ghsa-3r7x-52q9-w4pw
Vulnerability from github
Published
2025-05-01 15:31
Modified
2025-05-02 09:30
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mptcp: fix NULL pointer in can_accept_new_subflow

When testing valkey benchmark tool with MPTCP, the kernel panics in 'mptcp_can_accept_new_subflow' because subflow_req->msk is NULL.

Call trace:

mptcp_can_accept_new_subflow (./net/mptcp/subflow.c:63 (discriminator 4)) (P) subflow_syn_recv_sock (./net/mptcp/subflow.c:854) tcp_check_req (./net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c:863) tcp_v4_rcv (./net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2268) ip_protocol_deliver_rcu (./net/ipv4/ip_input.c:207) ip_local_deliver_finish (./net/ipv4/ip_input.c:234) ip_local_deliver (./net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254) ip_rcv_finish (./net/ipv4/ip_input.c:449) ...

According to the debug log, the same req received two SYN-ACK in a very short time, very likely because the client retransmits the syn ack due to multiple reasons.

Even if the packets are transmitted with a relevant time interval, they can be processed by the server on different CPUs concurrently). The 'subflow_req->msk' ownership is transferred to the subflow the first, and there will be a risk of a null pointer dereference here.

This patch fixes this issue by moving the 'subflow_req->msk' under the own_req == true conditional.

Note that the !msk check in subflow_hmac_valid() can be dropped, because the same check already exists under the own_req mpj branch where the code has been moved to.

Show details on source website


{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-23145"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-05-01T13:15:50Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmptcp: fix NULL pointer in can_accept_new_subflow\n\nWhen testing valkey benchmark tool with MPTCP, the kernel panics in\n\u0027mptcp_can_accept_new_subflow\u0027 because subflow_req-\u003emsk is NULL.\n\nCall trace:\n\n  mptcp_can_accept_new_subflow (./net/mptcp/subflow.c:63 (discriminator 4)) (P)\n  subflow_syn_recv_sock (./net/mptcp/subflow.c:854)\n  tcp_check_req (./net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c:863)\n  tcp_v4_rcv (./net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2268)\n  ip_protocol_deliver_rcu (./net/ipv4/ip_input.c:207)\n  ip_local_deliver_finish (./net/ipv4/ip_input.c:234)\n  ip_local_deliver (./net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254)\n  ip_rcv_finish (./net/ipv4/ip_input.c:449)\n  ...\n\nAccording to the debug log, the same req received two SYN-ACK in a very\nshort time, very likely because the client retransmits the syn ack due\nto multiple reasons.\n\nEven if the packets are transmitted with a relevant time interval, they\ncan be processed by the server on different CPUs concurrently). The\n\u0027subflow_req-\u003emsk\u0027 ownership is transferred to the subflow the first,\nand there will be a risk of a null pointer dereference here.\n\nThis patch fixes this issue by moving the \u0027subflow_req-\u003emsk\u0027 under the\n`own_req == true` conditional.\n\nNote that the !msk check in subflow_hmac_valid() can be dropped, because\nthe same check already exists under the own_req mpj branch where the\ncode has been moved to.",
  "id": "GHSA-3r7x-52q9-w4pw",
  "modified": "2025-05-02T09:30:31Z",
  "published": "2025-05-01T15:31:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-23145"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/443041deb5ef6a1289a99ed95015ec7442f141dc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4b2649b9717678aeb097893cc49f59311a1ecab0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7f9ae060ed64aef8f174c5f1ea513825b1be9af1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/855bf0aacd51fced11ea9aa0d5101ee0febaeadb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8cf7fef1bb2ffea7792bcbf71ca00216cecc725d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b3088bd2a6790c8efff139d86d7a9d0b1305977b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dc81e41a307df523072186b241fa8244fecd7803"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/efd58a8dd9e7a709a90ee486a4247c923d27296f"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}


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