fkie_cve-2025-38170
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2025-07-03 09:15
Modified
2025-07-03 15:13
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64/fpsimd: Discard stale CPU state when handling SME traps
The logic for handling SME traps manipulates saved FPSIMD/SVE/SME state
incorrectly, and a race with preemption can result in a task having
TIF_SME set and TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE clear even though the live CPU state
is stale (e.g. with SME traps enabled). This can result in warnings from
do_sme_acc() where SME traps are not expected while TIF_SME is set:
| /* With TIF_SME userspace shouldn't generate any traps */
| if (test_and_set_thread_flag(TIF_SME))
| WARN_ON(1);
This is very similar to the SVE issue we fixed in commit:
751ecf6afd6568ad ("arm64/sve: Discard stale CPU state when handling SVE traps")
The race can occur when the SME trap handler is preempted before and
after manipulating the saved FPSIMD/SVE/SME state, starting and ending on
the same CPU, e.g.
| void do_sme_acc(unsigned long esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
| {
| // Trap on CPU 0 with TIF_SME clear, SME traps enabled
| // task->fpsimd_cpu is 0.
| // per_cpu_ptr(&fpsimd_last_state, 0) is task.
|
| ...
|
| // Preempted; migrated from CPU 0 to CPU 1.
| // TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE is set.
|
| get_cpu_fpsimd_context();
|
| /* With TIF_SME userspace shouldn't generate any traps */
| if (test_and_set_thread_flag(TIF_SME))
| WARN_ON(1);
|
| if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE)) {
| unsigned long vq_minus_one =
| sve_vq_from_vl(task_get_sme_vl(current)) - 1;
| sme_set_vq(vq_minus_one);
|
| fpsimd_bind_task_to_cpu();
| }
|
| put_cpu_fpsimd_context();
|
| // Preempted; migrated from CPU 1 to CPU 0.
| // task->fpsimd_cpu is still 0
| // If per_cpu_ptr(&fpsimd_last_state, 0) is still task then:
| // - Stale HW state is reused (with SME traps enabled)
| // - TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE is cleared
| // - A return to userspace skips HW state restore
| }
Fix the case where the state is not live and TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE is set
by calling fpsimd_flush_task_state() to detach from the saved CPU
state. This ensures that a subsequent context switch will not reuse the
stale CPU state, and will instead set TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE, forcing the
new state to be reloaded from memory prior to a return to userspace.
Note: this was originallly posted as [1].
[ Rutland: rewrite commit message ]
References
Impacted products
Vendor | Product | Version |
---|
{ "cveTags": [], "descriptions": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\narm64/fpsimd: Discard stale CPU state when handling SME traps\n\nThe logic for handling SME traps manipulates saved FPSIMD/SVE/SME state\nincorrectly, and a race with preemption can result in a task having\nTIF_SME set and TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE clear even though the live CPU state\nis stale (e.g. with SME traps enabled). This can result in warnings from\ndo_sme_acc() where SME traps are not expected while TIF_SME is set:\n\n| /* With TIF_SME userspace shouldn\u0027t generate any traps */\n| if (test_and_set_thread_flag(TIF_SME))\n| WARN_ON(1);\n\nThis is very similar to the SVE issue we fixed in commit:\n\n 751ecf6afd6568ad (\"arm64/sve: Discard stale CPU state when handling SVE traps\")\n\nThe race can occur when the SME trap handler is preempted before and\nafter manipulating the saved FPSIMD/SVE/SME state, starting and ending on\nthe same CPU, e.g.\n\n| void do_sme_acc(unsigned long esr, struct pt_regs *regs)\n| {\n| // Trap on CPU 0 with TIF_SME clear, SME traps enabled\n| // task-\u003efpsimd_cpu is 0.\n| // per_cpu_ptr(\u0026fpsimd_last_state, 0) is task.\n|\n| ...\n|\n| // Preempted; migrated from CPU 0 to CPU 1.\n| // TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE is set.\n|\n| get_cpu_fpsimd_context();\n|\n| /* With TIF_SME userspace shouldn\u0027t generate any traps */\n| if (test_and_set_thread_flag(TIF_SME))\n| WARN_ON(1);\n|\n| if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE)) {\n| unsigned long vq_minus_one =\n| sve_vq_from_vl(task_get_sme_vl(current)) - 1;\n| sme_set_vq(vq_minus_one);\n|\n| fpsimd_bind_task_to_cpu();\n| }\n|\n| put_cpu_fpsimd_context();\n|\n| // Preempted; migrated from CPU 1 to CPU 0.\n| // task-\u003efpsimd_cpu is still 0\n| // If per_cpu_ptr(\u0026fpsimd_last_state, 0) is still task then:\n| // - Stale HW state is reused (with SME traps enabled)\n| // - TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE is cleared\n| // - A return to userspace skips HW state restore\n| }\n\nFix the case where the state is not live and TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE is set\nby calling fpsimd_flush_task_state() to detach from the saved CPU\nstate. This ensures that a subsequent context switch will not reuse the\nstale CPU state, and will instead set TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE, forcing the\nnew state to be reloaded from memory prior to a return to userspace.\n\nNote: this was originallly posted as [1].\n\n[ Rutland: rewrite commit message ]" }, { "lang": "es", "value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: arm64/fpsimd: Descartar estado de CPU obsoleto al manejar trampas de SME La l\u00f3gica para manejar trampas de SME manipula incorrectamente el estado FPSIMD/SVE/SME guardado, y una ejecuci\u00f3n con preempci\u00f3n puede dar como resultado que una tarea tenga TIF_SME establecido y TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE borrado incluso si el estado de CPU en vivo est\u00e1 obsoleto (por ejemplo, con trampas de SME habilitadas). Esto puede dar como resultado advertencias de do_sme_acc() donde no se esperan trampas de SME mientras TIF_SME est\u00e9 establecido: | /* Con TIF_SME, el espacio de usuario no deber\u00eda generar ninguna trampa */ | if (test_and_set_thread_flag(TIF_SME)) | WARN_ON(1); Esto es muy similar al problema de SVE que corregimos en el commit: 751ecf6afd6568ad (\"arm64/sve: descartar estado de CPU obsoleto al manejar trampas de SVE\") La ejecuci\u00f3n puede ocurrir cuando el controlador de trampas de SME se interrumpe antes y despu\u00e9s de manipular el estado FPSIMD/SVE/SME guardado, comenzando y terminando en la misma CPU, por ejemplo, | void do_sme_acc(unsigned long esr, struct pt_regs *regs) | { | // Trampa en la CPU 0 con TIF_SME limpio, trampas de SME habilitadas | // task-\u0026gt;fpsimd_cpu es 0. | // per_cpu_ptr(\u0026amp;fpsimd_last_state, 0) es la tarea. | | ... | | // Interrumpido; migrado de la CPU 0 a la CPU 1. | // TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE est\u00e1 configurado. | | get_cpu_fpsimd_context(); | | /* Con TIF_SME el espacio de usuario no deber\u00eda generar ninguna trampa */ | if (test_and_set_thread_flag(TIF_SME)) | WARN_ON(1); | | if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE)) { | unsigned long vq_minus_one = | sve_vq_from_vl(task_get_sme_vl(current)) - 1; | sme_set_vq(vq_minus_one); | | fpsimd_bind_task_to_cpu(); | } | | put_cpu_fpsimd_context(); | | // Interrumpido; migrado de la CPU 1 a la CPU 0. | // task-\u0026gt;fpsimd_cpu sigue siendo 0 | // Si per_cpu_ptr(\u0026amp;fpsimd_last_state, 0) sigue siendo tarea, entonces: | // - Se reutiliza el estado de hardware obsoleto (con las trampas de SME habilitadas) | // - Se borra TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE | // - Al regresar al espacio de usuario, se omite la restauraci\u00f3n del estado de hardware | } Se soluciona el caso en el que el estado no est\u00e1 activo y TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE se establece llamando a fpsimd_flush_task_state() para separarlo del estado de CPU guardado. Esto garantiza que un cambio de contexto posterior no reutilice el estado de CPU obsoleto, sino que establezca TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE, forzando la recarga del nuevo estado desde la memoria antes de regresar al espacio de usuario. Nota: esto se public\u00f3 originalmente como [1]. [Rutland: reescribir el mensaje de confirmaci\u00f3n]" } ], "id": "CVE-2025-38170", "lastModified": "2025-07-03T15:13:53.147", "metrics": {}, "published": "2025-07-03T09:15:32.643", "references": [ { "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/43be952e885476dafb74aa832c0847b2f4f650c6" }, { "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6103f9ba51a59afb5a0f32299c837377c5a5a693" }, { "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c4a4786d93e99517d6f10ed56b9ffba4ce88d3b3" }, { "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3eaab3c70905c5467e5c4ea403053d67505adeb" }, { "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/de89368de3894a8db27caeb8fd902ba1c49f696a" } ], "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis" }
Loading…
Loading…
Sightings
Author | Source | Type | Date |
---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
Loading…
Loading…