github - ghsa-mgvv-9p9g-3jv4

ghsa-mgvv-9p9g-3jv4

Vulnerability from github

Published

2024-07-18 15:26

Modified

2024-11-18 16:26

Severity ?

6.8 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L
8.6 (High) - CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Summary

gix-path can use a fake program files location

Details

Summary

When looking for Git for Windows so it can run it to report its paths, gix-path can be tricked into running another git.exe placed in an untrusted location by a limited user account.

Details

Windows permits limited user accounts without administrative privileges to create new directories in the root of the system drive. While gix-path first looks for git using a PATH search, in version 0.10.8 it also has a fallback strategy on Windows of checking two hard-coded paths intended to be the 64-bit and 32-bit Program Files directories:

https://github.com/Byron/gitoxide/blob/6cd8b4665bb7582f744c3244abaef812be39ec35/gix-path/src/env/git.rs#L9-L14

Existing functions, as well as the newly introduced exe_invocation function, were updated to make use of these alternative locations. This causes facilities in gix_path::env to directly execute git.exe in those locations, as well as to return its path or whatever configuration it reports to callers who rely on it.

Although unusual setups where the system drive is not C:, or even where Program Files directories have non-default names, are technically possible, the main problem arises on a 32-bit Windows system. Such a system has no C:\Program Files (x86) directory.

A limited user on a 32-bit Windows system can therefore create the C:\Program Files (x86) directory and populate it with arbitrary contents. Once a payload has been placed at the second of the two hard-coded paths in this way, other user accounts including administrators will execute it if they run an application that uses gix-path and do not have git in a PATH directory.

(While having git found in a PATH search prevents exploitation, merely having it installed in the default location under the real C:\Program Files directory does not. This is because the first hard-coded path's mingw64 component assumes a 64-bit installation.)

PoC

On a 32-bit (x86) Windows 10 system, with or without Git for Windows installed:

Create a limited user account in lusrmgr.msc or the Settings application.
Log in with that account and, using Windows Explorer or the mkdir command in PowerShell, create the directories C:\Program Files (x86)\Git\mingw32\bin. Although a limited user account cannot create regular files directly in C:\, it can create directories including one called Program Files (x86).
Place a copy of C:\Windows\system32\calc.exe in C:\Program Files (x86)\Git\mingw32\bin and rename it from calc.exe to git.exe. A different test payload may be used if preferred, and the executable need not already be signed or trusted.
Log out, and log in as a different user. This user may be an administrator.
If gitoxide is not installed, install it. If cargo install gitoxide is used for the installation, then the version of gix-path used in the installation can be observed.
The vulnerability is only exploitable if git cannot be found in a PATH search. So, in PowerShell, run gcm git to check if git is present in the PATH. If so, temporarily remove it. One way to do this is for the current shell only, by running $env:PATH to inspect it and by assigning $env:PATH = '...' where ... omits directories that contain git.
Some commands that can be run outside a repository, and most commands that can be run inside a repository, will run the Calculator or other payload at least once per invocation. Try gix clone foo or, inside of a repository, gix status, gix config, gix is-changed, gix fetch, ein t hours, or ein t query. This is not exhaustive; most other gix and ein commands that access existing repository state or a network resource likewise run the payload.

Impact

Only Windows is affected. Exploitation is unlikely except on a 32-bit system. In particular, running a 32-bit build on a 64-bit system is not a risk factor. Furthermore, the attacker must have a user account on the system, though it may be a relatively unprivileged account. Such a user can perform privilege escalation and execute code as another user, though it may be difficult to do so reliably because the targeted user account must run an application or service that uses gix-path and must not have git in its PATH.

The main exploitable configuration is one where Git for Windows has been installed but not added to PATH. This is one of the options in its installer, though not the default option. Alternatively, an affected program that sanitizes its PATH to remove seemingly nonessential directories could allow exploitation. But for the most part, if the target user has configured a PATH in which the real git.exe can be found, then this cannot be exploited.

This vulnerability is comparable to CVE-2022-24765, in which an uncontrolled path like C:\.git\config, which a limited user can create, could supply configuration used by other users. However, in this case, exploitation is slightly simpler because, rather than using configuration, an executable is directly run.

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "gix-path"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.10.8"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.10.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.10.8"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-40644"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-427"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-07-18T15:26:04Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nWhen looking for Git for Windows so it can run it to report its paths, `gix-path` can be tricked into running another `git.exe` placed in an untrusted location by a limited user account.\n\n### Details\n\nWindows permits limited user accounts without administrative privileges to create new directories in the root of the system drive. While `gix-path` first looks for `git` using a `PATH` search, in version 0.10.8 it also has a fallback strategy on Windows of checking two hard-coded paths intended to be the 64-bit and 32-bit Program Files directories:\n\nhttps://github.com/Byron/gitoxide/blob/6cd8b4665bb7582f744c3244abaef812be39ec35/gix-path/src/env/git.rs#L9-L14\n\nExisting functions, as well as the newly introduced `exe_invocation` function, were updated to make use of these alternative locations. This causes facilities in `gix_path::env` to directly execute `git.exe` in those locations, as well as to return its path or whatever configuration it reports to callers who rely on it.\n\nAlthough unusual setups where the system drive is not `C:`, or even where Program Files directories have non-default names, are technically possible, the main problem arises on a 32-bit Windows system. Such a system has no `C:\\Program Files (x86)` directory.\n\nA limited user on a 32-bit Windows system can therefore create the `C:\\Program Files (x86)` directory and populate it with arbitrary contents. Once a payload has been placed at the second of the two hard-coded paths in this way, other user accounts including administrators will execute it if they run an application that uses `gix-path` and do not have `git` in a `PATH` directory.\n\n(While having `git` found in a `PATH` search prevents exploitation, merely having it installed in the default location under the real `C:\\Program Files` directory does not. This is because the first hard-coded path\u0027s `mingw64` component assumes a 64-bit installation.)\n\n### PoC\n\nOn a 32-bit (x86) Windows 10 system, with or without Git for Windows installed:\n\n1. Create a limited user account in `lusrmgr.msc` or the Settings application.\n2. Log in with that account and, using Windows Explorer or the `mkdir` command in PowerShell, create the directories `C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Git\\mingw32\\bin`. Although a limited user account cannot create regular files directly in `C:\\`, it can create directories including one called `Program Files (x86)`.\n3. Place a copy of `C:\\Windows\\system32\\calc.exe` in `C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Git\\mingw32\\bin` and rename it from `calc.exe` to `git.exe`. A different test payload may be used if preferred, and the executable need not already be signed or trusted.\n4. Log out, and log in as a different user. This user may be an administrator.\n5. If `gitoxide` is not installed, install it. If `cargo install gitoxide` is used for the installation, then the version of `gix-path` used in the installation can be observed.\n6. The vulnerability is only exploitable if `git` cannot be found in a `PATH` search. So, in PowerShell, run `gcm git` to check if `git` is present in the `PATH`. If so, temporarily remove it. One way to do this is for the current shell only, by running `$env:PATH` to inspect it and by assigning `$env:PATH = \u0027...\u0027` where `...` omits directories that contain `git`.\n7. Some commands that can be run outside a repository, and most commands that can be run inside a repository, will run the Calculator or other payload at least once per invocation. Try `gix clone foo` or, inside of a repository, `gix status`, `gix config`, `gix is-changed`, `gix fetch`, `ein t hours`, or `ein t query`. This is not exhaustive; most other `gix` and `ein` commands that access existing repository state or a network resource likewise run the payload.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly Windows is affected. Exploitation is unlikely except on a 32-bit system. In particular, running a 32-bit build on a 64-bit system is not a risk factor. Furthermore, the attacker must have a user account on the system, though it may be a relatively unprivileged account. Such a user can perform privilege escalation and execute code as another user, though it may be difficult to do so reliably because the targeted user account must run an application or service that uses `gix-path` and must not have `git` in its `PATH`.\n\nThe main exploitable configuration is one where Git for Windows has been installed but not added to `PATH`. This is one of the options in its installer, though not the default option. Alternatively, an affected program that sanitizes its `PATH` to remove seemingly nonessential directories could allow exploitation. But for the most part, if the target user has configured a `PATH` in which the real `git.exe` can be found, then this cannot be exploited.\n\nThis vulnerability is comparable to [CVE-2022-24765](https://github.com/git-for-windows/git/security/advisories/GHSA-vw2c-22j4-2fh2), in which an uncontrolled path like `C:\\.git\\config`, which a limited user can create, could supply configuration used by other users. However, in this case, exploitation is slightly simpler because, rather than using configuration, an executable is directly run.",
  "id": "GHSA-mgvv-9p9g-3jv4",
  "modified": "2024-11-18T16:26:53Z",
  "published": "2024-07-18T15:26:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Byron/gitoxide/security/advisories/GHSA-mgvv-9p9g-3jv4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/git-for-windows/git/security/advisories/GHSA-vw2c-22j4-2fh2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Byron/gitoxide"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Byron/gitoxide/blob/6cd8b4665bb7582f744c3244abaef812be39ec35/gix-path/src/env/git.rs#L9-L14"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "gix-path can use a fake program files location"
}

CVE-2024-40644 (GCVE-0-2024-40644)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5

Published

2024-07-18 16:56

Modified

2024-08-02 04:33

Severity ?

6.8 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L

CWE

CWE-345 - Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity

Summary

gitoxide An idiomatic, lean, fast & safe pure Rust implementation of Git. `gix-path` can be tricked into running another `git.exe` placed in an untrusted location by a limited user account on Windows systems. Windows permits limited user accounts without administrative privileges to create new directories in the root of the system drive. While `gix-path` first looks for `git` using a `PATH` search, in version 0.10.8 it also has a fallback strategy on Windows of checking two hard-coded paths intended to be the 64-bit and 32-bit Program Files directories. Existing functions, as well as the newly introduced `exe_invocation` function, were updated to make use of these alternative locations. This causes facilities in `gix_path::env` to directly execute `git.exe` in those locations, as well as to return its path or whatever configuration it reports to callers who rely on it. Although unusual setups where the system drive is not `C:`, or even where Program Files directories have non-default names, are technically possible, the main problem arises on a 32-bit Windows system. Such a system has no `C:\Program Files (x86)` directory. A limited user on a 32-bit Windows system can therefore create the `C:\Program Files (x86)` directory and populate it with arbitrary contents. Once a payload has been placed at the second of the two hard-coded paths in this way, other user accounts including administrators will execute it if they run an application that uses `gix-path` and do not have `git` in a `PATH` directory. (While having `git` found in a `PATH` search prevents exploitation, merely having it installed in the default location under the real `C:\Program Files` directory does not. This is because the first hard-coded path's `mingw64` component assumes a 64-bit installation.). Only Windows is affected. Exploitation is unlikely except on a 32-bit system. In particular, running a 32-bit build on a 64-bit system is not a risk factor. Furthermore, the attacker must have a user account on the system, though it may be a relatively unprivileged account. Such a user can perform privilege escalation and execute code as another user, though it may be difficult to do so reliably because the targeted user account must run an application or service that uses `gix-path` and must not have `git` in its `PATH`. The main exploitable configuration is one where Git for Windows has been installed but not added to `PATH`. This is one of the options in its installer, though not the default option. Alternatively, an affected program that sanitizes its `PATH` to remove seemingly nonessential directories could allow exploitation. But for the most part, if the target user has configured a `PATH` in which the real `git.exe` can be found, then this cannot be exploited. This issue has been addressed in release version 0.10.9 and all users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

References

►

URL

Tags

	https://github.com/Byron/gitoxide/security/advisories/GHSA-mgvv-9p9g-3jv4	x_refsource_CONFIRM
	https://github.com/Byron/gitoxide/commit/15235bf7968042da0493d431bbc955d6f9f54188	x_refsource_MISC
	https://github.com/Byron/gitoxide/blob/6cd8b4665bb7582f744c3244abaef812be39ec35/gix-path/src/env/git.rs#L9-L14	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version
	Byron	gitoxide	Version: < 0.10.9

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
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      {
        "affected": [
          {
            "cpes": [
              "cpe:2.3:a:byron:gitoxide:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
            ],
            "defaultStatus": "unknown",
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            "vendor": "byron",
            "versions": [
              {
                "lessThan": "0.10.9",
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                "version": "0",
                "versionType": "custom"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2024-40644",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2024-07-18T19:34:39.266104Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
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            }
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        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2024-07-18T19:36:08.077Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      },
      {
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2024-08-02T04:33:11.977Z",
          "orgId": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
          "shortName": "CVE"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "name": "https://github.com/Byron/gitoxide/security/advisories/GHSA-mgvv-9p9g-3jv4",
            "tags": [
              "x_refsource_CONFIRM",
              "x_transferred"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/Byron/gitoxide/security/advisories/GHSA-mgvv-9p9g-3jv4"
          },
          {
            "name": "https://github.com/Byron/gitoxide/commit/15235bf7968042da0493d431bbc955d6f9f54188",
            "tags": [
              "x_refsource_MISC",
              "x_transferred"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/Byron/gitoxide/commit/15235bf7968042da0493d431bbc955d6f9f54188"
          },
          {
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            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/Byron/gitoxide/blob/6cd8b4665bb7582f744c3244abaef812be39ec35/gix-path/src/env/git.rs#L9-L14"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CVE Program Container"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "gitoxide",
          "vendor": "Byron",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 0.10.9"
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          "lang": "en",
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        }
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            "attackVector": "LOCAL",
            "availabilityImpact": "LOW",
            "baseScore": 6.8,
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            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-345",
              "description": "CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2024-07-18T16:56:35.915Z",
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      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/Byron/gitoxide/security/advisories/GHSA-mgvv-9p9g-3jv4",
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          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/Byron/gitoxide/security/advisories/GHSA-mgvv-9p9g-3jv4"
        },
        {
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        {
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            "x_refsource_MISC"
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      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-mgvv-9p9g-3jv4",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "gitoxide\u0027s gix-path can use a fake program files location"
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  },
  "cveMetadata": {
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    "datePublished": "2024-07-18T16:56:35.915Z",
    "dateReserved": "2024-07-08T16:13:15.512Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2024-08-02T04:33:11.977Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.1"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.

Action not permitted

ghsa-mgvv-9p9g-3jv4

Vulnerability from github

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

CVE-2024-40644 (GCVE-0-2024-40644)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature