gsd-2022-39248
Vulnerability from gsd
Modified
2023-12-13 01:19
Details
matrix-android-sdk2 is the Matrix SDK for Android. Prior to version 1.5.1, an attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver can construct messages that legitimately appear to have come from another person, without any indication such as a grey shield. Additionally, a sophisticated attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver could employ this vulnerability to perform a targeted attack in order to send fake to-device messages appearing to originate from another user. This can allow, for example, to inject the key backup secret during a self-verification, to make a targeted device start using a malicious key backup spoofed by the homeserver. matrix-android-sdk2 would then additionally sign such a key backup with its device key, spilling trust over to other devices trusting the matrix-android-sdk2 device. These attacks are possible due to a protocol confusion vulnerability that accepts to-device messages encrypted with Megolm instead of Olm. matrix-android-sdk2 version 1.5.1 has been modified to only accept Olm-encrypted to-device messages and to stop signing backups on a successful decryption. Out of caution, several other checks have been audited or added. This attack requires coordination between a malicious home server and an attacker, so those who trust their home servers do not need a workaround.
Aliases
Aliases
{ "GSD": { "alias": "CVE-2022-39248", "description": "matrix-android-sdk2 is the Matrix SDK for Android. Prior to version 1.5.1, an attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver can construct messages that legitimately appear to have come from another person, without any indication such as a grey shield. Additionally, a sophisticated attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver could employ this vulnerability to perform a targeted attack in order to send fake to-device messages appearing to originate from another user. This can allow, for example, to inject the key backup secret during a self-verification, to make a targeted device start using a malicious key backup spoofed by the homeserver. matrix-android-sdk2 would then additionally sign such a key backup with its device key, spilling trust over to other devices trusting the matrix-android-sdk2 device. These attacks are possible due to a protocol confusion vulnerability that accepts to-device messages encrypted with Megolm instead of Olm. matrix-android-sdk2 version 1.5.1 has been modified to only accept Olm-encrypted to-device messages and to stop signing backups on a successful decryption. Out of caution, several other checks have been audited or added. This attack requires coordination between a malicious home server and an attacker, so those who trust their home servers do not need a workaround.", "id": "GSD-2022-39248" }, "gsd": { "metadata": { "exploitCode": "unknown", "remediation": "unknown", "reportConfidence": "confirmed", "type": "vulnerability" }, "osvSchema": { "aliases": [ "CVE-2022-39248" ], "details": "matrix-android-sdk2 is the Matrix SDK for Android. Prior to version 1.5.1, an attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver can construct messages that legitimately appear to have come from another person, without any indication such as a grey shield. Additionally, a sophisticated attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver could employ this vulnerability to perform a targeted attack in order to send fake to-device messages appearing to originate from another user. This can allow, for example, to inject the key backup secret during a self-verification, to make a targeted device start using a malicious key backup spoofed by the homeserver. matrix-android-sdk2 would then additionally sign such a key backup with its device key, spilling trust over to other devices trusting the matrix-android-sdk2 device. These attacks are possible due to a protocol confusion vulnerability that accepts to-device messages encrypted with Megolm instead of Olm. matrix-android-sdk2 version 1.5.1 has been modified to only accept Olm-encrypted to-device messages and to stop signing backups on a successful decryption. Out of caution, several other checks have been audited or added. This attack requires coordination between a malicious home server and an attacker, so those who trust their home servers do not need a workaround.", "id": "GSD-2022-39248", "modified": "2023-12-13T01:19:20.692979Z", "schema_version": "1.4.0" } }, "namespaces": { "cve.org": { "CVE_data_meta": { "ASSIGNER": "security-advisories@github.com", "ID": "CVE-2022-39248", "STATE": "PUBLIC", "TITLE": "matrix-android-sdk2 vulnerable to Olm/Megolm protocol confusion" }, "affects": { "vendor": { "vendor_data": [ { "product": { "product_data": [ { "product_name": "matrix-android-sdk2", "version": { "version_data": [ { "version_value": "\u003c 1.5.1" } ] } } ] }, "vendor_name": "matrix-org" } ] } }, "data_format": "MITRE", "data_type": "CVE", "data_version": "4.0", "description": { "description_data": [ { "lang": "eng", "value": "matrix-android-sdk2 is the Matrix SDK for Android. Prior to version 1.5.1, an attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver can construct messages that legitimately appear to have come from another person, without any indication such as a grey shield. Additionally, a sophisticated attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver could employ this vulnerability to perform a targeted attack in order to send fake to-device messages appearing to originate from another user. This can allow, for example, to inject the key backup secret during a self-verification, to make a targeted device start using a malicious key backup spoofed by the homeserver. matrix-android-sdk2 would then additionally sign such a key backup with its device key, spilling trust over to other devices trusting the matrix-android-sdk2 device. These attacks are possible due to a protocol confusion vulnerability that accepts to-device messages encrypted with Megolm instead of Olm. matrix-android-sdk2 version 1.5.1 has been modified to only accept Olm-encrypted to-device messages and to stop signing backups on a successful decryption. Out of caution, several other checks have been audited or added. This attack requires coordination between a malicious home server and an attacker, so those who trust their home servers do not need a workaround." } ] }, "impact": { "cvss": { "attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.6, "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "NONE", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "scope": "CHANGED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N", "version": "3.1" } }, "problemtype": { "problemtype_data": [ { "description": [ { "lang": "eng", "value": "CWE-322: Key Exchange without Entity Authentication" } ] }, { "description": [ { "lang": "eng", "value": "CWE-287: Improper Authentication" } ] } ] }, "references": { "reference_data": [ { "name": "https://matrix.org/blog/2022/09/28/upgrade-now-to-address-encryption-vulns-in-matrix-sdks-and-clients", "refsource": "MISC", "url": "https://matrix.org/blog/2022/09/28/upgrade-now-to-address-encryption-vulns-in-matrix-sdks-and-clients" }, { "name": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-android-sdk2/commit/77df720a238d17308deab83ecaa37f7a4740a17e", "refsource": "MISC", "url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-android-sdk2/commit/77df720a238d17308deab83ecaa37f7a4740a17e" }, { "name": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-android-sdk2/releases/tag/v1.5.1", "refsource": "MISC", "url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-android-sdk2/releases/tag/v1.5.1" }, { "name": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-android-sdk2/security/advisories/GHSA-fpgf-pjjv-2qgm", "refsource": "CONFIRM", "url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-android-sdk2/security/advisories/GHSA-fpgf-pjjv-2qgm" } ] }, "source": { "advisory": "GHSA-fpgf-pjjv-2qgm", "discovery": "UNKNOWN" } }, "gitlab.com": { "advisories": [ { "affected_range": "(,1.4.36]", "affected_versions": "All versions up to 1.4.36", "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-1035", "CWE-287", "CWE-322", "CWE-937" ], "date": "2022-09-30", "description": "matrix-android-sdk2 is the Matrix SDK for Android. Prior to version 1.5.1, an attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver can construct messages that legitimately appear to have come from another person, without any indication such as a grey shield. Additionally, a sophisticated attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver could employ this vulnerability to perform a targeted attack in order to send fake to-device messages appearing to originate from another user. This can allow, for example, to inject the key backup secret during a self-verification, to make a targeted device start using a malicious key backup spoofed by the homeserver. matrix-android-sdk2 would then additionally sign such a key backup with its device key, spilling trust over to other devices trusting the matrix-android-sdk2 device. These attacks are possible due to a protocol confusion vulnerability that accepts to-device messages encrypted with Megolm instead of Olm. matrix-android-sdk2 version 1.5.1 has been modified to only accept Olm-encrypted to-device messages and to stop signing backups on a successful decryption. Out of caution, several other checks have been audited or added. This attack requires coordination between a malicious home server and an attacker, so those who trust their home servers do not need a workaround.", "fixed_versions": [ "1.5.1" ], "identifier": "CVE-2022-39248", "identifiers": [ "GHSA-fpgf-pjjv-2qgm", "CVE-2022-39248" ], "not_impacted": "All versions after 1.4.36", "package_slug": "maven/org.matrix.android/matrix-android-sdk2", "pubdate": "2022-09-30", "solution": "Upgrade to version 1.5.1 or above.", "title": "Key Exchange without Entity Authentication", "urls": [ "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-android-sdk2/security/advisories/GHSA-fpgf-pjjv-2qgm", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-39248", "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-android-sdk2/commit/77df720a238d17308deab83ecaa37f7a4740a17e", "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-android-sdk2/releases/tag/v1.5.1", "https://matrix.org/blog/2022/09/28/upgrade-now-to-address-encryption-vulns-in-matrix-sdks-and-clients", "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fpgf-pjjv-2qgm" ], "uuid": "93a2deaf-0a77-4ef1-9cb4-889c05fa9546" } ] }, "nvd.nist.gov": { "configurations": { "CVE_data_version": "4.0", "nodes": [ { "children": [], "cpe_match": [ { "cpe23Uri": "cpe:2.3:a:matrix:software_development_kit:*:*:*:*:*:android:*:*", "cpe_name": [], "versionEndExcluding": "1.5.1", "vulnerable": true } ], "operator": "OR" } ] }, "cve": { "CVE_data_meta": { "ASSIGNER": "security-advisories@github.com", "ID": "CVE-2022-39248" }, "data_format": "MITRE", "data_type": "CVE", "data_version": "4.0", "description": { "description_data": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "matrix-android-sdk2 is the Matrix SDK for Android. Prior to version 1.5.1, an attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver can construct messages that legitimately appear to have come from another person, without any indication such as a grey shield. Additionally, a sophisticated attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver could employ this vulnerability to perform a targeted attack in order to send fake to-device messages appearing to originate from another user. This can allow, for example, to inject the key backup secret during a self-verification, to make a targeted device start using a malicious key backup spoofed by the homeserver. matrix-android-sdk2 would then additionally sign such a key backup with its device key, spilling trust over to other devices trusting the matrix-android-sdk2 device. These attacks are possible due to a protocol confusion vulnerability that accepts to-device messages encrypted with Megolm instead of Olm. matrix-android-sdk2 version 1.5.1 has been modified to only accept Olm-encrypted to-device messages and to stop signing backups on a successful decryption. Out of caution, several other checks have been audited or added. This attack requires coordination between a malicious home server and an attacker, so those who trust their home servers do not need a workaround." } ] }, "problemtype": { "problemtype_data": [ { "description": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "CWE-287" }, { "lang": "en", "value": "CWE-322" } ] } ] }, "references": { "reference_data": [ { "name": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-android-sdk2/releases/tag/v1.5.1", "refsource": "MISC", "tags": [ "Release Notes", "Third Party Advisory" ], "url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-android-sdk2/releases/tag/v1.5.1" }, { "name": "https://matrix.org/blog/2022/09/28/upgrade-now-to-address-encryption-vulns-in-matrix-sdks-and-clients", "refsource": "MISC", "tags": [ "Vendor Advisory" ], "url": "https://matrix.org/blog/2022/09/28/upgrade-now-to-address-encryption-vulns-in-matrix-sdks-and-clients" }, { "name": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-android-sdk2/security/advisories/GHSA-fpgf-pjjv-2qgm", "refsource": "CONFIRM", "tags": [ "Patch", "Third Party Advisory" ], "url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-android-sdk2/security/advisories/GHSA-fpgf-pjjv-2qgm" }, { "name": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-android-sdk2/commit/77df720a238d17308deab83ecaa37f7a4740a17e", "refsource": "MISC", "tags": [ "Patch", "Third Party Advisory" ], "url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-android-sdk2/commit/77df720a238d17308deab83ecaa37f7a4740a17e" } ] } }, "impact": { "baseMetricV3": { "cvssV3": { "attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "baseScore": 7.5, "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "NONE", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N", "version": "3.1" }, "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "impactScore": 3.6 } }, "lastModifiedDate": "2022-09-30T16:24Z", "publishedDate": "2022-09-28T20:15Z" } } }
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Sightings
Author | Source | Type | Date |
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Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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