ghsa-cvxq-qv5g-cqw6
Vulnerability from github
Published
2024-12-28 12:30
Modified
2025-02-03 15:32
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Mark raw_tp arguments with PTR_MAYBE_NULL

Arguments to a raw tracepoint are tagged as trusted, which carries the semantics that the pointer will be non-NULL. However, in certain cases, a raw tracepoint argument may end up being NULL. More context about this issue is available in 0.

Thus, there is a discrepancy between the reality, that raw_tp arguments can actually be NULL, and the verifier's knowledge, that they are never NULL, causing explicit NULL checks to be deleted, and accesses to such pointers potentially crashing the kernel.

To fix this, mark raw_tp arguments as PTR_MAYBE_NULL, and then special case the dereference and pointer arithmetic to permit it, and allow passing them into helpers/kfuncs; these exceptions are made for raw_tp programs only. Ensure that we don't do this when ref_obj_id > 0, as in that case this is an acquired object and doesn't need such adjustment.

The reason we do mask_raw_tp_trusted_reg logic is because other will recheck in places whether the register is a trusted_reg, and then consider our register as untrusted when detecting the presence of the PTR_MAYBE_NULL flag.

To allow safe dereference, we enable PROBE_MEM marking when we see loads into trusted pointers with PTR_MAYBE_NULL.

While trusted raw_tp arguments can also be passed into helpers or kfuncs where such broken assumption may cause issues, a future patch set will tackle their case separately, as PTR_TO_BTF_ID (without PTR_TRUSTED) can already be passed into helpers and causes similar problems. Thus, they are left alone for now.

It is possible that these checks also permit passing non-raw_tp args that are trusted PTR_TO_BTF_ID with null marking. In such a case, allowing dereference when pointer is NULL expands allowed behavior, so won't regress existing programs, and the case of passing these into helpers is the same as above and will be dealt with later.

Also update the failure case in tp_btf_nullable selftest to capture the new behavior, as the verifier will no longer cause an error when directly dereference a raw tracepoint argument marked as __nullable.

Show details on source website


{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-56702"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-476"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-12-28T10:15:17Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Mark raw_tp arguments with PTR_MAYBE_NULL\n\nArguments to a raw tracepoint are tagged as trusted, which carries the\nsemantics that the pointer will be non-NULL.  However, in certain cases,\na raw tracepoint argument may end up being NULL. More context about this\nissue is available in [0].\n\nThus, there is a discrepancy between the reality, that raw_tp arguments\ncan actually be NULL, and the verifier\u0027s knowledge, that they are never\nNULL, causing explicit NULL checks to be deleted, and accesses to such\npointers potentially crashing the kernel.\n\nTo fix this, mark raw_tp arguments as PTR_MAYBE_NULL, and then special\ncase the dereference and pointer arithmetic to permit it, and allow\npassing them into helpers/kfuncs; these exceptions are made for raw_tp\nprograms only. Ensure that we don\u0027t do this when ref_obj_id \u003e 0, as in\nthat case this is an acquired object and doesn\u0027t need such adjustment.\n\nThe reason we do mask_raw_tp_trusted_reg logic is because other will\nrecheck in places whether the register is a trusted_reg, and then\nconsider our register as untrusted when detecting the presence of the\nPTR_MAYBE_NULL flag.\n\nTo allow safe dereference, we enable PROBE_MEM marking when we see loads\ninto trusted pointers with PTR_MAYBE_NULL.\n\nWhile trusted raw_tp arguments can also be passed into helpers or kfuncs\nwhere such broken assumption may cause issues, a future patch set will\ntackle their case separately, as PTR_TO_BTF_ID (without PTR_TRUSTED) can\nalready be passed into helpers and causes similar problems. Thus, they\nare left alone for now.\n\nIt is possible that these checks also permit passing non-raw_tp args\nthat are trusted PTR_TO_BTF_ID with null marking. In such a case,\nallowing dereference when pointer is NULL expands allowed behavior, so\nwon\u0027t regress existing programs, and the case of passing these into\nhelpers is the same as above and will be dealt with later.\n\nAlso update the failure case in tp_btf_nullable selftest to capture the\nnew behavior, as the verifier will no longer cause an error when\ndirectly dereference a raw tracepoint argument marked as __nullable.\n\n  [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/ZrCZS6nisraEqehw@jlelli-thinkpadt14gen4.remote.csb",
  "id": "GHSA-cvxq-qv5g-cqw6",
  "modified": "2025-02-03T15:32:01Z",
  "published": "2024-12-28T12:30:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-56702"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3634d4a310820567fc634bf8f1ee2b91378773e8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c9b91d2d54175f781ad2c361cb2ac2c0e29b14b6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cb4158ce8ec8a5bb528cc1693356a5eb8058094d"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}


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