fkie_cve-2023-53048
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2025-05-02 16:15
Modified
2025-05-05 20:54
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: tcpm: fix warning when handle discover_identity message Since both source and sink device can send discover_identity message in PD3, kernel may dump below warning: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 169 at drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c:1446 tcpm_queue_vdm+0xe0/0xf0 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 169 Comm: 1-0050 Not tainted 6.1.1-00038-g6a3c36cf1da2-dirty #567 Hardware name: NXP i.MX8MPlus EVK board (DT) pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : tcpm_queue_vdm+0xe0/0xf0 lr : tcpm_queue_vdm+0x2c/0xf0 sp : ffff80000c19bcd0 x29: ffff80000c19bcd0 x28: 0000000000000001 x27: ffff0000d11c8ab8 x26: ffff0000d11cc000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 00000000ff008081 x23: 0000000000000001 x22: 00000000ff00a081 x21: ffff80000c19bdbc x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff0000d11c8080 x18: ffffffffffffffff x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffff0000d716f580 x14: 0000000000000001 x13: ffff0000d716f507 x12: 0000000000000001 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000020 x9 : 00000000000ee098 x8 : 00000000ffffffff x7 : 000000000000001c x6 : ffff0000d716f580 x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffff80000c19bdbc x1 : 00000000ff00a081 x0 : 0000000000000004 Call trace: tcpm_queue_vdm+0xe0/0xf0 tcpm_pd_rx_handler+0x340/0x1ab0 kthread_worker_fn+0xcc/0x18c kthread+0x10c/0x110 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Below sequences may trigger this warning: tcpm_send_discover_work(work) tcpm_send_vdm(port, USB_SID_PD, CMD_DISCOVER_IDENT, NULL, 0); tcpm_queue_vdm(port, header, data, count); port->vdm_state = VDM_STATE_READY; vdm_state_machine_work(work); <-- received discover_identity from partner vdm_run_state_machine(port); port->vdm_state = VDM_STATE_SEND_MESSAGE; mod_vdm_delayed_work(port, x); tcpm_pd_rx_handler(work); tcpm_pd_data_request(port, msg); tcpm_handle_vdm_request(port, msg->payload, cnt); tcpm_queue_vdm(port, response[0], &response[1], rlen - 1); --> WARN_ON(port->vdm_state > VDM_STATE_DONE); For this case, the state machine could still send out discover identity message later if we skip current discover_identity message. So we should handle the received message firstly and override the pending discover_identity message without warning in this case. Then, a delayed send_discover work will send discover_identity message again.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/abfc4fa28f0160df61c7149567da4f6494dfb488
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bb579b3f75c60bf488a7c36e092e8be583407d53
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d55ca2d2ea1a7ec553213986993fba8c0257381c
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e37d2c489d71e94ed4a39529bc9520a7fd983d42
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version


To clipboard 

{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusb: typec: tcpm: fix warning when handle discover_identity message\n\nSince both source and sink device can send discover_identity message in\nPD3, kernel may dump below warning:\n\n------------[ cut here ]------------\nWARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 169 at drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c:1446 tcpm_queue_vdm+0xe0/0xf0\nModules linked in:\nCPU: 0 PID: 169 Comm: 1-0050 Not tainted 6.1.1-00038-g6a3c36cf1da2-dirty #567\nHardware name: NXP i.MX8MPlus EVK board (DT)\npstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)\npc : tcpm_queue_vdm+0xe0/0xf0\nlr : tcpm_queue_vdm+0x2c/0xf0\nsp : ffff80000c19bcd0\nx29: ffff80000c19bcd0 x28: 0000000000000001 x27: ffff0000d11c8ab8\nx26: ffff0000d11cc000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 00000000ff008081\nx23: 0000000000000001 x22: 00000000ff00a081 x21: ffff80000c19bdbc\nx20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff0000d11c8080 x18: ffffffffffffffff\nx17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffff0000d716f580\nx14: 0000000000000001 x13: ffff0000d716f507 x12: 0000000000000001\nx11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000020 x9 : 00000000000ee098\nx8 : 00000000ffffffff x7 : 000000000000001c x6 : ffff0000d716f580\nx5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000\nx2 : ffff80000c19bdbc x1 : 00000000ff00a081 x0 : 0000000000000004\nCall trace:\ntcpm_queue_vdm+0xe0/0xf0\ntcpm_pd_rx_handler+0x340/0x1ab0\nkthread_worker_fn+0xcc/0x18c\nkthread+0x10c/0x110\nret_from_fork+0x10/0x20\n---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---\n\nBelow sequences may trigger this warning:\n\ntcpm_send_discover_work(work)\n  tcpm_send_vdm(port, USB_SID_PD, CMD_DISCOVER_IDENT, NULL, 0);\n   tcpm_queue_vdm(port, header, data, count);\n    port-\u003evdm_state = VDM_STATE_READY;\n\nvdm_state_machine_work(work);\n\t\t\t\u003c-- received discover_identity from partner\n vdm_run_state_machine(port);\n  port-\u003evdm_state = VDM_STATE_SEND_MESSAGE;\n   mod_vdm_delayed_work(port, x);\n\ntcpm_pd_rx_handler(work);\n tcpm_pd_data_request(port, msg);\n  tcpm_handle_vdm_request(port, msg-\u003epayload, cnt);\n   tcpm_queue_vdm(port, response[0], \u0026response[1], rlen - 1);\n--\u003e WARN_ON(port-\u003evdm_state \u003e VDM_STATE_DONE);\n\nFor this case, the state machine could still send out discover\nidentity message later if we skip current discover_identity message.\nSo we should handle the received message firstly and override the pending\ndiscover_identity message without warning in this case. Then, a delayed\nsend_discover work will send discover_identity message again."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: usb: typec: tcpm: se corrige la advertencia al manejar el mensaje discover_identity Dado que tanto el dispositivo de origen como el receptor pueden enviar el mensaje discover_identity en PD3, el kernel puede mostrar la siguiente advertencia: ------------[ cortar aqu\u00ed ]------------ ADVERTENCIA: CPU: 0 PID: 169 en drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c:1446 tcpm_queue_vdm+0xe0/0xf0 M\u00f3dulos vinculados: CPU: 0 PID: 169 Comm: 1-0050 No contaminado 6.1.1-00038-g6a3c36cf1da2-dirty #567 Nombre del hardware: Placa NXP i.MX8MPlus EVK (DT) pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : tcpm_queue_vdm+0xe0/0xf0 lr : tcpm_queue_vdm+0x2c/0xf0 sp : ffff80000c19bcd0 x29: ffff80000c19bcd0 x28: 0000000000000001 x27: ffff0000d11c8ab8 x26: ffff0000d11cc000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 00000000ff008081 x23: 000000000000001 x22: 00000000ff00a081 x21: ffff80000c19bdbc x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff0000d11c8080 x18: ffffffffffffffff x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffff0000d716f580 x14: 0000000000000001 x13: ffff0000d716f507 x12: 000000000000001 x11: 000000000000000 x10: 000000000000020 x9 : 00000000000ee098 x8 : 00000000ffffffff x7 : 000000000000001c x6 : ffff0000d716f580 x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffff80000c19bdbc x1 : 00000000ff00a081 x0 : 0000000000000004 Rastreo de llamadas: tcpm_queue_vdm+0xe0/0xf0 tcpm_pd_rx_handler+0x340/0x1ab0 kthread_worker_fn+0xcc/0x18c kthread+0x10c/0x110 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 ---[ fin del seguimiento 000000000000000 ]--- Las siguientes secuencias pueden activar esta advertencia: tcpm_send_discover_work(trabajo) tcpm_send_vdm(puerto, USB_SID_PD, CMD_DISCOVER_IDENT, NULL, 0); tcpm_queue_vdm(puerto, encabezado, datos, recuento); puerto-\u0026gt;vdm_state = VDM_STATE_READY; vdm_state_machine_work(trabajo); \u0026lt;-- se recibi\u00f3 discover_identity del socio vdm_run_state_machine(puerto); puerto-\u0026gt;vdm_state = VDM_STATE_SEND_MESSAGE; mod_vdm_delayed_work(puerto, x); tcpm_pd_rx_handler(trabajo); tcpm_pd_data_request(port, msg); tcpm_handle_vdm_request(port, msg-\u0026gt;payload, cnt); tcpm_queue_vdm(port, response[0], \u0026amp;response[1], rlen - 1); --\u0026gt; WARN_ON(port-\u0026gt;vdm_state \u0026gt; VDM_STATE_DONE); En este caso, la m\u00e1quina de estados podr\u00eda enviar el mensaje de descubrimiento de identidad m\u00e1s tarde si omitimos el mensaje de descubrimiento de identidad actual. Por lo tanto, debemos procesar primero el mensaje recibido y anular el mensaje de descubrimiento de identidad pendiente sin previo aviso. Posteriormente, una operaci\u00f3n de env\u00edo de descubrimiento retrasado enviar\u00e1 el mensaje de descubrimiento de identidad nuevamente."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2023-53048",
  "lastModified": "2025-05-05T20:54:45.973",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2025-05-02T16:15:23.897",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/abfc4fa28f0160df61c7149567da4f6494dfb488"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bb579b3f75c60bf488a7c36e092e8be583407d53"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d55ca2d2ea1a7ec553213986993fba8c0257381c"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e37d2c489d71e94ed4a39529bc9520a7fd983d42"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
  • Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.