ghsa-93hq-5wgc-jc82
Vulnerability from github
Published
2023-04-20 14:11
Modified
2023-04-27 15:35
Summary
GovernorCompatibilityBravo may trim proposal calldata
Details

Impact

The proposal creation entrypoint (propose) in GovernorCompatibilityBravo allows the creation of proposals with a signatures array shorter than the calldatas array. This causes the additional elements of the latter to be ignored, and if the proposal succeeds the corresponding actions would eventually execute without any calldata. The ProposalCreated event correctly represents what will eventually execute, but the proposal parameters as queried through getActions appear to respect the original intended calldata.

Patches

This issue has been patched in v4.8.3.

Workarounds

Ensure that all proposals that pass through governance have equal length signatures and calldatas parameters.

Show details on source website


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@openzeppelin/contracts"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.3.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.8.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.3.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.8.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-30542"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-04-20T14:11:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-04-16T08:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nThe proposal creation entrypoint (`propose`) in `GovernorCompatibilityBravo` allows the creation of proposals with a `signatures` array shorter than the `calldatas` array. This causes the additional elements of the latter to be ignored, and if the proposal succeeds the corresponding actions would eventually execute without any calldata. The `ProposalCreated` event correctly represents what will eventually execute, but the proposal parameters as queried through `getActions` appear to respect the original intended calldata.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis issue has been patched in v4.8.3.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nEnsure that all proposals that pass through governance have equal length `signatures` and `calldatas` parameters.\n",
  "id": "GHSA-93hq-5wgc-jc82",
  "modified": "2023-04-27T15:35:33Z",
  "published": "2023-04-20T14:11:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/security/advisories/GHSA-93hq-5wgc-jc82"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-30542"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/commit/8d633cb7d169f2f8595b273660b00b69e845c2fe"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/releases/tag/v4.8.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "GovernorCompatibilityBravo may trim proposal calldata"
}


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