ghsa-p82q-rxpm-hjpc
Vulnerability from github
Published
2022-12-21 18:48
Modified
2022-12-21 19:26
Summary
AAD Pod Identity obtaining token with backslash
Details

Impact

What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted? The NMI component in AAD Pod Identity intercepts and validates token requests based on regex. In this case, a token request made with backslash in the request (example: /metadata/identity\oauth2\token/) would bypass the NMI validation and be sent to IMDS allowing a pod in the cluster to access identities that it shouldn't have access to.

Patches

Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to? - We analyzed this bug and determined that we needed to fix it. This fix has been included in AAD Pod Identity release v1.8.13 - If using the AKS pod-managed identities add-on, no action is required. The clusters should now be running the v1.8.13 release.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

Open an issue in Azure/aad-pod-identity

Show details on source website


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/Azure/aad-pod-identity"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.8.13"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-23551"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-12-21T18:48:22Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-12-21T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\nThe [NMI](https://azure.github.io/aad-pod-identity/docs/concepts/nmi/) component in AAD Pod Identity intercepts and validates token requests based on regex. In this case, a token request made with backslash in the request (example: `/metadata/identity\\oauth2\\token/`) would bypass the NMI validation and be sent to [IMDS](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/windows/instance-metadata-service?tabs=windows) allowing a pod in the cluster to access identities that it shouldn\u0027t have access to.\n\n### Patches\n_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_\n- We analyzed this bug and determined that we needed to fix it. This fix has been included in AAD Pod Identity release [v1.8.13](https://github.com/Azure/aad-pod-identity/releases/tag/v1.8.13)\n- If using the [AKS pod-managed identities add-on](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/aks/use-azure-ad-pod-identity), no action is required. The clusters should now be running the `v1.8.13` release.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n\nOpen an issue in [Azure/aad-pod-identity](https://github.com/Azure/aad-pod-identity)\n",
  "id": "GHSA-p82q-rxpm-hjpc",
  "modified": "2022-12-21T19:26:02Z",
  "published": "2022-12-21T18:48:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Azure/aad-pod-identity/security/advisories/GHSA-p82q-rxpm-hjpc"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-23551"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Azure/aad-pod-identity/commit/7e01970391bde6c360d077066ca17d059204cb5d"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Azure/aad-pod-identity"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Azure/aad-pod-identity/releases/tag/v1.8.13"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AAD Pod Identity obtaining token with backslash"
}


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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
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