ghsa-5hcj-rwm6-xmw4
Vulnerability from github
Published
2024-07-31 18:48
Modified
2024-11-18 16:26
Summary
biscuit-java vulnerable to public key confusion in third party block
Details

Impact

Tokens with third-party blocks containing trusted annotations generated through a third party block request. Due to implementation issues in biscuit-java, third party block support in published versions is inoperating. Nevertheless, to synchronize with other implementations, we publish this advisory and the related fix.

Description

Third-party blocks can be generated without transferring the whole token to the third-party authority. Instead, a ThirdPartyBlock request can be sent, providing only the necessary info to generate a third-party block and to sign it:

the public key of the previous block (used in the signature) the public keys part of the token symbol table (for public key interning in datalog expressions) A third-part block request forged by a malicious user can trick the third-party authority into generating datalog trusting the wrong keypair.

Consider the following example (nominal case) * Authority A emits the following token: check if thirdparty("b") trusting ${pubkeyB} * The well-behaving holder then generates a third-party block request based on the token and sends it to third-party authority B * Third-party B generates the following third-party block thirdparty("b"); check if thirdparty("c") trusting ${pubkeyC} * The token holder now must obtain a third-party block from third party C to be able to use the token

Now, with a malicious user: * Authority A emits the following token: check if thirdparty("b") trusting ${pubkeyB} * The holder then attenuates the token with the following third party block thirdparty("c"), signed with a keypair pubkeyD, privkeyD) they generate * The holder then generates a third-party block request based on this token, but alter the ThirdPartyBlockRequest publicKeys field and replace pubkeyD with pubkeyC * Third-party B generates the following third-party block thirdparty("b"); check if thirdparty("c") trusting ${pubkeyC} * Due to the altered symbol table, the actual meaning of the block is thirdparty("b"); check if thirdparty("c") trusting ${pubkeyD} * The attacker can now use the token without obtaining a third-party block from C.

Patches

Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?

Workarounds

Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?

References

Are there any links users can visit to find out more?

Show details on source website


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.biscuitsec:biscuit"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-41948"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1259"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-07-31T18:48:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-08-01T22:15:28Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nTokens with third-party blocks containing trusted annotations generated through a third party block request. Due to implementation issues in biscuit-java,  third party block support in published versions is inoperating. Nevertheless, to synchronize with other implementations, we publish this advisory and the related fix.\n\n### Description\nThird-party blocks can be generated without transferring the whole token to the third-party authority. Instead, a `ThirdPartyBlock` request can be sent, providing only the necessary info to generate a third-party block and to sign it:\n\nthe public key of the previous block (used in the signature)\nthe public keys part of the token symbol table (for public key interning in datalog expressions)\nA third-part block request forged by a malicious user can trick the third-party authority into generating datalog trusting the wrong keypair.\n\nConsider the following example (nominal case)\n* Authority A emits the following token: `check if thirdparty(\"b\") trusting ${pubkeyB}`\n* The well-behaving holder then generates a third-party block request based on the token and sends it to third-party authority B\n* Third-party B generates the following third-party block `thirdparty(\"b\"); check if thirdparty(\"c\") trusting ${pubkeyC}`\n* The token holder now must obtain a third-party block from third party C to be able to use the token\n\nNow, with a malicious user:\n* Authority A emits the following token: `check if thirdparty(\"b\") trusting ${pubkeyB}`\n* The holder then attenuates the token with the following third party block `thirdparty(\"c\")`, signed with a keypair pubkeyD, privkeyD) they generate\n* The holder then generates a third-party block request based on this token, but alter the `ThirdPartyBlockRequest` publicKeys field and replace pubkeyD with pubkeyC\n* Third-party B generates the following third-party block `thirdparty(\"b\"); check if thirdparty(\"c\") trusting ${pubkeyC}`\n* Due to the altered symbol table, the actual meaning of the block is `thirdparty(\"b\"); check if thirdparty(\"c\") trusting ${pubkeyD}`\n* The attacker can now use the token without obtaining a third-party block from C.\n\n### Patches\n_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_\n\n### Workarounds\n_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_\n\n### References\n_Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_\n\n",
  "id": "GHSA-5hcj-rwm6-xmw4",
  "modified": "2024-11-18T16:26:57Z",
  "published": "2024-07-31T18:48:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/biscuit-auth/biscuit-java/security/advisories/GHSA-5hcj-rwm6-xmw4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/biscuit-auth/biscuit/security/advisories/GHSA-rgqv-mwc3-c78m"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-41948"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/biscuit-auth/biscuit-java/commit/2e05e7b3f8f2aae38f33294f19419e2d638cb564"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/biscuit-auth/biscuit-java"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/biscuit-auth/biscuit-java/releases/tag/4.0.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "biscuit-java vulnerable to public key confusion in third party block"
}


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