ghsa-cfgj-2h5j-cvp7
Vulnerability from github
Published
2025-05-01 15:31
Modified
2025-05-01 15:31
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

9p/trans_fd: always use O_NONBLOCK read/write

syzbot is reporting hung task at p9_fd_close() [1], for p9_mux_poll_stop() from p9_conn_destroy() from p9_fd_close() is failing to interrupt already started kernel_read() from p9_fd_read() from p9_read_work() and/or kernel_write() from p9_fd_write() from p9_write_work() requests.

Since p9_socket_open() sets O_NONBLOCK flag, p9_mux_poll_stop() does not need to interrupt kernel_read()/kernel_write(). However, since p9_fd_open() does not set O_NONBLOCK flag, but pipe blocks unless signal is pending, p9_mux_poll_stop() needs to interrupt kernel_read()/kernel_write() when the file descriptor refers to a pipe. In other words, pipe file descriptor needs to be handled as if socket file descriptor.

We somehow need to interrupt kernel_read()/kernel_write() on pipes.

A minimal change, which this patch is doing, is to set O_NONBLOCK flag from p9_fd_open(), for O_NONBLOCK flag does not affect reading/writing of regular files. But this approach changes O_NONBLOCK flag on userspace- supplied file descriptors (which might break userspace programs), and O_NONBLOCK flag could be changed by userspace. It would be possible to set O_NONBLOCK flag every time p9_fd_read()/p9_fd_write() is invoked, but still remains small race window for clearing O_NONBLOCK flag.

If we don't want to manipulate O_NONBLOCK flag, we might be able to surround kernel_read()/kernel_write() with set_thread_flag(TIF_SIGPENDING) and recalc_sigpending(). Since p9_read_work()/p9_write_work() works are processed by kernel threads which process global system_wq workqueue, signals could not be delivered from remote threads when p9_mux_poll_stop() from p9_conn_destroy() from p9_fd_close() is called. Therefore, calling set_thread_flag(TIF_SIGPENDING)/recalc_sigpending() every time would be needed if we count on signals for making kernel_read()/kernel_write() non-blocking.

[Dominique: add comment at Christian's suggestion]

Show details on source website


{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-49767"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-05-01T15:15:59Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\n9p/trans_fd: always use O_NONBLOCK read/write\n\nsyzbot is reporting hung task at p9_fd_close() [1], for p9_mux_poll_stop()\n from p9_conn_destroy() from p9_fd_close() is failing to interrupt already\nstarted kernel_read() from p9_fd_read() from p9_read_work() and/or\nkernel_write() from p9_fd_write() from p9_write_work() requests.\n\nSince p9_socket_open() sets O_NONBLOCK flag, p9_mux_poll_stop() does not\nneed to interrupt kernel_read()/kernel_write(). However, since p9_fd_open()\ndoes not set O_NONBLOCK flag, but pipe blocks unless signal is pending,\np9_mux_poll_stop() needs to interrupt kernel_read()/kernel_write() when\nthe file descriptor refers to a pipe. In other words, pipe file descriptor\nneeds to be handled as if socket file descriptor.\n\nWe somehow need to interrupt kernel_read()/kernel_write() on pipes.\n\nA minimal change, which this patch is doing, is to set O_NONBLOCK flag\n from p9_fd_open(), for O_NONBLOCK flag does not affect reading/writing\nof regular files. But this approach changes O_NONBLOCK flag on userspace-\nsupplied file descriptors (which might break userspace programs), and\nO_NONBLOCK flag could be changed by userspace. It would be possible to set\nO_NONBLOCK flag every time p9_fd_read()/p9_fd_write() is invoked, but still\nremains small race window for clearing O_NONBLOCK flag.\n\nIf we don\u0027t want to manipulate O_NONBLOCK flag, we might be able to\nsurround kernel_read()/kernel_write() with set_thread_flag(TIF_SIGPENDING)\nand recalc_sigpending(). Since p9_read_work()/p9_write_work() works are\nprocessed by kernel threads which process global system_wq workqueue,\nsignals could not be delivered from remote threads when p9_mux_poll_stop()\n from p9_conn_destroy() from p9_fd_close() is called. Therefore, calling\nset_thread_flag(TIF_SIGPENDING)/recalc_sigpending() every time would be\nneeded if we count on signals for making kernel_read()/kernel_write()\nnon-blocking.\n\n[Dominique: add comment at Christian\u0027s suggestion]",
  "id": "GHSA-cfgj-2h5j-cvp7",
  "modified": "2025-05-01T15:31:46Z",
  "published": "2025-05-01T15:31:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-49767"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0b5e6bd72b8171364616841603a70e4ba9837063"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0e07032b4b4724b8ad1003698cb81083c1818999"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5af16182c5639349415118e9e9aecd8355f7a08b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7abf40f06a76c0dff42eada10597917e9776fbd4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9f8554615df668e4bf83294633ee9d232b28ce45"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a8e2fc8f7b41fa9d9ca5f624f4e4d34fce5b40a9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b1ad04da7fe4515e2ce2d5f2dcab3b5b6d45614b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ef575281b21e9a34dfae544a187c6aac2ae424a9"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}


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