ghsa-27wg-99g8-2v4v
Vulnerability from github
Impact
In rust-evm
, a feature called record_external_operation
was introduced, allowing library users to record custom gas changes. This feature can have some bogus interactions with the call stack.
In particular, during finalization of a CREATE
or CREATE2
, in the case that the substack execution happens successfully, rust-evm
will first commit the substate, and then call record_external_operation(Write(out_code.len()))
. If record_external_operation
later fails, this error is returned to the parent call stack, instead of Succeeded
. Yet, the substate commitment already happened. This causes smart contracts able to commit state changes, when the parent caller contract receives zero address (which usually indicates that the execution has failed).
This issue only impacts library users with custom record_external_operation
that returns errors.
Patches
The issue is patched in release 0.41.1. The commit can be seem here.
Workarounds
None.
References
Patch PR #264.
{ "affected": [ { "database_specific": { "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.41.0" }, "package": { "ecosystem": "crates.io", "name": "evm" }, "ranges": [ { "events": [ { "introduced": "0" }, { "fixed": "0.41.1" } ], "type": "ECOSYSTEM" } ] } ], "aliases": [ "CVE-2024-21629" ], "database_specific": { "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-703" ], "github_reviewed": true, "github_reviewed_at": "2024-01-03T21:48:34Z", "nvd_published_at": "2024-01-02T22:15:09Z", "severity": "MODERATE" }, "details": "### Impact\n\nIn `rust-evm`, a feature called `record_external_operation` was introduced, allowing library users to record custom gas changes. This feature can have some bogus interactions with the call stack.\n\nIn particular, during finalization of a `CREATE` or `CREATE2`, in the case that [the substack execution happens successfully](https://github.com/rust-ethereum/evm/blob/release-v041/src/executor/stack/executor.rs#L1012C25-L1012C69), `rust-evm` will first commit the substate, and then call `record_external_operation(Write(out_code.len()))`. If `record_external_operation` later fails, this error is returned to the parent call stack, instead of `Succeeded`. Yet, the substate commitment already happened. This causes smart contracts able to commit state changes, when the parent caller contract receives zero address (which usually indicates that the execution has failed).\n\nThis issue only impacts library users with custom `record_external_operation` that returns errors.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe issue is patched in release 0.41.1. The commit can be seem [here](https://github.com/rust-ethereum/evm/commit/d8991ec727ad0fb64fe9957a3cd307387a6701e4).\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNone.\n\n### References\n\nPatch PR [#264](https://github.com/rust-ethereum/evm/pull/264).\n", "id": "GHSA-27wg-99g8-2v4v", "modified": "2024-01-03T21:48:34Z", "published": "2024-01-03T21:48:34Z", "references": [ { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/rust-ethereum/evm/security/advisories/GHSA-27wg-99g8-2v4v" }, { "type": "ADVISORY", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-21629" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/rust-ethereum/evm/pull/264" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/rust-ethereum/evm/commit/d8991ec727ad0fb64fe9957a3cd307387a6701e4" }, { "type": "PACKAGE", "url": "https://github.com/rust-ethereum/evm" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/rust-ethereum/evm/blob/release-v041/src/executor/stack/executor.rs#L1012C25-L1012C69" } ], "schema_version": "1.4.0", "severity": [ { "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N", "type": "CVSS_V3" } ], "summary": "Rust EVM erroneousle handles `record_external_operation` error return" }
Sightings
Author | Source | Type | Date |
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Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.