fkie_cve-2025-38089
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2025-06-30 08:15
Modified
2025-07-03 09:15
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sunrpc: handle SVC_GARBAGE during svc auth processing as auth error tianshuo han reported a remotely-triggerable crash if the client sends a kernel RPC server a specially crafted packet. If decoding the RPC reply fails in such a way that SVC_GARBAGE is returned without setting the rq_accept_statp pointer, then that pointer can be dereferenced and a value stored there. If it's the first time the thread has processed an RPC, then that pointer will be set to NULL and the kernel will crash. In other cases, it could create a memory scribble. The server sunrpc code treats a SVC_GARBAGE return from svc_authenticate or pg_authenticate as if it should send a GARBAGE_ARGS reply. RFC 5531 says that if authentication fails that the RPC should be rejected instead with a status of AUTH_ERR. Handle a SVC_GARBAGE return as an AUTH_ERROR, with a reason of AUTH_BADCRED instead of returning GARBAGE_ARGS in that case. This sidesteps the whole problem of touching the rpc_accept_statp pointer in this situation and avoids the crash.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version



{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsunrpc: handle SVC_GARBAGE during svc auth processing as auth error\n\ntianshuo han reported a remotely-triggerable crash if the client sends a\nkernel RPC server a specially crafted packet. If decoding the RPC reply\nfails in such a way that SVC_GARBAGE is returned without setting the\nrq_accept_statp pointer, then that pointer can be dereferenced and a\nvalue stored there.\n\nIf it\u0027s the first time the thread has processed an RPC, then that\npointer will be set to NULL and the kernel will crash. In other cases,\nit could create a memory scribble.\n\nThe server sunrpc code treats a SVC_GARBAGE return from svc_authenticate\nor pg_authenticate as if it should send a GARBAGE_ARGS reply. RFC 5531\nsays that if authentication fails that the RPC should be rejected\ninstead with a status of AUTH_ERR.\n\nHandle a SVC_GARBAGE return as an AUTH_ERROR, with a reason of\nAUTH_BADCRED instead of returning GARBAGE_ARGS in that case. This\nsidesteps the whole problem of touching the rpc_accept_statp pointer in\nthis situation and avoids the crash."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: sunrpc: manejo de SVC_GARBAGE durante el procesamiento de autenticaci\u00f3n de servicio como error de autenticaci\u00f3n. Tianshuo Han inform\u00f3 de un fallo que se puede activar de forma remota si el cliente env\u00eda a un servidor RPC del kernel un paquete especialmente manipulado. Si la decodificaci\u00f3n de la respuesta RPC falla de tal manera que se devuelve SVC_GARBAGE sin establecer el puntero rq_accept_statp, se puede desreferenciar ese puntero y almacenar un valor all\u00ed. Si es la primera vez que el hilo procesa una RPC, ese puntero se establecer\u00e1 en NULL y el kernel se bloquear\u00e1. En otros casos, podr\u00eda crear un garabato de memoria. El c\u00f3digo del servidor sunrpc trata una devoluci\u00f3n de SVC_GARBAGE de svc_authenticate o pg_authenticate como si debiera enviar una respuesta GARBAGE_ARGS. El RFC 5531 indica que si la autenticaci\u00f3n falla, la RPC debe rechazarse con un estado de AUTH_ERR. Tratar una devoluci\u00f3n de SVC_GARBAGE como AUTH_ERROR, con el motivo AUTH_BADCRED, en lugar de devolver GARBAGE_ARGS en ese caso. Esto evita el problema de tocar el puntero rpc_accept_statp en esta situaci\u00f3n y evita el bloqueo."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2025-38089",
  "lastModified": "2025-07-03T09:15:22.777",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2025-06-30T08:15:23.590",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/353e75b55e583635bf71cde6abcec274dba05edd"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/599c489eea793821232a2f69a00fa57d82b0ac98"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/94d10a4dba0bc482f2b01e39f06d5513d0f75742"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c90459cd58bb421d275337093d8e901e0ba748dd"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://github.com/keymaker-arch/NFSundown"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2025/07/02/2"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}


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