ghsa-gjv3-89hh-9xq2
Vulnerability from github
Impact
Prior to 2.1.1 and 2.2.0, the Steel.validateCommitment
Solidity library function will return true
for a crafted commitment with a digest value of zero.
This violates the semantics of validateCommitment
, as this does not commitment to a block that is in the current chain. Because the digest is zero, it does not correspond to any block and there exist no known openings. As a result, this commitment will never be produced by a correct zkVM guest using Steel. Leveraging this bug to compromise the soundness of an application using Steel would require a separate bug or misuse of the Steel library, which is expected to be used to validate the root of state opening proofs (e.g. having the guest commit to a digest of zero, or failing to check the zkVM proof).
Because this bug does not risk application integrity, correctly written applications are not at risk.
Fix
Please see #605 for a full description of the bug, and the fix. This fix has been released as part of risc0-ethereum
2.1.1 and 2.2.0.
Recommended actions
Users for the Steel
Solidity library versions 2.1.0 or earlier should ensure they are using Steel.validateCommitment
in tandem with zkVM proof verification of a Steel program, as shown in the ERC-20 counter example, and documentation. This is the correct usage of Steel, and users following this pattern are not at risk, and do not need to take action.
Users not verifying a zkVM proof of a Steel program should update their application to do so, as this is incorrect usage of Steel.
Credit
A thank you to Daniel526 on HackenProof for reporting this issue
{ "affected": [ { "package": { "ecosystem": "crates.io", "name": "risc0-ethereum-contracts" }, "ranges": [ { "events": [ { "introduced": "0" }, { "fixed": "2.1.1" } ], "type": "ECOSYSTEM" } ] } ], "aliases": [ "CVE-2025-52884" ], "database_specific": { "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-159" ], "github_reviewed": true, "github_reviewed_at": "2025-06-25T21:27:59Z", "nvd_published_at": "2025-06-24T21:15:26Z", "severity": "LOW" }, "details": "### Impact\n\nPrior to 2.1.1 and 2.2.0, the `Steel.validateCommitment` Solidity library function will return `true` for a crafted commitment with a digest value of zero.\n\nThis violates the semantics of `validateCommitment`, as this does not commitment to a block that is in the current chain. Because the digest is zero, it does not correspond to any block and there exist no known openings. As a result, this commitment will never be produced by a correct zkVM guest using Steel. Leveraging this bug to compromise the soundness of an application using Steel would require a separate bug or misuse of the Steel library, which is expected to be used to validate the root of state opening proofs (e.g. having the guest commit to a digest of zero, or failing to check the zkVM proof).\n\nBecause this bug does not risk application integrity, correctly written applications are not at risk.\n\n### Fix\n\nPlease see [#605] for a full description of the bug, and the fix. This fix has been released as part of `risc0-ethereum` [2.1.1] and [2.2.0].\n\n### Recommended actions\n\nUsers for the `Steel` Solidity library versions 2.1.0 or earlier should ensure they are using `Steel.validateCommitment` in tandem with zkVM proof verification of a Steel program, as shown in the [ERC-20 counter example][example], and [documentation]. This is the correct usage of Steel, and users following this pattern are not at risk, and do not need to take action.\n\nUsers not verifying a zkVM proof of a Steel program should update their application to do so, as this is incorrect usage of Steel.\n\n### Credit\n\nA thank you to Daniel526 on HackenProof for reporting this issue\n\n[#605]: https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/pull/605\n[example]: https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/blob/ff0cb9253a87945b653b825711b8b5075f8b7545/examples/erc20-counter/contracts/src/Counter.sol#L56-L63\n[documentation]: https://docs.beboundless.xyz/developers/steel/how-it-works#verifying-the-proof-onchain\n[2.1.1]: https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/releases/tag/v2.1.1\n[2.2.0]: https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/releases/tag/v2.2.0", "id": "GHSA-gjv3-89hh-9xq2", "modified": "2025-06-25T21:28:00Z", "published": "2025-06-25T21:27:59Z", "references": [ { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/security/advisories/GHSA-gjv3-89hh-9xq2" }, { "type": "ADVISORY", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-52884" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/pull/605" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/commit/3bbac859c7132b21ba5fdf2d47f1dd52e7e73d98" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://docs.beboundless.xyz/developers/steel/how-it-works#verifying-the-proof-onchain" }, { "type": "PACKAGE", "url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/blob/ff0cb9253a87945b653b825711b8b5075f8b7545/examples/erc20-counter/contracts/src/Counter.sol#L56-L63" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/releases/tag/v2.1.1" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/releases/tag/v2.2.0" } ], "schema_version": "1.4.0", "severity": [ { "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U", "type": "CVSS_V4" } ], "summary": "RISC Zero Ethereum invalid commitment with digest value of zero accepted by Steel.validateCommitment" }
Sightings
Author | Source | Type | Date |
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Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.