ghsa-v49w-m7p6-cj8x
Vulnerability from github
Published
2025-05-01 15:31
Modified
2025-05-01 15:31
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

kcm: close race conditions on sk_receive_queue

sk->sk_receive_queue is protected by skb queue lock, but for KCM sockets its RX path takes mux->rx_lock to protect more than just skb queue. However, kcm_recvmsg() still only grabs the skb queue lock, so race conditions still exist.

We can teach kcm_recvmsg() to grab mux->rx_lock too but this would introduce a potential performance regression as struct kcm_mux can be shared by multiple KCM sockets.

So we have to enforce skb queue lock in requeue_rx_msgs() and handle skb peek case carefully in kcm_wait_data(). Fortunately, skb_recv_datagram() already handles it nicely and is widely used by other sockets, we can just switch to skb_recv_datagram() after getting rid of the unnecessary sock lock in kcm_recvmsg() and kcm_splice_read(). Side note: SOCK_DONE is not used by KCM sockets, so it is safe to get rid of this check too.

I ran the original syzbot reproducer for 30 min without seeing any issue.

Show details on source website


{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-49814"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-05-01T15:16:04Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nkcm: close race conditions on sk_receive_queue\n\nsk-\u003esk_receive_queue is protected by skb queue lock, but for KCM\nsockets its RX path takes mux-\u003erx_lock to protect more than just\nskb queue. However, kcm_recvmsg() still only grabs the skb queue\nlock, so race conditions still exist.\n\nWe can teach kcm_recvmsg() to grab mux-\u003erx_lock too but this would\nintroduce a potential performance regression as struct kcm_mux can\nbe shared by multiple KCM sockets.\n\nSo we have to enforce skb queue lock in requeue_rx_msgs() and handle\nskb peek case carefully in kcm_wait_data(). Fortunately,\nskb_recv_datagram() already handles it nicely and is widely used by\nother sockets, we can just switch to skb_recv_datagram() after\ngetting rid of the unnecessary sock lock in kcm_recvmsg() and\nkcm_splice_read(). Side note: SOCK_DONE is not used by KCM sockets,\nso it is safe to get rid of this check too.\n\nI ran the original syzbot reproducer for 30 min without seeing any\nissue.",
  "id": "GHSA-v49w-m7p6-cj8x",
  "modified": "2025-05-01T15:31:48Z",
  "published": "2025-05-01T15:31:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-49814"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/22f6b5d47396b4287662668ee3f5c1f766cb4259"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4154b6afa2bd639214ff259d912faad984f7413a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5121197ecc5db58c07da95eb1ff82b98b121a221"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf92e54597d842da127c59833b365d6faeeaf020"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce57d6474ae999a3b2d442314087473a646a65c7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d9ad4de92e184b19bcae4da10dac0275abf83931"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f7b0e95071bb4be4b811af3f0bfc3e200eedeaa3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}


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