fkie_cve-2024-56702
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2024-12-28 10:15
Modified
2025-02-03 15:14
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Mark raw_tp arguments with PTR_MAYBE_NULL
Arguments to a raw tracepoint are tagged as trusted, which carries the
semantics that the pointer will be non-NULL. However, in certain cases,
a raw tracepoint argument may end up being NULL. More context about this
issue is available in [0].
Thus, there is a discrepancy between the reality, that raw_tp arguments
can actually be NULL, and the verifier's knowledge, that they are never
NULL, causing explicit NULL checks to be deleted, and accesses to such
pointers potentially crashing the kernel.
To fix this, mark raw_tp arguments as PTR_MAYBE_NULL, and then special
case the dereference and pointer arithmetic to permit it, and allow
passing them into helpers/kfuncs; these exceptions are made for raw_tp
programs only. Ensure that we don't do this when ref_obj_id > 0, as in
that case this is an acquired object and doesn't need such adjustment.
The reason we do mask_raw_tp_trusted_reg logic is because other will
recheck in places whether the register is a trusted_reg, and then
consider our register as untrusted when detecting the presence of the
PTR_MAYBE_NULL flag.
To allow safe dereference, we enable PROBE_MEM marking when we see loads
into trusted pointers with PTR_MAYBE_NULL.
While trusted raw_tp arguments can also be passed into helpers or kfuncs
where such broken assumption may cause issues, a future patch set will
tackle their case separately, as PTR_TO_BTF_ID (without PTR_TRUSTED) can
already be passed into helpers and causes similar problems. Thus, they
are left alone for now.
It is possible that these checks also permit passing non-raw_tp args
that are trusted PTR_TO_BTF_ID with null marking. In such a case,
allowing dereference when pointer is NULL expands allowed behavior, so
won't regress existing programs, and the case of passing these into
helpers is the same as above and will be dealt with later.
Also update the failure case in tp_btf_nullable selftest to capture the
new behavior, as the verifier will no longer cause an error when
directly dereference a raw tracepoint argument marked as __nullable.
[0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/ZrCZS6nisraEqehw@jlelli-thinkpadt14gen4.remote.csb
References
Impacted products
Vendor | Product | Version | |
---|---|---|---|
linux | linux_kernel | * | |
linux | linux_kernel | * |
{ "configurations": [ { "nodes": [ { "cpeMatch": [ { "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "matchCriteriaId": "A5EC3EA5-C348-4DEA-A771-70965BB6CE47", "versionEndExcluding": "6.11.11", "versionStartIncluding": "6.2", "vulnerable": true }, { "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "matchCriteriaId": "D8882B1B-2ABC-4838-AC1D-DBDBB5764776", "versionEndExcluding": "6.12.2", "versionStartIncluding": "6.12", "vulnerable": true } ], "negate": false, "operator": "OR" } ] } ], "cveTags": [], "descriptions": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Mark raw_tp arguments with PTR_MAYBE_NULL\n\nArguments to a raw tracepoint are tagged as trusted, which carries the\nsemantics that the pointer will be non-NULL. However, in certain cases,\na raw tracepoint argument may end up being NULL. More context about this\nissue is available in [0].\n\nThus, there is a discrepancy between the reality, that raw_tp arguments\ncan actually be NULL, and the verifier\u0027s knowledge, that they are never\nNULL, causing explicit NULL checks to be deleted, and accesses to such\npointers potentially crashing the kernel.\n\nTo fix this, mark raw_tp arguments as PTR_MAYBE_NULL, and then special\ncase the dereference and pointer arithmetic to permit it, and allow\npassing them into helpers/kfuncs; these exceptions are made for raw_tp\nprograms only. Ensure that we don\u0027t do this when ref_obj_id \u003e 0, as in\nthat case this is an acquired object and doesn\u0027t need such adjustment.\n\nThe reason we do mask_raw_tp_trusted_reg logic is because other will\nrecheck in places whether the register is a trusted_reg, and then\nconsider our register as untrusted when detecting the presence of the\nPTR_MAYBE_NULL flag.\n\nTo allow safe dereference, we enable PROBE_MEM marking when we see loads\ninto trusted pointers with PTR_MAYBE_NULL.\n\nWhile trusted raw_tp arguments can also be passed into helpers or kfuncs\nwhere such broken assumption may cause issues, a future patch set will\ntackle their case separately, as PTR_TO_BTF_ID (without PTR_TRUSTED) can\nalready be passed into helpers and causes similar problems. Thus, they\nare left alone for now.\n\nIt is possible that these checks also permit passing non-raw_tp args\nthat are trusted PTR_TO_BTF_ID with null marking. In such a case,\nallowing dereference when pointer is NULL expands allowed behavior, so\nwon\u0027t regress existing programs, and the case of passing these into\nhelpers is the same as above and will be dealt with later.\n\nAlso update the failure case in tp_btf_nullable selftest to capture the\nnew behavior, as the verifier will no longer cause an error when\ndirectly dereference a raw tracepoint argument marked as __nullable.\n\n [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/ZrCZS6nisraEqehw@jlelli-thinkpadt14gen4.remote.csb" }, { "lang": "es", "value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: bpf: Marcar argumentos raw_tp con PTR_MAYBE_NULL Los argumentos para un tracepoint sin procesar se etiquetan como confiables, lo que conlleva la sem\u00e1ntica de que el puntero no ser\u00e1 NULL. Sin embargo, en ciertos casos, un argumento de tracepoint sin procesar puede terminar siendo NULL. Hay m\u00e1s contexto disponible sobre este problema en [0]. Por lo tanto, existe una discrepancia entre la realidad, que los argumentos raw_tp pueden ser NULL, y el conocimiento del verificador, de que nunca son NULL, lo que hace que se eliminen las comprobaciones NULL expl\u00edcitas y los accesos a dichos punteros potencialmente bloqueen el kernel. Para solucionar esto, marque los argumentos raw_tp como PTR_MAYBE_NULL y luego aplique un caso especial a la desreferencia y la aritm\u00e9tica de punteros para permitirlo, y permita pasarlos a ayudantes/kfuncs; estas excepciones se realizan solo para programas raw_tp. Aseg\u00farese de no hacer esto cuando ref_obj_id \u0026gt; 0, ya que en ese caso se trata de un objeto adquirido y no necesita dicho ajuste. La raz\u00f3n por la que hacemos la l\u00f3gica mask_raw_tp_trusted_reg es porque otros volver\u00e1n a verificar en algunos lugares si el registro es un trusted_reg y luego considerar\u00e1n nuestro registro como no confiable al detectar la presencia del indicador PTR_MAYBE_NULL. Para permitir una desreferencia segura, habilitamos el marcado PROBE_MEM cuando vemos cargas en punteros confiables con PTR_MAYBE_NULL. Si bien los argumentos raw_tp confiables tambi\u00e9n se pueden pasar a los ayudantes o kfuncs donde tal suposici\u00f3n rota puede causar problemas, un futuro conjunto de parches abordar\u00e1 su caso por separado, ya que PTR_TO_BTF_ID (sin PTR_TRUSTED) ya se puede pasar a los ayudantes y causa problemas similares. Por lo tanto, se dejan solos por ahora. Es posible que estas verificaciones tambi\u00e9n permitan pasar argumentos que no sean raw_tp que sean PTR_TO_BTF_ID confiables con marcado nulo. En tal caso, permitir la desreferencia cuando el puntero es NULL expande el comportamiento permitido, por lo que no se producir\u00e1 una regresi\u00f3n de los programas existentes, y el caso de pasarlos a los ayudantes es el mismo que el anterior y se tratar\u00e1 m\u00e1s adelante. Tambi\u00e9n actualice el caso de falla en la autoprueba tp_btf_nullable para capturar el nuevo comportamiento, ya que el verificador ya no provocar\u00e1 un error cuando desreferencia directamente un argumento de punto de seguimiento sin formato marcado como __nullable. [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/ZrCZS6nisraEqehw@jlelli-thinkpadt14gen4.remote.csb" } ], "id": "CVE-2024-56702", "lastModified": "2025-02-03T15:14:18.797", "metrics": { "cvssMetricV31": [ { "cvssData": { "attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 5.5, "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "NONE", "integrityImpact": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H", "version": "3.1" }, "exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "impactScore": 3.6, "source": "nvd@nist.gov", "type": "Primary" } ] }, "published": "2024-12-28T10:15:17.980", "references": [ { "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "tags": [ "Patch" ], "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3634d4a310820567fc634bf8f1ee2b91378773e8" }, { "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "tags": [ "Patch" ], "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c9b91d2d54175f781ad2c361cb2ac2c0e29b14b6" }, { "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "tags": [ "Patch" ], "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cb4158ce8ec8a5bb528cc1693356a5eb8058094d" } ], "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "vulnStatus": "Analyzed", "weaknesses": [ { "description": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "CWE-476" } ], "source": "nvd@nist.gov", "type": "Primary" } ] }
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Sightings
Author | Source | Type | Date |
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Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
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- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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