b/0x6070 ? bpf_perf_link_attach+0x530/0x530 ? new_sync_read+0x600/0x600 ? __fget_files+0x255/0x450 ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0 ? fput+0x30/0x1a0 ? ksys_write+0x1a8/0x260 __x64_sys_bpf+0x7a/0xc0 ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x21/0x70 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f917c4e2c2d El problema aqu\u00ed es que un rango de tnum_range(0, map-\u0026gt;max_entries - 1) tiene una capacidad limitada para representar el rango estrecho concreto con el tnum como el conjunto de estados resultantes de value + mask puede resultar en un superconjunto del rango real deseado, y como tal una comprobaci\u00f3n tnum_in(range, reg-\u0026gt;var_off) puede dar como resultado verdadero cuando no deber\u00eda, por ejemplo tnum_range(0, 2) dar\u00eda como resultado 00XX -\u0026gt; v = 0000, m = 0011 de modo que el conjunto deseado de {0, 1, 2} est\u00e1 representado aqu\u00ed por un superconjunto menos preciso de {0, 1, 2, 3}. Como el registro es un escalar constante, simplemente use el valor concreto reg-\u0026gt;var_off.value para la verificaci\u00f3n del \u00edndice superior."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2022-49985",
  "lastModified": "2025-06-18T13:46:52.973",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2025-06-18T11:15:26.067",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4f672112f8665102a5842c170be1713f8ff95919"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a36df92c7ff7ecde2fb362241d0ab024dddd0597"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a657182a5c5150cdfacb6640aad1d2712571a409"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e8979807178434db8ceaa84dfcd44363e71e50bb"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}


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