gsd-2021-21423
Vulnerability from gsd
Modified
2023-12-13 01:23
Details
`projen` is a project generation tool that synthesizes project configuration files such as `package.json`, `tsconfig.json`, `.gitignore`, GitHub Workflows, `eslint`, `jest`, and more, from a well-typed definition written in JavaScript. Users of projen's `NodeProject` project type (including any project type derived from it) include a `.github/workflows/rebuild-bot.yml` workflow that may allow any GitHub user to trigger execution of un-trusted code in the context of the "main" repository (as opposed to that of a fork). In some situations, such untrusted code may potentially be able to commit to the "main" repository. The rebuild-bot workflow is triggered by comments including `@projen rebuild` on pull-request to trigger a re-build of the projen project, and updating the pull request with the updated files. This workflow is triggered by an `issue_comment` event, and thus always executes with a `GITHUB_TOKEN` belonging to the repository into which the pull-request is made (this is in contrast with workflows triggered by `pull_request` events, which always execute with a `GITHUB_TOKEN` belonging to the repository from which the pull-request is made). Repositories that do not have branch protection configured on their default branch (typically `main` or `master`) could possibly allow an untrusted user to gain access to secrets configured on the repository (such as NPM tokens, etc). Branch protection prohibits this escalation, as the managed `GITHUB_TOKEN` would not be able to modify the contents of a protected branch and affected workflows must be defined on the default branch.
Aliases
Aliases
{ "GSD": { "alias": "CVE-2021-21423", "description": "`projen` is a project generation tool that synthesizes project configuration files such as `package.json`, `tsconfig.json`, `.gitignore`, GitHub Workflows, `eslint`, `jest`, and more, from a well-typed definition written in JavaScript. Users of projen\u0027s `NodeProject` project type (including any project type derived from it) include a `.github/workflows/rebuild-bot.yml` workflow that may allow any GitHub user to trigger execution of un-trusted code in the context of the \"main\" repository (as opposed to that of a fork). In some situations, such untrusted code may potentially be able to commit to the \"main\" repository. The rebuild-bot workflow is triggered by comments including `@projen rebuild` on pull-request to trigger a re-build of the projen project, and updating the pull request with the updated files. This workflow is triggered by an `issue_comment` event, and thus always executes with a `GITHUB_TOKEN` belonging to the repository into which the pull-request is made (this is in contrast with workflows triggered by `pull_request` events, which always execute with a `GITHUB_TOKEN` belonging to the repository from which the pull-request is made). Repositories that do not have branch protection configured on their default branch (typically `main` or `master`) could possibly allow an untrusted user to gain access to secrets configured on the repository (such as NPM tokens, etc). Branch protection prohibits this escalation, as the managed `GITHUB_TOKEN` would not be able to modify the contents of a protected branch and affected workflows must be defined on the default branch.", "id": "GSD-2021-21423" }, "gsd": { "metadata": { "exploitCode": "unknown", "remediation": "unknown", "reportConfidence": "confirmed", "type": "vulnerability" }, "osvSchema": { "aliases": [ "CVE-2021-21423" ], "details": "`projen` is a project generation tool that synthesizes project configuration files such as `package.json`, `tsconfig.json`, `.gitignore`, GitHub Workflows, `eslint`, `jest`, and more, from a well-typed definition written in JavaScript. Users of projen\u0027s `NodeProject` project type (including any project type derived from it) include a `.github/workflows/rebuild-bot.yml` workflow that may allow any GitHub user to trigger execution of un-trusted code in the context of the \"main\" repository (as opposed to that of a fork). In some situations, such untrusted code may potentially be able to commit to the \"main\" repository. The rebuild-bot workflow is triggered by comments including `@projen rebuild` on pull-request to trigger a re-build of the projen project, and updating the pull request with the updated files. This workflow is triggered by an `issue_comment` event, and thus always executes with a `GITHUB_TOKEN` belonging to the repository into which the pull-request is made (this is in contrast with workflows triggered by `pull_request` events, which always execute with a `GITHUB_TOKEN` belonging to the repository from which the pull-request is made). Repositories that do not have branch protection configured on their default branch (typically `main` or `master`) could possibly allow an untrusted user to gain access to secrets configured on the repository (such as NPM tokens, etc). Branch protection prohibits this escalation, as the managed `GITHUB_TOKEN` would not be able to modify the contents of a protected branch and affected workflows must be defined on the default branch.", "id": "GSD-2021-21423", "modified": "2023-12-13T01:23:10.514361Z", "schema_version": "1.4.0" } }, "namespaces": { "cve.org": { "CVE_data_meta": { "ASSIGNER": "security-advisories@github.com", "ID": "CVE-2021-21423", "STATE": "PUBLIC", "TITLE": "Exposure of Version-Control Repository to an Unauthorized Control Sphere in projen" }, "affects": { "vendor": { "vendor_data": [ { "product": { "product_data": [ { "product_name": "projen", "version": { "version_data": [ { "version_value": "\u003e= 0.6.0, \u003c 0.16.41" } ] } } ] }, "vendor_name": "projen" } ] } }, "data_format": "MITRE", "data_type": "CVE", "data_version": "4.0", "description": { "description_data": [ { "lang": "eng", "value": "`projen` is a project generation tool that synthesizes project configuration files such as `package.json`, `tsconfig.json`, `.gitignore`, GitHub Workflows, `eslint`, `jest`, and more, from a well-typed definition written in JavaScript. Users of projen\u0027s `NodeProject` project type (including any project type derived from it) include a `.github/workflows/rebuild-bot.yml` workflow that may allow any GitHub user to trigger execution of un-trusted code in the context of the \"main\" repository (as opposed to that of a fork). In some situations, such untrusted code may potentially be able to commit to the \"main\" repository. The rebuild-bot workflow is triggered by comments including `@projen rebuild` on pull-request to trigger a re-build of the projen project, and updating the pull request with the updated files. This workflow is triggered by an `issue_comment` event, and thus always executes with a `GITHUB_TOKEN` belonging to the repository into which the pull-request is made (this is in contrast with workflows triggered by `pull_request` events, which always execute with a `GITHUB_TOKEN` belonging to the repository from which the pull-request is made). Repositories that do not have branch protection configured on their default branch (typically `main` or `master`) could possibly allow an untrusted user to gain access to secrets configured on the repository (such as NPM tokens, etc). Branch protection prohibits this escalation, as the managed `GITHUB_TOKEN` would not be able to modify the contents of a protected branch and affected workflows must be defined on the default branch." } ] }, "generator": { "engine": "Vulnogram 0.0.9" }, "impact": { "cvss": { "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "baseScore": 6.8, "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N", "version": "3.1" } }, "problemtype": { "problemtype_data": [ { "description": [ { "lang": "eng", "value": "CWE-527: Exposure of Version-Control Repository to an Unauthorized Control Sphere" } ] } ] }, "references": { "reference_data": [ { "name": "https://github.com/projen/projen/security/advisories/GHSA-gg2g-m5wc-vccq", "refsource": "CONFIRM", "url": "https://github.com/projen/projen/security/advisories/GHSA-gg2g-m5wc-vccq" }, { "name": "https://github.com/projen/projen/commit/36030c6a4b1acd0054673322612e7c70e9446643", "refsource": "MISC", "url": "https://github.com/projen/projen/commit/36030c6a4b1acd0054673322612e7c70e9446643" }, { "name": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/projen", "refsource": "MISC", "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/projen" } ] }, "source": { "advisory": "GHSA-gg2g-m5wc-vccq", "discovery": "UNKNOWN" } }, "gitlab.com": { "advisories": [ { "affected_range": "\u003e=0.6.0 \u003c0.16.41", "affected_versions": "All versions starting from 0.6.0 before 0.16.41", "cvss_v2": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:N", "cvss_v3": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N", "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-1035", "CWE-527", "CWE-937" ], "date": "2021-04-15", "description": "Users of projen\u0027s `NodeProject` project type (including any project type derived from it) include a `.github/workflows/rebuild-bot.yml` workflow that may allow any GitHub user to trigger execution of un-trusted code in the context of the \"main\" repository (as opposed to that of a fork). In some situations, such untrusted code may potentially be able to commit to the \"main\" repository.", "fixed_versions": [ "0.16.41" ], "identifier": "CVE-2021-21423", "identifiers": [ "CVE-2021-21423", "GHSA-gg2g-m5wc-vccq" ], "not_impacted": "All versions before 0.6.0, all versions starting from 0.16.41", "package_slug": "npm/projen", "pubdate": "2021-04-06", "solution": "Upgrade to version 0.16.41 or above.", "title": "Exposure of CVS Repository to an Unauthorized Control Sphere", "urls": [ "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21423" ], "uuid": "f209183a-08fe-44e3-b97f-6553b9b96db4" } ] }, "nvd.nist.gov": { "configurations": { "CVE_data_version": "4.0", "nodes": [ { "children": [], "cpe_match": [ { "cpe23Uri": "cpe:2.3:a:projen_project:projen:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*", "cpe_name": [], "versionEndExcluding": "0.16.41", "versionStartIncluding": "0.6.0", "vulnerable": true } ], "operator": "OR" } ] }, "cve": { "CVE_data_meta": { "ASSIGNER": "security-advisories@github.com", "ID": "CVE-2021-21423" }, "data_format": "MITRE", "data_type": "CVE", "data_version": "4.0", "description": { "description_data": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "`projen` is a project generation tool that synthesizes project configuration files such as `package.json`, `tsconfig.json`, `.gitignore`, GitHub Workflows, `eslint`, `jest`, and more, from a well-typed definition written in JavaScript. Users of projen\u0027s `NodeProject` project type (including any project type derived from it) include a `.github/workflows/rebuild-bot.yml` workflow that may allow any GitHub user to trigger execution of un-trusted code in the context of the \"main\" repository (as opposed to that of a fork). In some situations, such untrusted code may potentially be able to commit to the \"main\" repository. The rebuild-bot workflow is triggered by comments including `@projen rebuild` on pull-request to trigger a re-build of the projen project, and updating the pull request with the updated files. This workflow is triggered by an `issue_comment` event, and thus always executes with a `GITHUB_TOKEN` belonging to the repository into which the pull-request is made (this is in contrast with workflows triggered by `pull_request` events, which always execute with a `GITHUB_TOKEN` belonging to the repository from which the pull-request is made). Repositories that do not have branch protection configured on their default branch (typically `main` or `master`) could possibly allow an untrusted user to gain access to secrets configured on the repository (such as NPM tokens, etc). Branch protection prohibits this escalation, as the managed `GITHUB_TOKEN` would not be able to modify the contents of a protected branch and affected workflows must be defined on the default branch." } ] }, "problemtype": { "problemtype_data": [ { "description": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "CWE-527" } ] } ] }, "references": { "reference_data": [ { "name": "https://github.com/projen/projen/security/advisories/GHSA-gg2g-m5wc-vccq", "refsource": "CONFIRM", "tags": [ "Mitigation", "Third Party Advisory" ], "url": "https://github.com/projen/projen/security/advisories/GHSA-gg2g-m5wc-vccq" }, { "name": "https://github.com/projen/projen/commit/36030c6a4b1acd0054673322612e7c70e9446643", "refsource": "MISC", "tags": [ "Patch", "Third Party Advisory" ], "url": "https://github.com/projen/projen/commit/36030c6a4b1acd0054673322612e7c70e9446643" }, { "name": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/projen", "refsource": "MISC", "tags": [ "Product", "Third Party Advisory" ], "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/projen" } ] } }, "impact": { "baseMetricV2": { "acInsufInfo": false, "cvssV2": { "accessComplexity": "LOW", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "SINGLE", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "baseScore": 5.5, "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:N", "version": "2.0" }, "exploitabilityScore": 8.0, "impactScore": 4.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false, "severity": "MEDIUM", "userInteractionRequired": false }, "baseMetricV3": { "cvssV3": { "attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N", "version": "3.1" }, "exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "impactScore": 5.2 } }, "lastModifiedDate": "2021-04-15T14:37Z", "publishedDate": "2021-04-06T19:15Z" } } }
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Sightings
Author | Source | Type | Date |
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Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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