gsd-2007-6755
Vulnerability from gsd
Modified
2023-12-13 01:21
Details
The NIST SP 800-90A default statement of the Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generation (Dual_EC_DRBG) algorithm contains point Q constants with a possible relationship to certain "skeleton key" values, which might allow context-dependent attackers to defeat cryptographic protection mechanisms by leveraging knowledge of those values. NOTE: this is a preliminary CVE for Dual_EC_DRBG; future research may provide additional details about point Q and associated attacks, and could potentially lead to a RECAST or REJECT of this CVE.
Aliases
Aliases
CVE-2007-6755


To clipboard 

{
  "GSD": {
    "alias": "CVE-2007-6755",
    "description": "The NIST SP 800-90A default statement of the Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generation (Dual_EC_DRBG) algorithm contains point Q constants with a possible relationship to certain \"skeleton key\" values, which might allow context-dependent attackers to defeat cryptographic protection mechanisms by leveraging knowledge of those values.  NOTE: this is a preliminary CVE for Dual_EC_DRBG; future research may provide additional details about point Q and associated attacks, and could potentially lead to a RECAST or REJECT of this CVE.",
    "id": "GSD-2007-6755",
    "references": [
      "https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2007-6755.html"
    ]
  },
  "gsd": {
    "metadata": {
      "exploitCode": "unknown",
      "remediation": "unknown",
      "reportConfidence": "confirmed",
      "type": "vulnerability"
    },
    "osvSchema": {
      "aliases": [
        "CVE-2007-6755"
      ],
      "details": "The NIST SP 800-90A default statement of the Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generation (Dual_EC_DRBG) algorithm contains point Q constants with a possible relationship to certain \"skeleton key\" values, which might allow context-dependent attackers to defeat cryptographic protection mechanisms by leveraging knowledge of those values.  NOTE: this is a preliminary CVE for Dual_EC_DRBG; future research may provide additional details about point Q and associated attacks, and could potentially lead to a RECAST or REJECT of this CVE.",
      "id": "GSD-2007-6755",
      "modified": "2023-12-13T01:21:38.767963Z",
      "schema_version": "1.4.0"
    }
  },
  "namespaces": {
    "cve.org": {
      "CVE_data_meta": {
        "ASSIGNER": "secalert_us@oracle.com",
        "ID": "CVE-2007-6755",
        "STATE": "PUBLIC"
      },
      "affects": {
        "vendor": {
          "vendor_data": [
            {
              "product": {
                "product_data": [
                  {
                    "product_name": "n/a",
                    "version": {
                      "version_data": [
                        {
                          "version_value": "n/a"
                        }
                      ]
                    }
                  }
                ]
              },
              "vendor_name": "n/a"
            }
          ]
        }
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      "data_version": "4.0",
      "description": {
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            "value": "The NIST SP 800-90A default statement of the Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generation (Dual_EC_DRBG) algorithm contains point Q constants with a possible relationship to certain \"skeleton key\" values, which might allow context-dependent attackers to defeat cryptographic protection mechanisms by leveraging knowledge of those values.  NOTE: this is a preliminary CVE for Dual_EC_DRBG; future research may provide additional details about point Q and associated attacks, and could potentially lead to a RECAST or REJECT of this CVE."
          }
        ]
      },
      "problemtype": {
        "problemtype_data": [
          {
            "description": [
              {
                "lang": "eng",
                "value": "n/a"
              }
            ]
          }
        ]
      },
      "references": {
        "reference_data": [
          {
            "name": "http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/rsa-warns-developers-against-its-own.html",
            "refsource": "MISC",
            "url": "http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/rsa-warns-developers-against-its-own.html"
          },
          {
            "name": "http://stream.wsj.com/story/latest-headlines/SS-2-63399/SS-2-332655/",
            "refsource": "MISC",
            "url": "http://stream.wsj.com/story/latest-headlines/SS-2-63399/SS-2-332655/"
          },
          {
            "name": "https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/11/the_strange_sto.html",
            "refsource": "MISC",
            "url": "https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/11/the_strange_sto.html"
          },
          {
            "name": "http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/the-many-flaws-of-dualecdrbg.html",
            "refsource": "MISC",
            "url": "http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/the-many-flaws-of-dualecdrbg.html"
          },
          {
            "name": "http://threatpost.com/in-wake-of-latest-crypto-revelations-everything-is-suspect",
            "refsource": "MISC",
            "url": "http://threatpost.com/in-wake-of-latest-crypto-revelations-everything-is-suspect"
          },
          {
            "name": "63657",
            "refsource": "BID",
            "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/63657"
          },
          {
            "name": "http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/09/stop-using-nsa-influence-code-in-our-product-rsa-tells-customers/",
            "refsource": "MISC",
            "url": "http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/09/stop-using-nsa-influence-code-in-our-product-rsa-tells-customers/"
          },
          {
            "name": "http://rump2007.cr.yp.to/15-shumow.pdf",
            "refsource": "MISC",
            "url": "http://rump2007.cr.yp.to/15-shumow.pdf"
          }
        ]
      }
    },
    "nvd.nist.gov": {
      "configurations": {
        "CVE_data_version": "4.0",
        "nodes": [
          {
            "children": [],
            "cpe_match": [
              {
                "cpe23Uri": "cpe:2.3:a:dell:bsafe_crypto-c-micro-edition:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                "cpe_name": [],
                "versionEndIncluding": "3.0.0.20",
                "versionStartIncluding": "3.0.0.0",
                "vulnerable": true
              },
              {
                "cpe23Uri": "cpe:2.3:a:dell:bsafe_crypto-j:5.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                "cpe_name": [],
                "vulnerable": true
              },
              {
                "cpe23Uri": "cpe:2.3:a:dell:bsafe_crypto-j:5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                "cpe_name": [],
                "vulnerable": true
              }
            ],
            "operator": "OR"
          }
        ]
      },
      "cve": {
        "CVE_data_meta": {
          "ASSIGNER": "secalert_us@oracle.com",
          "ID": "CVE-2007-6755"
        },
        "data_format": "MITRE",
        "data_type": "CVE",
        "data_version": "4.0",
        "description": {
          "description_data": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "The NIST SP 800-90A default statement of the Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generation (Dual_EC_DRBG) algorithm contains point Q constants with a possible relationship to certain \"skeleton key\" values, which might allow context-dependent attackers to defeat cryptographic protection mechanisms by leveraging knowledge of those values.  NOTE: this is a preliminary CVE for Dual_EC_DRBG; future research may provide additional details about point Q and associated attacks, and could potentially lead to a RECAST or REJECT of this CVE."
            }
          ]
        },
        "problemtype": {
          "problemtype_data": [
            {
              "description": [
                {
                  "lang": "en",
                  "value": "CWE-327"
                }
              ]
            }
          ]
        },
        "references": {
          "reference_data": [
            {
              "name": "http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/rsa-warns-developers-against-its-own.html",
              "refsource": "MISC",
              "tags": [
                "Third Party Advisory"
              ],
              "url": "http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/rsa-warns-developers-against-its-own.html"
            },
            {
              "name": "https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/11/the_strange_sto.html",
              "refsource": "MISC",
              "tags": [
                "Third Party Advisory"
              ],
              "url": "https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/11/the_strange_sto.html"
            },
            {
              "name": "http://rump2007.cr.yp.to/15-shumow.pdf",
              "refsource": "MISC",
              "tags": [
                "Third Party Advisory"
              ],
              "url": "http://rump2007.cr.yp.to/15-shumow.pdf"
            },
            {
              "name": "http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/the-many-flaws-of-dualecdrbg.html",
              "refsource": "MISC",
              "tags": [
                "Third Party Advisory"
              ],
              "url": "http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/the-many-flaws-of-dualecdrbg.html"
            },
            {
              "name": "http://threatpost.com/in-wake-of-latest-crypto-revelations-everything-is-suspect",
              "refsource": "MISC",
              "tags": [
                "Third Party Advisory"
              ],
              "url": "http://threatpost.com/in-wake-of-latest-crypto-revelations-everything-is-suspect"
            },
            {
              "name": "http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/09/stop-using-nsa-influence-code-in-our-product-rsa-tells-customers/",
              "refsource": "MISC",
              "tags": [
                "Third Party Advisory"
              ],
              "url": "http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/09/stop-using-nsa-influence-code-in-our-product-rsa-tells-customers/"
            },
            {
              "name": "http://stream.wsj.com/story/latest-headlines/SS-2-63399/SS-2-332655/",
              "refsource": "MISC",
              "tags": [
                "Not Applicable"
              ],
              "url": "http://stream.wsj.com/story/latest-headlines/SS-2-63399/SS-2-332655/"
            },
            {
              "name": "63657",
              "refsource": "BID",
              "tags": [
                "Third Party Advisory",
                "VDB Entry"
              ],
              "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/63657"
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "impact": {
        "baseMetricV2": {
          "cvssV2": {
            "accessComplexity": "MEDIUM",
            "accessVector": "NETWORK",
            "authentication": "NONE",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 5.8,
            "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL",
            "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL",
            "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N",
            "version": "2.0"
          },
          "exploitabilityScore": 8.6,
          "impactScore": 4.9,
          "obtainAllPrivilege": false,
          "obtainOtherPrivilege": false,
          "obtainUserPrivilege": false,
          "severity": "MEDIUM",
          "userInteractionRequired": false
        }
      },
      "lastModifiedDate": "2022-11-01T14:44Z",
      "publishedDate": "2013-10-11T22:55Z"
    }
  }
}


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