ghsa-2j2m-cc64-3xh4
Vulnerability from github
Published
2025-05-02 18:31
Modified
2025-05-02 18:31
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf, sockmap: Fix an infinite loop error when len is 0 in tcp_bpf_recvmsg_parser()

When the buffer length of the recvmsg system call is 0, we got the flollowing soft lockup problem:

watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#3 stuck for 27s! [a.out:6149] CPU: 3 PID: 6149 Comm: a.out Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.2.0+ #30 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:remove_wait_queue+0xb/0xc0 Code: 5e 41 5f c3 cc cc cc cc 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 <41> 56 41 55 41 54 55 48 89 fd 53 48 89 f3 4c 8d 6b 18 4c 8d 73 20 RSP: 0018:ffff88811b5978b8 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88811a7d3780 RCX: ffffffffb7a4d768 RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: ffff88811b597908 RDI: ffff888115408040 RBP: 1ffff110236b2f1b R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88811a7d37e7 R10: ffffed10234fa6fc R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88811179b800 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff88811a7d38a8 R15: ffff88811a7d37e0 FS: 00007f6fb5398740(0000) GS:ffff888237180000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020000000 CR3: 000000010b6ba002 CR4: 0000000000370ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: tcp_msg_wait_data+0x279/0x2f0 tcp_bpf_recvmsg_parser+0x3c6/0x490 inet_recvmsg+0x280/0x290 sock_recvmsg+0xfc/0x120 _sysrecvmsg+0x160/0x3d0 _sys_recvmsg+0xf0/0x180 __sys_recvmsg+0xea/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc

The logic in tcp_bpf_recvmsg_parser is as follows:

msg_bytes_ready: copied = sk_msg_recvmsg(sk, psock, msg, len, flags); if (!copied) { wait data; goto msg_bytes_ready; }

In this case, "copied" always is 0, the infinite loop occurs.

According to the Linux system call man page, 0 should be returned in this case. Therefore, in tcp_bpf_recvmsg_parser(), if the length is 0, directly return. Also modify several other functions with the same problem.

Show details on source website


{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-53133"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-05-02T16:15:32Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf, sockmap: Fix an infinite loop error when len is 0 in tcp_bpf_recvmsg_parser()\n\nWhen the buffer length of the recvmsg system call is 0, we got the\nflollowing soft lockup problem:\n\nwatchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#3 stuck for 27s! [a.out:6149]\nCPU: 3 PID: 6149 Comm: a.out Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.2.0+ #30\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014\nRIP: 0010:remove_wait_queue+0xb/0xc0\nCode: 5e 41 5f c3 cc cc cc cc 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 \u003c41\u003e 56 41 55 41 54 55 48 89 fd 53 48 89 f3 4c 8d 6b 18 4c 8d 73 20\nRSP: 0018:ffff88811b5978b8 EFLAGS: 00000246\nRAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88811a7d3780 RCX: ffffffffb7a4d768\nRDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: ffff88811b597908 RDI: ffff888115408040\nRBP: 1ffff110236b2f1b R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88811a7d37e7\nR10: ffffed10234fa6fc R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88811179b800\nR13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff88811a7d38a8 R15: ffff88811a7d37e0\nFS:  00007f6fb5398740(0000) GS:ffff888237180000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 0000000020000000 CR3: 000000010b6ba002 CR4: 0000000000370ee0\nDR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\nDR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n tcp_msg_wait_data+0x279/0x2f0\n tcp_bpf_recvmsg_parser+0x3c6/0x490\n inet_recvmsg+0x280/0x290\n sock_recvmsg+0xfc/0x120\n ____sys_recvmsg+0x160/0x3d0\n ___sys_recvmsg+0xf0/0x180\n __sys_recvmsg+0xea/0x1a0\n do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc\n\nThe logic in tcp_bpf_recvmsg_parser is as follows:\n\nmsg_bytes_ready:\n\tcopied = sk_msg_recvmsg(sk, psock, msg, len, flags);\n\tif (!copied) {\n\t\twait data;\n\t\tgoto msg_bytes_ready;\n\t}\n\nIn this case, \"copied\" always is 0, the infinite loop occurs.\n\nAccording to the Linux system call man page, 0 should be returned in this\ncase. Therefore, in tcp_bpf_recvmsg_parser(), if the length is 0, directly\nreturn. Also modify several other functions with the same problem.",
  "id": "GHSA-2j2m-cc64-3xh4",
  "modified": "2025-05-02T18:31:38Z",
  "published": "2025-05-02T18:31:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-53133"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4a476285f6d2921c3c9faa494eab83b78f78fc55"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf0579989de64d36e177c0611c685dc4a91457a7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d900f3d20cc3169ce42ec72acc850e662a4d4db2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f45cf3ae3068e70e2c7f3e24a7f8e8aa99511f03"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}


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