fkie_cve-2025-37964
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2025-05-20 16:15
Modified
2025-05-21 20:24
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/mm: Eliminate window where TLB flushes may be inadvertently skipped
tl;dr: There is a window in the mm switching code where the new CR3 is
set and the CPU should be getting TLB flushes for the new mm. But
should_flush_tlb() has a bug and suppresses the flush. Fix it by
widening the window where should_flush_tlb() sends an IPI.
Long Version:
=== History ===
There were a few things leading up to this.
First, updating mm_cpumask() was observed to be too expensive, so it was
made lazier. But being lazy caused too many unnecessary IPIs to CPUs
due to the now-lazy mm_cpumask(). So code was added to cull
mm_cpumask() periodically[2]. But that culling was a bit too aggressive
and skipped sending TLB flushes to CPUs that need them. So here we are
again.
=== Problem ===
The too-aggressive code in should_flush_tlb() strikes in this window:
// Turn on IPIs for this CPU/mm combination, but only
// if should_flush_tlb() agrees:
cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(next));
next_tlb_gen = atomic64_read(&next->context.tlb_gen);
choose_new_asid(next, next_tlb_gen, &new_asid, &need_flush);
load_new_mm_cr3(need_flush);
// ^ After 'need_flush' is set to false, IPIs *MUST*
// be sent to this CPU and not be ignored.
this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm, next);
// ^ Not until this point does should_flush_tlb()
// become true!
should_flush_tlb() will suppress TLB flushes between load_new_mm_cr3()
and writing to 'loaded_mm', which is a window where they should not be
suppressed. Whoops.
=== Solution ===
Thankfully, the fuzzy "just about to write CR3" window is already marked
with loaded_mm==LOADED_MM_SWITCHING. Simply checking for that state in
should_flush_tlb() is sufficient to ensure that the CPU is targeted with
an IPI.
This will cause more TLB flush IPIs. But the window is relatively small
and I do not expect this to cause any kind of measurable performance
impact.
Update the comment where LOADED_MM_SWITCHING is written since it grew
yet another user.
Peter Z also raised a concern that should_flush_tlb() might not observe
'loaded_mm' and 'is_lazy' in the same order that switch_mm_irqs_off()
writes them. Add a barrier to ensure that they are observed in the
order they are written.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nx86/mm: Eliminate window where TLB flushes may be inadvertently skipped\n\ntl;dr: There is a window in the mm switching code where the new CR3 is\nset and the CPU should be getting TLB flushes for the new mm. But\nshould_flush_tlb() has a bug and suppresses the flush. Fix it by\nwidening the window where should_flush_tlb() sends an IPI.\n\nLong Version:\n\n=== History ===\n\nThere were a few things leading up to this.\n\nFirst, updating mm_cpumask() was observed to be too expensive, so it was\nmade lazier. But being lazy caused too many unnecessary IPIs to CPUs\ndue to the now-lazy mm_cpumask(). So code was added to cull\nmm_cpumask() periodically[2]. But that culling was a bit too aggressive\nand skipped sending TLB flushes to CPUs that need them. So here we are\nagain.\n\n=== Problem ===\n\nThe too-aggressive code in should_flush_tlb() strikes in this window:\n\n\t// Turn on IPIs for this CPU/mm combination, but only\n\t// if should_flush_tlb() agrees:\n\tcpumask_set_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(next));\n\n\tnext_tlb_gen = atomic64_read(\u0026next-\u003econtext.tlb_gen);\n\tchoose_new_asid(next, next_tlb_gen, \u0026new_asid, \u0026need_flush);\n\tload_new_mm_cr3(need_flush);\n\t// ^ After \u0027need_flush\u0027 is set to false, IPIs *MUST*\n\t// be sent to this CPU and not be ignored.\n\n this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm, next);\n\t// ^ Not until this point does should_flush_tlb()\n\t// become true!\n\nshould_flush_tlb() will suppress TLB flushes between load_new_mm_cr3()\nand writing to \u0027loaded_mm\u0027, which is a window where they should not be\nsuppressed. Whoops.\n\n=== Solution ===\n\nThankfully, the fuzzy \"just about to write CR3\" window is already marked\nwith loaded_mm==LOADED_MM_SWITCHING. Simply checking for that state in\nshould_flush_tlb() is sufficient to ensure that the CPU is targeted with\nan IPI.\n\nThis will cause more TLB flush IPIs. But the window is relatively small\nand I do not expect this to cause any kind of measurable performance\nimpact.\n\nUpdate the comment where LOADED_MM_SWITCHING is written since it grew\nyet another user.\n\nPeter Z also raised a concern that should_flush_tlb() might not observe\n\u0027loaded_mm\u0027 and \u0027is_lazy\u0027 in the same order that switch_mm_irqs_off()\nwrites them. Add a barrier to ensure that they are observed in the\norder they are written."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: x86/mm: Eliminar la ventana donde los vaciados de TLB pueden omitirse inadvertidamente tl;dr: Hay una ventana en el c\u00f3digo de conmutaci\u00f3n mm donde se establece el nuevo CR3 y la CPU deber\u00eda obtener vaciados de TLB para el nuevo mm. Pero should_flush_tlb() tiene un error y suprime el vaciado. Arr\u00e9glelo ampliando la ventana donde should_flush_tlb() env\u00eda una IPI. Versi\u00f3n larga: === Historial === Hubo algunas cosas que llevaron a esto. Primero, se observ\u00f3 que actualizar mm_cpumask() era demasiado costoso, por lo que se hizo m\u00e1s perezoso. Pero ser perezoso caus\u00f3 demasiados IPI innecesarios a las CPU debido al ahora perezoso mm_cpumask(). Entonces se agreg\u00f3 c\u00f3digo para descartar mm_cpumask() peri\u00f3dicamente[2]. Pero ese descarte fue demasiado agresivo y omiti\u00f3 el env\u00edo de vaciados de TLB a las CPU que los necesitan. As\u00ed que aqu\u00ed estamos de nuevo. === Problema === El c\u00f3digo demasiado agresivo en should_flush_tlb() ataca en esta ventana: // Activa las IPI para esta combinaci\u00f3n de CPU/mm, pero solo si should_flush_tlb() est\u00e1 de acuerdo: cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(next)); next_tlb_gen = atomic64_read(\u0026amp;next-\u0026gt;context.tlb_gen); choose_new_asid(next, next_tlb_gen, \u0026amp;new_asid, \u0026amp;need_flush); load_new_mm_cr3(need_flush); // ^ Despu\u00e9s de que \u0027need_flush\u0027 se establece en falso, las IPI *DEBEN* // enviarse a esta CPU y no ignorarse. this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm, next); // ^ \u00a1No es hasta este punto que should_flush_tlb() // se vuelve verdadero! should_flush_tlb() suprimir\u00e1 los vaciados de TLB entre load_new_mm_cr3() y la escritura en \u0027loaded_mm\u0027, que es una ventana donde no deber\u00edan suprimirse. \u00a1Uy! === Soluci\u00f3n === Afortunadamente, la ventana difusa \"a punto de escribir CR3\" ya est\u00e1 marcada con load_mm==LOADED_MM_SWITCHING. Simplemente comprobar ese estado en should_flush_tlb() es suficiente para asegurar que la CPU est\u00e9 dirigida a un IPI. Esto provocar\u00e1 m\u00e1s IPI de vaciado de TLB. Sin embargo, la ventana es relativamente peque\u00f1a y no preveo que esto tenga ning\u00fan impacto medible en el rendimiento. Actualice el comentario donde se escribe LOADED_MM_SWITCHING, ya que ha generado otro usuario. Peter Z tambi\u00e9n plante\u00f3 la preocupaci\u00f3n de que should_flush_tlb() podr\u00eda no observar \u0027loaded_mm\u0027 e \u0027is_lazy\u0027 en el mismo orden en que switch_mm_irqs_off() los escribe. A\u00f1ade una barrera para garantizar que se observen en el orden en que est\u00e1n escritos."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-37964",
"lastModified": "2025-05-21T20:24:58.133",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2025-05-20T16:15:34.683",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/02ad4ce144bd27f71f583f667fdf3b3ba0753477"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/12f703811af043d32b1c8a30001b2fa04d5cd0ac"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/399ec9ca8fc4999e676ff89a90184ec40031cf59"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d41072906abec8bb8e01ed16afefbaa558908c89"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d87392094f96e162fa5fa5a8640d70cc0952806f"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fea4e317f9e7e1f449ce90dedc27a2d2a95bee5a"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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