ghsa-5v2q-9mrf-qmcj
Vulnerability from github
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: tcpm: fix warning when handle discover_identity message
Since both source and sink device can send discover_identity message in PD3, kernel may dump below warning:
------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 169 at drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c:1446 tcpm_queue_vdm+0xe0/0xf0 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 169 Comm: 1-0050 Not tainted 6.1.1-00038-g6a3c36cf1da2-dirty #567 Hardware name: NXP i.MX8MPlus EVK board (DT) pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : tcpm_queue_vdm+0xe0/0xf0 lr : tcpm_queue_vdm+0x2c/0xf0 sp : ffff80000c19bcd0 x29: ffff80000c19bcd0 x28: 0000000000000001 x27: ffff0000d11c8ab8 x26: ffff0000d11cc000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 00000000ff008081 x23: 0000000000000001 x22: 00000000ff00a081 x21: ffff80000c19bdbc x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff0000d11c8080 x18: ffffffffffffffff x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffff0000d716f580 x14: 0000000000000001 x13: ffff0000d716f507 x12: 0000000000000001 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000020 x9 : 00000000000ee098 x8 : 00000000ffffffff x7 : 000000000000001c x6 : ffff0000d716f580 x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffff80000c19bdbc x1 : 00000000ff00a081 x0 : 0000000000000004 Call trace: tcpm_queue_vdm+0xe0/0xf0 tcpm_pd_rx_handler+0x340/0x1ab0 kthread_worker_fn+0xcc/0x18c kthread+0x10c/0x110 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Below sequences may trigger this warning:
tcpm_send_discover_work(work) tcpm_send_vdm(port, USB_SID_PD, CMD_DISCOVER_IDENT, NULL, 0); tcpm_queue_vdm(port, header, data, count); port->vdm_state = VDM_STATE_READY;
vdm_state_machine_work(work); <-- received discover_identity from partner vdm_run_state_machine(port); port->vdm_state = VDM_STATE_SEND_MESSAGE; mod_vdm_delayed_work(port, x);
tcpm_pd_rx_handler(work); tcpm_pd_data_request(port, msg); tcpm_handle_vdm_request(port, msg->payload, cnt); tcpm_queue_vdm(port, response[0], &response[1], rlen - 1); --> WARN_ON(port->vdm_state > VDM_STATE_DONE);
For this case, the state machine could still send out discover identity message later if we skip current discover_identity message. So we should handle the received message firstly and override the pending discover_identity message without warning in this case. Then, a delayed send_discover work will send discover_identity message again.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-53048"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-05-02T16:15:23Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusb: typec: tcpm: fix warning when handle discover_identity message\n\nSince both source and sink device can send discover_identity message in\nPD3, kernel may dump below warning:\n\n------------[ cut here ]------------\nWARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 169 at drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c:1446 tcpm_queue_vdm+0xe0/0xf0\nModules linked in:\nCPU: 0 PID: 169 Comm: 1-0050 Not tainted 6.1.1-00038-g6a3c36cf1da2-dirty #567\nHardware name: NXP i.MX8MPlus EVK board (DT)\npstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)\npc : tcpm_queue_vdm+0xe0/0xf0\nlr : tcpm_queue_vdm+0x2c/0xf0\nsp : ffff80000c19bcd0\nx29: ffff80000c19bcd0 x28: 0000000000000001 x27: ffff0000d11c8ab8\nx26: ffff0000d11cc000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 00000000ff008081\nx23: 0000000000000001 x22: 00000000ff00a081 x21: ffff80000c19bdbc\nx20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff0000d11c8080 x18: ffffffffffffffff\nx17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffff0000d716f580\nx14: 0000000000000001 x13: ffff0000d716f507 x12: 0000000000000001\nx11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000020 x9 : 00000000000ee098\nx8 : 00000000ffffffff x7 : 000000000000001c x6 : ffff0000d716f580\nx5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000\nx2 : ffff80000c19bdbc x1 : 00000000ff00a081 x0 : 0000000000000004\nCall trace:\ntcpm_queue_vdm+0xe0/0xf0\ntcpm_pd_rx_handler+0x340/0x1ab0\nkthread_worker_fn+0xcc/0x18c\nkthread+0x10c/0x110\nret_from_fork+0x10/0x20\n---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---\n\nBelow sequences may trigger this warning:\n\ntcpm_send_discover_work(work)\n tcpm_send_vdm(port, USB_SID_PD, CMD_DISCOVER_IDENT, NULL, 0);\n tcpm_queue_vdm(port, header, data, count);\n port-\u003evdm_state = VDM_STATE_READY;\n\nvdm_state_machine_work(work);\n\t\t\t\u003c-- received discover_identity from partner\n vdm_run_state_machine(port);\n port-\u003evdm_state = VDM_STATE_SEND_MESSAGE;\n mod_vdm_delayed_work(port, x);\n\ntcpm_pd_rx_handler(work);\n tcpm_pd_data_request(port, msg);\n tcpm_handle_vdm_request(port, msg-\u003epayload, cnt);\n tcpm_queue_vdm(port, response[0], \u0026response[1], rlen - 1);\n--\u003e WARN_ON(port-\u003evdm_state \u003e VDM_STATE_DONE);\n\nFor this case, the state machine could still send out discover\nidentity message later if we skip current discover_identity message.\nSo we should handle the received message firstly and override the pending\ndiscover_identity message without warning in this case. Then, a delayed\nsend_discover work will send discover_identity message again.",
"id": "GHSA-5v2q-9mrf-qmcj",
"modified": "2025-05-02T18:31:33Z",
"published": "2025-05-02T18:31:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-53048"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/abfc4fa28f0160df61c7149567da4f6494dfb488"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bb579b3f75c60bf488a7c36e092e8be583407d53"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d55ca2d2ea1a7ec553213986993fba8c0257381c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e37d2c489d71e94ed4a39529bc9520a7fd983d42"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
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