fkie_cve-2023-52986
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2025-03-27 17:15
Modified
2025-03-28 18:11
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, sockmap: Check for any of tcp_bpf_prots when cloning a listener A listening socket linked to a sockmap has its sk_prot overridden. It points to one of the struct proto variants in tcp_bpf_prots. The variant depends on the socket's family and which sockmap programs are attached. A child socket cloned from a TCP listener initially inherits their sk_prot. But before cloning is finished, we restore the child's proto to the listener's original non-tcp_bpf_prots one. This happens in tcp_create_openreq_child -> tcp_bpf_clone. Today, in tcp_bpf_clone we detect if the child's proto should be restored by checking only for the TCP_BPF_BASE proto variant. This is not correct. The sk_prot of listening socket linked to a sockmap can point to to any variant in tcp_bpf_prots. If the listeners sk_prot happens to be not the TCP_BPF_BASE variant, then the child socket unintentionally is left if the inherited sk_prot by tcp_bpf_clone. This leads to issues like infinite recursion on close [1], because the child state is otherwise not set up for use with tcp_bpf_prot operations. Adjust the check in tcp_bpf_clone to detect all of tcp_bpf_prots variants. Note that it wouldn't be sufficient to check the socket state when overriding the sk_prot in tcp_bpf_update_proto in order to always use the TCP_BPF_BASE variant for listening sockets. Since commit b8b8315e39ff ("bpf, sockmap: Remove unhash handler for BPF sockmap usage") it is possible for a socket to transition to TCP_LISTEN state while already linked to a sockmap, e.g. connect() -> insert into map -> connect(AF_UNSPEC) -> listen(). [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/00000000000073b14905ef2e7401@google.com/
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/12b0ec7c6953e1602957926439e5297095d7d065
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9bd6074e1872d22190a8da30e796cbf937d334f0
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c681d7a4ed3d360de0574f4d6b7305a8de8dc54f
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ddce1e091757d0259107c6c0c7262df201de2b66
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version


To clipboard 

{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf, sockmap: Check for any of tcp_bpf_prots when cloning a listener\n\nA listening socket linked to a sockmap has its sk_prot overridden. It\npoints to one of the struct proto variants in tcp_bpf_prots. The variant\ndepends on the socket\u0027s family and which sockmap programs are attached.\n\nA child socket cloned from a TCP listener initially inherits their sk_prot.\nBut before cloning is finished, we restore the child\u0027s proto to the\nlistener\u0027s original non-tcp_bpf_prots one. This happens in\ntcp_create_openreq_child -\u003e tcp_bpf_clone.\n\nToday, in tcp_bpf_clone we detect if the child\u0027s proto should be restored\nby checking only for the TCP_BPF_BASE proto variant. This is not\ncorrect. The sk_prot of listening socket linked to a sockmap can point to\nto any variant in tcp_bpf_prots.\n\nIf the listeners sk_prot happens to be not the TCP_BPF_BASE variant, then\nthe child socket unintentionally is left if the inherited sk_prot by\ntcp_bpf_clone.\n\nThis leads to issues like infinite recursion on close [1], because the\nchild state is otherwise not set up for use with tcp_bpf_prot operations.\n\nAdjust the check in tcp_bpf_clone to detect all of tcp_bpf_prots variants.\n\nNote that it wouldn\u0027t be sufficient to check the socket state when\noverriding the sk_prot in tcp_bpf_update_proto in order to always use the\nTCP_BPF_BASE variant for listening sockets. Since commit\nb8b8315e39ff (\"bpf, sockmap: Remove unhash handler for BPF sockmap usage\")\nit is possible for a socket to transition to TCP_LISTEN state while already\nlinked to a sockmap, e.g. connect() -\u003e insert into map -\u003e\nconnect(AF_UNSPEC) -\u003e listen().\n\n[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/00000000000073b14905ef2e7401@google.com/"
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: bpf, sockmap: Comprueba si hay alg\u00fan tcp_bpf_prots al clonar un oyente Un socket que escucha vinculado a un sockmap tiene su sk_prot anulado. Apunta a una de las variantes de struct proto en tcp_bpf_prots. La variante depende de la familia del socket y de los programas sockmap que est\u00e9n adjuntos. Un socket hijo clonado de un oyente TCP hereda inicialmente su sk_prot. Pero antes de que finalice la clonaci\u00f3n, restauramos el proto del hijo al original del oyente que no es tcp_bpf_prots. Esto sucede en tcp_create_openreq_child -\u0026gt; tcp_bpf_clone. Hoy, en tcp_bpf_clone detectamos si el proto del hijo debe restaurarse comprobando solo la variante del proto TCP_BPF_BASE. Esto no es correcto. El sk_prot del socket de escucha vinculado a un mapa de socks puede apuntar a cualquier variante de tcp_bpf_prots. Si el sk_prot del socket de escucha no es la variante TCP_BPF_BASE, el socket hijo se abandona involuntariamente si el sk_prot heredado por tcp_bpf_clone lo impide. Esto genera problemas como la recursi\u00f3n infinita al cerrar [1], ya que el estado del hijo no est\u00e1 configurado para su uso con operaciones de tcp_bpf_prot. Ajuste la comprobaci\u00f3n en tcp_bpf_clone para detectar todas las variantes de tcp_bpf_prots. Tenga en cuenta que no ser\u00eda suficiente comprobar el estado del socket al sobrescribir el sk_prot en tcp_bpf_update_proto para usar siempre la variante TCP_BPF_BASE para los sockets de escucha. Desde el commit b8b8315e39ff (\"bpf, sockmap: eliminar el controlador unhash para el uso de sockmap BPF\"), es posible que un socket pase al estado TCP_LISTEN mientras ya est\u00e1 vinculado a un sockmap, por ejemplo, connect() -\u0026gt; insert into map -\u0026gt; connect(AF_UNSPEC) -\u0026gt; listen(). [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/00000000000073b14905ef2e7401@google.com/"
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2023-52986",
  "lastModified": "2025-03-28T18:11:49.747",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2025-03-27T17:15:45.930",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/12b0ec7c6953e1602957926439e5297095d7d065"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9bd6074e1872d22190a8da30e796cbf937d334f0"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c681d7a4ed3d360de0574f4d6b7305a8de8dc54f"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ddce1e091757d0259107c6c0c7262df201de2b66"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}


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