fkie_cve-2025-38262
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2025-07-09 11:15
Modified
2025-07-17 17:15
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tty: serial: uartlite: register uart driver in init When two instances of uart devices are probing, a concurrency race can occur. If one thread calls uart_register_driver function, which first allocates and assigns memory to 'uart_state' member of uart_driver structure, the other instance can bypass uart driver registration and call ulite_assign. This calls uart_add_one_port, which expects the uart driver to be fully initialized. This leads to a kernel panic due to a null pointer dereference: [ 8.143581] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000002b8 [ 8.156982] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode [ 8.156984] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page [ 8.156986] PGD 0 P4D 0 ... [ 8.180668] RIP: 0010:mutex_lock+0x19/0x30 [ 8.188624] Call Trace: [ 8.188629] ? __die_body.cold+0x1a/0x1f [ 8.195260] ? page_fault_oops+0x15c/0x290 [ 8.209183] ? __irq_resolve_mapping+0x47/0x80 [ 8.209187] ? exc_page_fault+0x64/0x140 [ 8.209190] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [ 8.209196] ? mutex_lock+0x19/0x30 [ 8.223116] uart_add_one_port+0x60/0x440 [ 8.223122] ? proc_tty_register_driver+0x43/0x50 [ 8.223126] ? tty_register_driver+0x1ca/0x1e0 [ 8.246250] ulite_probe+0x357/0x4b0 [uartlite] To prevent it, move uart driver registration in to init function. This will ensure that uart_driver is always registered when probe function is called.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version



{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntty: serial: uartlite: register uart driver in init\n\nWhen two instances of uart devices are probing, a concurrency race can\noccur. If one thread calls uart_register_driver function, which first\nallocates and assigns memory to \u0027uart_state\u0027 member of uart_driver\nstructure, the other instance can bypass uart driver registration and\ncall ulite_assign. This calls uart_add_one_port, which expects the uart\ndriver to be fully initialized. This leads to a kernel panic due to a\nnull pointer dereference:\n\n[    8.143581] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000002b8\n[    8.156982] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode\n[    8.156984] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page\n[    8.156986] PGD 0 P4D 0\n...\n[    8.180668] RIP: 0010:mutex_lock+0x19/0x30\n[    8.188624] Call Trace:\n[    8.188629]  ? __die_body.cold+0x1a/0x1f\n[    8.195260]  ? page_fault_oops+0x15c/0x290\n[    8.209183]  ? __irq_resolve_mapping+0x47/0x80\n[    8.209187]  ? exc_page_fault+0x64/0x140\n[    8.209190]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30\n[    8.209196]  ? mutex_lock+0x19/0x30\n[    8.223116]  uart_add_one_port+0x60/0x440\n[    8.223122]  ? proc_tty_register_driver+0x43/0x50\n[    8.223126]  ? tty_register_driver+0x1ca/0x1e0\n[    8.246250]  ulite_probe+0x357/0x4b0 [uartlite]\n\nTo prevent it, move uart driver registration in to init function. This\nwill ensure that uart_driver is always registered when probe function\nis called."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: tty: serial: uartlite: registrar el controlador UART en init. Cuando dos instancias de dispositivos UART est\u00e1n realizando pruebas, puede producirse una ejecuci\u00f3n de concurrencia. Si un subproceso invoca la funci\u00f3n uart_register_driver, que primero asigna memoria al miembro \u0027uart_state\u0027 de la estructura uart_driver, la otra instancia puede omitir el registro del controlador UART y llamar a ulite_assign. Esto invoca uart_add_one_port, que espera que el controlador UART est\u00e9 completamente inicializado. Esto genera un p\u00e1nico del kernel debido a una desreferencia de puntero nulo: [8.143581] ERROR: desreferencia de puntero NULL del kernel, direcci\u00f3n: 00000000000002b8 [8.156982] #PF: acceso de escritura del supervisor en modo kernel [8.156984] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - p\u00e1gina no presente [8.156986] PGD 0 P4D 0 ... [8.180668] RIP: 0010:mutex_lock+0x19/0x30 [8.188624] Rastreo de llamadas: [ 8.188629] ? __die_body.cold+0x1a/0x1f [ 8.195260] ? page_fault_oops+0x15c/0x290 [ 8.209183] ? __irq_resolve_mapping+0x47/0x80 [ 8.209187] ? exc_page_fault+0x64/0x140 [ 8.209190] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [ 8.209196] ? mutex_lock+0x19/0x30 [ 8.223116] uart_add_one_port+0x60/0x440 [ 8.223122] ? proc_tty_register_driver+0x43/0x50 [ 8.223126] ? tty_register_driver+0x1ca/0x1e0 [ 8.246250] ulite_probe+0x357/0x4b0 [uartlite] Para evitarlo, mueva el registro del controlador UART a la funci\u00f3n init. Esto garantizar\u00e1 que uart_driver siempre se registre al llamar a la funci\u00f3n de sondeo."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2025-38262",
  "lastModified": "2025-07-17T17:15:39.130",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2025-07-09T11:15:28.570",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5015eed450005bab6e5cb6810f7a62eab0434fc4"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/685d29f2c5057b32c7b1b46f2a7d303b926c8f72"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6bd697b5fc39fd24e2aa418c7b7d14469f550a93"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6db06aaea07bb7c8e33a425cf7b98bf29ee6056e"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8e958d10dd0ce5ae674cce460db5c9ca3f25243b"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9c905fdbba68a6d73d39a6b7de9b9f0d6c46df87"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f5e4229d94792b40e750f30c92bcf7a3107c72ef"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}


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